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1974

CHAPTER

XVI

OF MORE THINGS

This part of our story will include the World War II years.

Much that we write about will have nothing to do with the war; we
have already anticipated certain developments; there is a dearth

of information about some of the things that happened, and memories
are somewhat confused by the very complexity of the events of those

times.

However, let us proceed.

Nothing much happened in the first few months of 1939, other
than things that we have already mentioned.

remained unchanged for the year.

The price of newsprint

Announcements were made early in

November, 1938, almost at the same time, by International and Great
Northern, the former extending its $50 New York price, freight allowed

the latter holding to its $48 price, through the usual discounts on

multiple-year contracts at higher figures.

Most of the Canadian

industry followed I.P.’s lead; most of the United States mills
followed Great Northern.

It will be remembered that the Canadian mills’ price of $50

established as of January 1, 1938, had represented a jump of $7.50

a ton, a very large figure in comparison with the modest increases

of the previous two years.

Shortly after this price took effect,

the Justice Department, at the instigation of one or more publishers,

had sicced the Federal Trade Commission onto the newsprint industry
again.

This investigation developed some odd angles, and we have

to go back a little to develop them.
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On March 24, 1938, the F.T.C. had sent a questionnaire to

United States manufacturers.

The Company’s answer took the Audit

ing Department more than a month to prepare.

At the same time,

another questionnaire was sent, apparently to a single publisher, a

member of the American Newspaper Publishers' Association.

This

brought forth from the A.N.P.A., on April 8th, their Bulletin No.
6818 "B" Special, which began with the head ’’PUBLISHERS NOT OBLIGED
TO SUPPLY MATERIAL SOUGHT IN FISHING EXPEDITIONS OF GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES”; listed the questions asked, and commented in part:

"But one glance at this request is sufficient to in

dicate not only the amount of work: required... but the impro
priety of the request itself.... The members are under no
legal obligation to answer the questionnaire.

This inquiry is typical of those which emanate from

many bureaus and agencies of the government....Counsel
advises that publishers refer them to their attorneys
before compliance in whole or in part.... Fishing expedi

tions may be resisted successfully, if the inquisitors are
delayed until the rights of the parties are determined.

Partial compliance with illegal requests may result, how

ever, in opening the door and making it difficult later
to eject the intruders.”
In view of what bad gone on in the past, this attitude was

so hypocritical that it incurred the wrath of the President of
the International Brotherhood of Paper Makers, an organization
hitherto not exactly a bosom pal of the newsprint manufacturers.
He put out a bulletin of bis own, printing the publishers’ special
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memo in toto, and under it the head ’’BEHIND THE SCENES THE A.N.P.A.

CARRIES ON THIS WRECKING ACTIVITY”; went on to say that the Fed

eral Trade Commission had undertaken to investigate

the newsprint

price increase at the request of the publishers; that in order to
be fair it bad tried to obtain complete information, and that

”we suddenly discover the A.N.P.A. in the act of circu
lating a bulletin to members, advising them that they are

not required to furnish material for a government ’fishing

expedition’ .......... Publishers apparently denounce the high
cost of newsprint, and they offer it as an excuse for low

wages, for ’economy dismissals' and for higher circulation

and advertising rates.
It is recalled that it was finally determined, after

many American mills had discontinued the manufacture of

newsprint, and more than 50% of the Canadian mills were

in the hands of receivers.... that prices should be advanced.
Therefore in 1937 a slight advance was made in the price of

newsprint, and the 1938 price was boosted from $42.50 to $50

per ton by every company except the Great Northern.

Loud

cries of anguish were heard from the organized publishers
over this increase, and they....petitioned the Federal

Trade Commission for the thorough investigation which they
now sabotage and wreck.

The publishers had been able to inveigle at least two

locals....of the Typographical Union to adopt resolutions
demanding the investigation.

These unions can now be well

ashamed for having been used as stooges....
It is the opinion of the International Brotherhood
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Paper Makers that the manufacturers of newsprint would
gladly welcome any complete or thorough investigation of
prices.

It is believed that such an investigation would

prove that publishers themselves have wrecked the industry
through just such tactics as they now use, and that it would
be found that newsprint prices are not yet sufficiently high

enough. . . . ”
The deletions, like those which we have made in quotations in
other parts of our story, do not change the sense.

The A.N.P.A.

Bulletin was very effective with its members, as we will see.

If

the Paper Makers’ outburst had any effect on the situation it was
not noticeable, but it gave encouragement to the newsprint manu
facturers, and was a sign of the growing recognition of the common

interest of labor and management in the welfare of the industry.

This persisted, at least as far as Great Northern was concerned,
for a good many years.

On April 28th, Sheldon Wardwell wrote Edwin Bechtel a letter

in which he stated that the F.T.C. announcement had indicated
that it was to look into ’’combinations”, but that it had turned

also to possible violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, and that

this raised some questions about the price zoning system, saying:
”As the Company’s action has been almost too independent, there
should not be much concern....but the anti-basing-point theories

of the Commission trouble me quite a little in spite of my opinion
that there is no violation.”

Early in June, representatives of the F.T.C. interviewed
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officers of the Company and went through the files of the Sales

Department, taking copies of more than one hundred letters going

back to 1931.

They also, of course, went through the files of

others, and an examination of the correspondence of at least one
company drew the comment:

"such letters as refer to the G.N.P....

show very clearly from 1934 on that no one knew what the G.N.P.

was going to do”.

The writer does not remember any hearings,

and does not recall that anyone except Sheldon Wardwell, who was
a chronic worrier, had any real concern about this inquiry. Great

Northern’s management being of the opinion that its historically

independent stance put it in a special position.
The investigation was a dud.

The terms of reference under

which it was conducted went back to a 1917 consent decree against
several firms for price fixing -- there were so many investigations

of the newsprint industry that it has been difficult to keep track
of them -- and the investigators had discovered what anyone could
have told them before they began, that very few of the United States

mills of 1917 were still in the newsprint business, and that where
as in that year they had made 75 percent of domestic consumption,

they now made only about 25 percent.

The Federal Trade Commission report was made to the Department
of Justice in January, 1939, and Attorney General Thurman Arnold’s
office issued a statement a little later, admitting in effect that

the inquiry had been undertaken on a mistaken premise, but, that
because certain evidence had been uncovered, it would be continued

in two programs; a further general investigation, and a special
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inquiry into the situation on the West Coast.

Sheldon Wardwell wrote:

As to the former,

“I doubt that they have anything on United

States companies, and certainly nothing on the G.N.P., yet you never

can tell what they may try to do.”

They did not do much of anything

as regards the Eastern mills, the only result being that Interna

tional dissolved its sales subsidiary, incorporated in the United
States, and re-established it in Canada, removing it from U.S.

legal jurisdiction, a move which as the writer recalls, was follow

ed by some other Canadian producers having the same kind of sales
subsidiary, division or agency.

In June, 1939, at the beginning of this new witch-hunt, a
questionnaire was sent out by the F.T.C. to a long list of pub

lishers.

Following the advice of the A.N.P.A., many of them did

not answer, and some of them took the trouble of expressing their
opinion of it to the Company.

Like this, to salesman John Dwyer

in New York:

’’Dear John:
If the government could put me in jail for

what I think about some of its fool ideas, you

would never see me at large again. I have just
sent in this paper’s contribution to Thurman

Arnold’s inquiry as to the general iniquity of
the newsprint makers....I am sending you a copy

of the fourth question and my reply thereto.
I hope he sends me a summons to appear at a hear

ing in Washington.

If he does, I’ll stop by for

you on the way.
Question 4.

From what manufacturers, jobbers or

paper merchants have you bought
newsprint since January 1, 1936?
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If possible please specify as to year.

Answer.

Great Northern Paper Co. exclusively....

We have purchased all our paper from the

Great Northern since 1913 or 1914, at

the prevailing market price and under
prevailing conditions as to contract
renewals.

We have neither been favored

nor discriminated against.

We so highly

regard the Great Northern that we would
take their spoken word as quickly as their

written bond in the matter of newsprint

service.”
From another to John Grissinger in Philadelphia:

"Dear Mr. Grissinger:
...Until I am subpoenaed with twenty-seven subpoenas

I will pay no attention to this request....”

And one more:
”My dear Caspar:

I presume you had copies of the Government in
As I do not tell Dun &

quiries which I enclose.

Bradstreet any of my business, why should I tell

Uncle Snoopy?

I’ve already lost much of the respect

I formerly had for the aforesaid organization.

Hitler must be laughing up bis sleeve at us -and why not?

He is at least honest about it -- and

I think he should be shot.

It would help save civili

zation .

The world has seen nothing as yet.
tators time.
Yours in disgust”
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This letter was written well before the German blitzkrieg

against Poland in September 1939.

On the West Coast, seven companies, most of which bad mills

or interest in mills on both sides of the border, were
later in the year for price-fixing.

indicted

The proceedings dragged along

until 1941, when some or all of them pleaded ’’nolo contendere”
and paid nominal fines.

The whole business was a waste of time.

Early in 1939, the salary of the Vice-President and Manager
of Manufacture was raised to $20,000 -- we give these figures

on the officers’ salaries to show how relatively small they were

even for those times; in March $100,000 more or less was appro
priated to begin to put larger motors on the four-foot grinders at

Millinocket; in April $500,000 was voted to carry on the Mattaceunk

job to September 1st; in May another $180,000 was provided to pur
chase and install No. 3 unit, and in September, $550,000 was appro
priated to complete

the project, the estimated total cost being

given to the Directors at this time as $2,630,000.

This may not

have included the fourth unit, as there was another appropriation

for that later.

In the same month, the Company gave the town of

Millinocket 60,000 square feet of land in Block 58 for a new armory

in exchange for Lots 19 and 20 in Block 20, where the old armory

stood.

About the same time, it donated 7,500 square feet of land

in Lots 30, 31 and 32 on Aroostook Avenue on which to build a new

fire and police station.

An interesting side-light on this was

that William A. Whitcomb interested himself in the design of the

proposed new building, and sent the writer to inspect and report
on a new station of about the same size and for the same purposes,
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recently constructed on Nantucket Island, which he had heard was
the last word and the echo.

The writer found the layout and the

pseudo-colonial architecture unsuitable, in his opinion, for Milli
nocket, but developed a preliminary plan incorporating some of its
features, which was worked over into the building erected.

Another

payment of $44,580 was received from the Central Maine Power Company
for another piece of Great Northern’s interest in the Brassua Stor

age.

This was due to an increase in C.M.P.’s developed head on the

Kennebec River, but the writer does not recall what the develop

ment may have been that brought this about.

For the year 1939, the Company produced an amount of newsprint
that figured out to 105.6 percent of capacity, using an average of

just under 9 percent sulphite for safe running.

This compared

with about 7 percent in 1937 and 5-1/2 percent in 1938.

These two

years represented the low point in the Company’s use of long fibre.

Both had been excellent water years, allowing more power to be used
per ton of groundwood, with resulting better quality pulp.

When

the writer began working for Great Northern, the furnish to the

machines averaged about 23 percent sulphite.

This had been worked

down to 19 percent by 1929, when the Millinocket machine room was

rebuilt, at which time many other mills were still using around 25
percent.

In the next ten years, it had gradually been reduced to

the 9 percent figure.

In 1937, however, the tremendous demand had

created a situation where the quality of the newsprint produced was

of secondary importance, while low price had kept the emphasis on

low cost.

In view of the slump in business in 1938, low cost had

been the prime need, regardless of the effect on quality.

Under

these pressures, the percentage of long-fibre pulp in the paper had
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been driven to further unprecedented lows — for the year 1938
the East Millinocket mill averaged only 4.3 percent, and as we

have said elsewhere, actually made newsprint for a few months

using no long fibre at all.

While 1939 was also a good water

year, the heat was on production, and for safer running, the lid

was lifted on sulphite.

However, 9 percent was still a low figure,

and one which, at the time, it seemed possible to maintain.

We

have given some importance to this matter here, because it has a

bearing on what follows.
The second unit at the Mattaceunk station went into operation

on November 7, 1939, and on November 8th the Directors authorized

the expenditure of $350,000 to rebuild the old No. 1 paper machine
at the Millinocket mill to increase its capacity by 25 tons per day.
This was a decision which in its final consequences may have been

one of the most important in the history of the Company.

It will be recalled that in the middle 1920’s the original
Nos. 7 and 8 machines at Millinocket, making at that time about
50 tons of paper per day each, had been replaced with new machines
of practically the same width, but which, running at higher speed,

could average about 75 tons.

Following this installation came a

decision to replace the six remaining old ’’two-roll” machines with
four wide ”three-roll” units.

This was based upon studies of the

installation of six 2-roll vs. four 3-roll machines made beginning
back in 1927 and put into formal shape early in 1929 by Roy Weldon,

working with the operating people.

The increase in production --

150 tons per day — would have been the same in either case.

The

difference in the cost of installation, including the rebuilding
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of the machine room, which would be required in any event;
auxilliary equipment, spare parts and a new roll grinder if the

wide units were chosen, estimated at $3,436,000 for six 2-roll
and $3,659,000 for four 3-roll units, was small.

More production

would be lost while installing the large machines than while

putting in the smaller ones, but the cost per ton of making

paper on the former was estimated to be marginally lower, the
saving coming almost entirely in labor.

That was the deciding

factor, because the equipment was going to make a lot of tons,
and the machine room, as we have noted, was rebuilt,between

1929 and 1932, to house four 234” machines.
It is interesting to note that in these studies no weight was

given to really high speed operation.

Fifteen years before, in

Garret Schenck’s time, Great Northern had been the leader in the

promotion of high-speed, high-production equipment.

It had ob

tained a proposal on a 236” machine as far back as 1919, and it
had been only eight years since it had been the first to break

1000 feet per minute, but the 1929 report contains the statement:
"It is generally agreed within our organization that the most de

sirable speed for economical operating is around 900 feet per minute."
Looking back from this point in time, this conclusion seems in
credibly short-sighted, and it did not hold up, but there was a

reason for it, which we will go into shortly.
While the arrival of the depression removed the immediate

need for increased paper production, and the decision to post

pone replacement of the paper machines and start putting the money
available for capital improvements into the Millinocket grinder
room, other cost-saving jobs and every repair that could be capital
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ized, was deliberate, the diversion of funds into the power
developments was dictated by necessity, and as we have seen,

the surge in demand following the lean years caught the Company
with its capacity down.

Between these two points some things

had happened which determined the path it followed.

The plan of beginning to replace the Millinocket machines

had not been dropped abruptly in 1930.

Studies of the operation

of the new wide machines at Bucksport were made shortly after

they started up.

A new quotation was obtained from Rice Barton

on a 234” machine in 1931, and it may be of interest to note
that the price of a machine of this width at that time, exclusive

of the drive, winder and auxilliary equipment, was $310,000, down
from $350,000 quoted in 1929.

The Dalhousie machines, which were

running at about 1,200 feet in 1931 were studied, and in 1932 new
quotations on a wide machine, a General Electric drive, a Cameron
winder and various auxilliaries were obtained.

Far-sighted William

0. McKay was most anxious to proceed, in spite of business condi
tions, and in a way because of them, and was using all his powers

of persuasion to pry loose some more money and get someth ing going.
On January 26, 1933, he wrote several letters to Frank Bowler, ask

ing him to re-examine the costs involved in installing a 234” machine,
offering such suggestions as using an old broke beater available at
East Millinocket, leaving out the economizers, and even using ex

pedients like a half-length crane which could be set on temporary
steel to serve one machine and later be lengthened to the width of
the room.

At the same time, with every machinery manufacturer

starving for business, requests for revised quotations were put

out again to the suppliers of auxilliary equipment.
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27th, he sent out a joint letter to Frank Bowler and Bob Hume,
the Superintendent of the Millinocket mill:

’’During the past week we have been giving considerable
thought to the installation of a wide machine at Millinocket,

and the middle of the week Mr. Barton was here and Mr. Whit

comb and the writer had quite a long discussion of the matter

with him.'
We advised him that there would have to be a material
reduction in the price of all equipment in comparison with

the figures previously furnished if we were to attempt to
install a wide machine during the present year.

Mr. Whit

comb feels that we could lighten up many parts of the pro

posed machine without seriously interfering with its opera
tion .

In a general way, he says take a machine similar to No. 7

and simply lengthen it out to the three-roll width.

There

probably would be some difficulties in following this idea

out to the letter, but on the other hand the scheme is
worthy of most serious consideration.......... ”

This was the kind of merciless bargaining which we have des
cribed in the chapter on the Boston office in the depression years.

Rice Barton had already come down to $298,000 for the machine in
the 1932 round, and now cut again to $276,000.

The prices on most

of the auxilliaries were also lowered, and Frank Bowler figured an
$8,000 saving in installation cost.

While all this was being con

sidered, the problem of low water shifted the emphasis to power

needs, and any action on a new machine had to be put aside for the
North Twin project.
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By the time this station was on the line, William 0. McKay

was hammering away again at the proposition of new paper machine
equipment for Millinocket, but now he faced a new obstacle, to wit,
William A. Whitcomb’s reversion to the belief that good paper could

not be made economically on wide machines.

This question had pretty

well been put to rest in the 1929 and later studies, as far as
William 0. McKay was concerned, but the President had never been

fully convinced.

His reasoning went something like this.

phite pulp cost a lot more than groundwood.

Sul

The Company had been

able to survive and even make money by getting its long fibre con
tent down,

and besides, a low-sulphite sheet, even if it was al

ways near the bottom of the rolls per break list in the pressrooms,

had better printability --witness the fact that year after year
the honors in competition for quality of printing had been taken by

daily newspapers using Great Northern newsprint.

The ability to

use low sulphite depended upon good groundwood and good formation,
along with moderate speed, long fibre percentage being considered
to go up in direct ratio to the latter, for safe running.

The

Company made good groundwood, at least when it had enough power,

but formation depended upon the way the stock got onto the wire and
what happened to it after it got there.

In the old days, it had

been possible to aid formation by shaking the wire, in a mechanical
approximation of the old method used in making paper by hand.

The

rule of thumb was one shake stroke per foot of speed, and as speeds

had gone up, shakes had become less and less effective, because the
old eccentric-driven heads could not take it, so shakes were no

longer much used, but William A. Whitcomb was convinced that they
should be, and new straight-line heads had been developed which

could get up to 1,000 strokes per minute, more or less.
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it was inconceivable to him, as an engineer, in view of an ex

perience which we will speak of later, that the huge mass of a
3-roll forming section could be shaken at this rate.

Ergo, the

way to make good newsprint economically was to run it at reason

able speed on a fourdrinier that could be shaken, which meant a

two-roll machine and an arbitrary speed of 900 to 1000 feet per

minute.
By 1936, he had pretty much made up his mind that this was

the course that should be taken, although he listened attentive

ly to arguments for wide machines, and there were many.

However,

the small cost advantage in favor of the large units indicated
by the figures, assuming that either size would run at the same

speed, seemed to him to be tenuous, and did not justify what he
considered to be the risk of going from the known to the uncertain.

He had some support from Frank Bowler and some of the mill people
for other reasons; for instance that if one of the big machines

went down

there would be more loss of production than if a smaller

unit quit; that installation of a small machine could be accomplish

ed with far less disruption of operations, and even that it would
be almost imperative to use anti-friction bearings on the dryers

of a wide machine because of the terrific starting load, but that

nobody had developed a satisfactory bearing -- a fallacy based on
troubles with some early installations.

The proponents of the wide

machine, William 0. McKay, Roy Weldon and Creighton Stanwood,
found this low sulphite and moderate speed premise bard to dispute,

although they did not buy the theory on the shake, and what was

’’moderate” speed was relative; the proposed optimum 900 feet al
ready having been forgotten in the need for more production; and
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had to depend upon the figures, which they felt they could sustain

or even better, and the gut feeling that ’’fifty million Frenchmen
can’t be wrong.”

Everybody was going to the wide units.

did not impress William A. Whitcomb a bit.

follow anyone just to be fashionable.

This

Great Northern did not

There was a little thought,

up to that time, of going beyond the projected production increase

of 150 tons per day, which would make Millinocket an 800-ton mill,
because there was not power enough in sight for even this tonnage,

to say nothing of the large expenditure that would be required in
the pulp mills.

The greater potential of wide machines for in

creased production in the future, a big point in their favor, was

therefore not much of a factor.

Neither were Bob Hume’s pleas

for improvements in the sulphite mill which would allow him to
make better pulp, so that less of it would have to be used.
The two propositions had been argued over and over, without

any real heat, William A. Whitcomb not openly ruling out the wide

machines, William 0. McKay recognizing the merits of the alterna
tive.

Early in 1936, visits were made to four mills, Maine Sea

board at Bucksport, Anglo-Canadian at Quebec City, International

at Dalhousie, N.B. and Mersey at Liverpool, N.S., all having wide
machines running at between 1175 and 1275 feet.

All claimed that

they could make as good paper on these as they could on narrow

machines, but all were using between 18 and 22 percent sulphite
against Great Northern’s 9 percent.

Along about this time the

writer was sent out to inspect the manufacturing facilities of three
major newsprint machine builders, Bagley & Sewall, Pusey & Jones
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and Rice Barton.

Neither Beloit Iron Works nor Black-Clawson

bad much of any experience with newsprint at that time.

His

report ranked Bagley & Sewall high on quality of machine work;
Pusey & Jones high on design for strength, and Rice Barton
pretty good all around.

The Minton vacuum dryer in use at one

of the Price Bros, mills was also investigated, but it was con
cluded that it was not practical.

New bids were then again obtained all around -- the width of
the proposed 3-roll machine being reduced to 228” on account of

the changes in newsprint roll sizes which we have noted -- and
a complete new study of the 2-roll vs. 3-roll machine proposi
tion was made by Roy Weldon.

This wound up strongly recommend

ing the wide machines, to run at around 1,000 feet per minute

initially, the investment figuring out about the same in either
case, and the saving in cost per ton about twice that estimated in
It did raise the problem of additional power, which would

1929.

have to be found somewhere, and proposed several schemes for par

tial new installations until the power could be obtained, all of
which favored the 3-roll units, but with a barely discernible

saving per ton.

This put the ’’chicken or egg” problem in focus,

and as it did not make much sense to put a lot of money into new
production equipment that could not increase production, the manage
ment addressed itself to the power problem, the replacement of

paper machines being shelved until the Mattaceunk project was com-

ple ted.
All this discussion about paper machines gave William A. Whit

comb, who was always thinking about new ways to do things, some
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ideas, and the delays had given him the opportunity to try them
out.

Back in 1934, he had revived the concept of a cylinder former

to replace the fourdrinier, and this was tried out on the experi

mental machine, a piece of equipment which we have not previously
mentioned, but which had been installed at Millinocket for the use

of the Bureau and made a sheet about two feet wide.

It was not

one of his better ideas, and we will not waste much time on it,

although the Bureau boys did.

The fourdrinier was removed from

the machine and a bronze suction roll, with round perforations and
no suction box, the whole roll being under vacuum, was installed

in a conventional vat.

A fourdrinier wire ran around this, over

a couple of flat boxes, and returned over the top of the dryer

side of the vat, so that it wrapped almost the whole suction roll.
The result was predictable -- a beautiful polka-dot formation,
and flocking where the wire left the stock.

The roll was taken

out and a square countersink was cut at each hole, leaving only
about 1/16" of land between holes.

This made square polka-dots,

and did nothing to improve the flocking.

The suction roll made

an odd noise, giving the little machine its nickname -- the "hornet" .

The Bureau played with it off and on for two years or more, trying

one thing and another, with no success, and the equipment was re
moved in 1938.

In 1937, after it had been decided to postpone any new machine

installation, be began to bear down on formation.

In this year,

shaking fourdriniers were put on the relatively new Nos. 7 and 8
machines at Millinocket, the wires being lengthened in the process.
The writer does not recall the ratio of shake frequency to machine

speed, but he knows it was nowhere near the desired parity.

How

ever, some improvement in formation and finish resulted -- enough to
strengthen William A. Whitcomb's opinion, anyway.
Of More Things - 18
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solve the problem of a wide machine. The shaking parts of a 2-roll

fourdrinier weighed about 11 tons, and experience did not encourage
the prospect of shaking almost twice as much weight at nearly twice
as high a frequency.

During the discussions of shaking a wide

fourdrinier, the Rice Barton people had suggested that there
might be possibilities in the McDonnell shake, a device which they
had a license to manufacture, and which bad been working well for
a considerable time on a few slow speed machines making free sheets.

Since shaking fourdriniers are no longer common, we should perhaps

explain them as simply as possible.

The breast roll bearing

housings and the rails on each side of the fourdrinier on which
sat the table rolls over which the wire ran, were connected, and

were supported from the frames beneath on flat springs that allowed
a small lateral movement.

The table roll rails were pivoted at

the lower end, next to the flat boxes.

The back breast roll bear

ing housing was connected through an arm to a powered shake head
of one kind or another, by means of which the whole assembly of
breast roll, table rolls and rails, and the top run of the wire,

were jiggled back and forth, movement being maximum at the breast

roll and zero at the rail pivots.

Length and frequency of the

stroke could generally be varied.

All the Company’s original

fourdriniers were of this type, but at the time of which we are

writing no shakes were in operation at Millinocket, to the best

of our knowledge, although they may still have been in use at the

Lower Mill.
In the McDonnell system, the breast roll and table rolls were
stationary.

Several of the latter, about half-way down the wire,

were replaced by a soft-rubber-covered shake roll of considerably
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larger diameter, supported on flat springs raising it several

inches above the run of the wire, which wrapped it slightly.
The table roll bearings were shimmed up gradually from the suc

tion box and breast roll ends toward the shake roll, to support

the wire.

The large roll was shaken by a standard shake head,

carrying the wire with it, sliding on the table rolls, the move
ment in this case being greatest at the middle of the forming

surface, and zero at the ends.
An installation of this type had been tried on No. 10 machine

in 1931, but as the shake roll and bearings weighed about 7,500

lbs., the vibration, when the rate of shake was brought up to near
1,000 strokes per minute, was tremendous.

The writer did not see

this trial, but has been told that within a few minutes the win
dows back of the fourdrinier began to fall out, and it was prompt

ly shut down and removed.

This was William A. Whitcomb’s previous

experience with high-speed shaking.

It was not a very auspicious

background, but in view of his insistence that a shake was necessary,
it was decided to try it again, as the only even remote possibility

for a wide machine.

The project was assigned to the writer.

He

inspected a working unit in a mill in the vicinity of Boston, and
new McDonnell roll equipment and a straight-line shake bead were

bought, and were installed, again on No. 10.

As before, the vibra

tion was unacceptable when the shake got much over one stroke
for each two feet of speed, but no windows fell out, and below
that point it did shake the wire, and did make some discernable

improvement in formation.

This was sufficient encouragement to

try to find some way to dampen the vibration, and the writer turned

to the Submarine Signal Company, of Boston, which, after study,
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came up with what became known as the "compensator".
A mass of lead in round, slotted plates a couple of inches

thick, its weight exactly equal to that of the shake roll and its
bearings, was set in a frame supported by beryllium copper flat
springs and mounted on a pedestal back of the fourdrinier, with

its center in line with the center of the shake roll journal.
A flat, circular plate was bolted to a modified housing on the
back bearing of the shake roll, and this was connected to the

floating mass of lead by six big coil extension springs arranged

in a circle around the straight-line shake arm, which ran from
the head through the hole formed by the slots in the lead plates.
These were designed to give a harmonic response at the rate of

vibration -- 1,000 strokes per minute -- the load on each end of
them being equal, so that after the first few strokes the roll and

the weight were moving in opposite directions at exactly the same
rate of speed, the thrust of one offsetting that of the other.

The stroke could be varied, but the speed was fixed.
was almost unbelievable.

This thing

There was 15,000 lbs. of metal moving

back and forth as much as 3/8" one thousand times a minute, with
no vibration that could be felt, except for a few seconds while
getting up to speed.
There were some troubles, notably that the wire slipped on

the roll, and the soft rubber cover gathered pitch.

We will not

go into all the things that were done in the effort to correct

these conditions, but will just say that the best arrangement was
found to be a roll fitted with a felt jacket like that used on

the old-fashioned couch.

Similar but larger compensators were
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put on new full-shake fourdriniers installed in this year on

Nos. 7 and 8 machines, and 22 tons of fourdrinier parts and lead

blocks vibrated with no trouble at all.

No. 9 was equipped with

a McDonnell shake and compensator in 1938.

two types of shake were about the same.

The results with the

Both made an improve

ment in formation, the McDonnell equipment being a little better

in this respect if anything.

Neither had any conclusive effect

on the strength of the sheet, though.
All this is the background of the decision late in 1939 to

begin the renewal of the six old paper machines at Millinocket
by replacing No. 1 with another two-roll unit.

In spite of all

the foregoing, and the fact that the writer was there, he is
unable to say with certainty why the narrow machine was chosen,

but basically, the investment in the Mattaceunk station had to pay
off in increased production, and this could be realized quickly
only by putting in a narrow machine, which could be obtained

quite soon, could be installed with a minimum of lost time, and

would immediately produce 25 or 30 tons more paper a day.

In

stalling a wide machine would have meant later delivery, longer
installation time, more loss of production, not only because of

the longer period required for installation, but because two of
the old machines would have to be removed; and there would be

little gain in production, since the two old machines that would
be shut down were making about 100 tons a day, and one wide machine,
at the projected speed, would produce only about 112 tons.

In

addition, there was just so much money from depreciation, a lot

was needed for other things, and the first two-roll machine could
be put in for less than half the cost of the first three-roll unit.
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Less tangible, William A. Whitcomb was still disposed toward the

narrow machines as being subject to better control.

He was

still not convinced that Great Northern’s kind of paper could be

made on a wide machine, although the possibility of shaking a wide
fourdrinier had been demonstrated and speeds such as were being

reached in Canada were not contemplated.

It was bis decision,

and William 0. McKay, while not happy about it, did not fight it,
as there were the immediate advantages we have pointed out, and

the installation of one new small unit did not necessarily fore
close on three large ones in the future, although he was quite

sure that William A. Whitcomb would find some way to get around
this.

He was right.
While No. 1 was being designed and built, William A. Whitcomb

had another idea, having to do with the suction press.

All this

equipment at that time was about the same -- a rubber-covered

perforated bottom roll thirty-odd inches in diameter, with a
rather narrow internal suction box just behind the nip of a single

top pressure roll, the function of the suction box being entirely

to remove the water squeezed out of the sheet into the felt at the
nip.

Most machines had two of these presses in tandem, the paper

going into the dryers from the second press being perhaps 32 per
cent dry.

William A. Whitcomb’s thought was that in this type of

press the sheet really was not subjected to vacuum at all, or at
best for

but an instant; that this did not give time for removal

of the water pressed out, part of it being retained in the felt

and going back into the paper, and that felt and sheet should be

under vacuum for some meaningful period of time after leaving the
nip, to prevent this.

The device which he envisioned, the writer
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doing the preliminary design, was a very large perforated bottom
roll -- 44 inches in diameter, from memory, with an internal suc

tion box some thirty inches wide, and three top rolls, one at the
leading edge of this suction box, one at the trailing edge, and

the third half-way between, the felt and sheet, following the

bottom roll, being subject to constant vacuum the whole width of

the suction box.

One of these, called at first a “multiple roll

press” and later a “Multipress”, was built by Rice Barton, and

started up on No. 9 machine in January, 1940, this machine being
picked because the very long draws in the press part allowed of

a trial installation of the Multipress between the existing first
and second presses without disturbing anything.

After the first

week of operation, the regular second press was shut down, and

the middle roll of the Multipress was removed, as it was hard to
thread, and did not seem to be doing any work anyway.

Without

going into further detail here, this press was a qualified success,

giving a few percentage points more water removal, although it used
a lot of power, and had other problems which turned up later.

It

was patented; some changes were made in the design of the suction
box later, but it did not catch on, and was never used to any ex
tent, if at all, except by the Company.

A lot of the preliminary work having been done in advance,
the old No. 1 machine was shut down on April 14, 1940, the new

machine was installed, starting up on the morning of April 29th,

and was making shipping paper by afternoon.

We should note

that the fourdrinier of this machine was equipped with a McDonnell
shake and a compensator, and the Multipress was removed from No. 9

and used in No. 1 as a second press.

As a matter of interest,

this machine, installed, cost $461,000.
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By the middle of the summer, the time had come to make the

next move, and the management found that it had put itself in a
bind.

No matter how it was sliced, two small machines had to be

taken out of production to install the first large one, which was
going to cost a whole lot of money with very little increase in

production.

Moreover, because there could now be only three, any

wide machines would have to be run at higher speeds than intended,

to get the proposed 150 tons increase, which meant the use of a

higher percentage of sulphite.

That tore it.

Poor Roy Weldon

was put to work on another study, and the writer knows that he
was told, in effect, that it bad better come out in favor of two-

roll machines this time.

He did a thorough job of reversing

himself; no discredit to him; making comparisons of all kinds of

combinations of wide and narrow machines, his 22-page report, dated
August 24, 1940, concluding that for the same tonnage, in comparison

with three wide machines, five additional two-roll units would re
quire the least outlay of cash; would result in less loss of pro

duction during installation; would involve the least installation

cost per ton; would operate at lower cost because the wide machines
would have to be run at higher speed, as noted above, the increased

long fibre required offsetting any other savings; would not call
for any layoff of labor, and recommended the installation of five

two-roll machines ’’similar to the so-called New No. 1”.

On Sept

ember 11th, the Directors appropriated $1,050,000 for the replace
ment of Nos. 2 and 3.

You could get quick delivery on a paper machine

in those days, particularly when all the patterns were available.
No. 2 machine was installed in February, 1941, and No. 3 in August.

Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were not replaced until after World War II, and

were for all practical purposes identical with No. 1.

Of More Things - 25

The cost

1974

of installing No. 6, however, was more than twice that of No. 1 --

$1,114,000.

We will tell elsewhere the rather interesting story

of how these machines were put in, but the foregoing discussion
will explain why for years there has been a row of steel columns

in the aisle

between Nos. 3 and 4 that should not be there.

Al

though after 1940 it was never possible, for a number of reasons,

to run on the 9 percent sulphite on which the final study had been

based, 12 to 15 percent becoming normal, no more consideration

was given to 3-roll machines.
We have devoted considerable space to this subject, because

as we have said, it may have involved one of the Company’s more
important decisions.

Changes in the attitude of the people in

financial control in the late 1940’s resulted finally in a new
type of management, and bad it found in the Millinocket mill four

big newsprint machines; which by the very nature of things would
have been by that time high-speed, high-production units; instead

of these pygmies in the industry, the shape of the ’’new” Great

Northern might have been quite different.

That of the Millinocket

mill surely would have been.
Now let us get back to the whole period under consideration,

and start with the statistics, which for convenience, we will put
all in one place.

Some of the figures do not have the signifi

cance of former years, but they are part of the story.

YEAR

PRODUCTION
TONS

EARNINGS

EARNINGS
PER SHARE

DIVIDEND
PER SHARE

NO.SHARES
($25 PAR)
998,330

1939

326,769

$2,727,442

$ 2.73

$ 2.40

1940

335,074

2,865,667

2.87

2.50

"

1941

341,351

2,432,261

2.44

2.50

"
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1942

341,071

1,686,529

1.69

2.00

1943

318,196

1,859,896

1.86

1.60

1944

297,355

1,666,978

1.67

1.60

1945

322,080

902,710

.90

1.60

1946

344,138

2,591,366

2.59

1.60

Earnings figures are after provision for Federal income taxes,
which took, of course, an increasing bite during the war years.

A surtax imposed in 1936 had been embodied in the general tax rate

in 1938.

A ’’defense’ tax, as a percentage of the normal tax was

added in 1940, and this was superseded in 1941 by a surtax of 7
percent on all but a small amount of exempt earnings.

This sur

tax was raised to 16 percent in 1942.

PROVISION FOR FEDERAL TAXES

1939

$

562,295

1940

911,289

1941

1,382,887

1942

1,121,408

1943

1,237,214

1944

1,107,766

1945

626,694

1946

1,585,027

Newsprint output was affected by wartime conditions and

controls.

We may not be able to explain this intelligently, but

the results were as below:
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NEWSPRINT

YEAR

U.S.
CONSUMPTION
tons

U.S.
PRODUCTION
TONS

CANADIAN
PRODUCTION
TONS

CANADIAN
EXPORTS TO U.S.
TONS

1939

3,555,900

954,300

3,174,500

2,281,500

1940

3,774,900

1,056,300

3,770,000

2,741,400

1941

3,956,100

1,044,000

3,770,700

2,987,000

1942

3,846,800

967,200

3,454,500

3,007,000

1943

3,413,500

811,300

3,219,000

- 2,681,000

1944

3,181,000

720,800

3,264,600

2,530,000

1945

3,350,600

725,500

3,591,900

2,666,000

1946

4,236,900

772,800

4,506,100

3,563,000

The war, in one way or another, almost put the United States

industry out of business.

In 1944, the production of United States

mills dropped to the lowest point since 1902, and Great Northern
was making 35 percent of it.

In 1946, the Company accounted for

40 percent of all domestic production.

The Canadian industry,

it will be noted, was much less affected, and we will see what we
can find to say about this later on.

The price of newsprint during this period looked like this:
NEWSPRINT PRICE PER TON - DELIVERED NEW YORK

YEAR

AVERAGE CONTRACT
FOR YEAR

PRICE

GREAT NORTHERN
WEIGHTED AV'G PRICE HIGH

LOW

1939

$ 50.00

$ 48.00

N.C.

1940

50.00

49.00

N.C.

1941

50.00

49.20

1942

50.00

50.00

1943

55.50

55.50

1944

58.00

58.00

1945

61.00

60.00

61.00

58.00

1946

72.20

71.50
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67.00

$50.00

$49.00

N.C.

50.00

58.00
N.C.
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Prices are from a report prepared by the Company for the
Celler investigation in 1950.

The averages, however, were made

by the writer, there being a number of changes in some years.
The Company, it will be noted, pretty much continued to keep
its price below that of its competition.
Finally, the effect of all this on the market price of Great

Northern stock.

The figures are as they were quoted at the time

on the stock then outstanding:

YEAR

LOW

HIGH
$ 45

1939

$ 33

1940

49-3/4

36

1941

42

29-1/2

1942

35-3/4

24-1/2

1943

36

27-1/4

1944

37-1/2

29-1/4

1945

47-1/2

35-1/2

1946

46-1/2

37

In 1940, Canada was at war, and the United States was getting
ready for almost inevitable involvement.

Everybody seemed to

develop a sort of feeling of comradeship which had not been in

evidence for a long time.

Costs, except transportation, had not

risen unduly by the beginning of the year, labor was available

for woods operations, and the price of newsprint remained un
changed, except that Great Northern went up from $48 to $49 on

January 1st, still a dollar under the market, causing no distur
bance whatever.

In miscellaneous developments during the year, the salary of

the Vice-President and Manager of the Spruce Wood Department
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was raised to $18,000; the 2 percent interest rate on employee
stock loans was continued; an additional 15 acres or so of land

was sold to the Town of Millinocket for the airport, at $10 an
acre, and the Hathaway Farm on the Fast Branch -- Lot 5 and parts
of Lots 6 and 7 in the Town of Medway, was purchased from Albion
Hathaway for $20,000; the Company’s 56 shares of stock in the

Moosehead Telephone & Telegraph Co. was sold to New England
Tel & Tel.

While we did not mention it in connection with the

Mattaceunk job, as it was not really part of that project, al
though made necessary by it, a new 33,000-volt transmission line,

on steel towers, 38 in number, was built up the west side of the
river from Dolby to Millinocket, some 5-1/4 miles, replacing the
old wooden pole line.

As on the line from Mattaceunk to Dolby,

foundations were put in for a future second set of towers.

This

job was started in January and was completed in September, along

with a new transformer station at Millinocket.

Almost all the

equipment was ferried across the West Branch at Jerry Brook,
gravel for concrete being trucked from Medway, and it was found

necessary to drive piling under the foundations of the structures

which were located in the big bog west of Dolby Pond.

Nelson

Felix, who had been Bryan Seelye’s assistant since 1919 died
suddenly, and his place was taken by Leslie G. Kewer, a young

man hired from outside the Company.
In 1940, the Council of National Defense set up the Office

of Emergency Management (O.E.M.), the first move toward the later
wartime controls on industry.

This agency in turn established

a National Defense Advisory Commission, and by Sept ember, more
than a year before Pearl Harbor, this contained a Pulp & Paper
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section.

However, no controls on pulp and paper were established

at this time, and the publishers began to build up substantial
inventories in anticipation of later shortages or increased de

mand.

For the year, United States mills in general ran at over

90 percent of capacity; Great Northern ran full.

The Canadian

industry operated at about 80 percent, and with the better price
and the benefit of the exchange rate (Canadian paper was paid for

in U.S. funds), it began to look a little better financially.
In miscellaneous developments during the next year, 1941,

the interest rate on employee stock loans remained the same.
Another sale of about 35 acres of land in Lots 79 and 83 for a

further enlargement of the airport was made to the Town at the
same price as before.

The Directors appropriated $165,000 for

the installation of the fourth unit at Mattaceunk.

Woods labor

began to be paid by check instead of cash -- at least the first
mention of check payment was found in this year -- and an account

was opened in the Ashland Trust Company for the purpose.

Purchases

of New Brunswick wood, which could be shipped C.P.R. - Maine
Central to Madison were stepped up.

This move ran into the war

time controls already in effect in Canada, and to obtain an export

license it was necessary to deposit funds in

a

Canadian bank

from which to pay freight, resulting in the opening of an account
in the Royal Bank at Fredericton, "not to exceed $2,000.Back
in 1931, a 65-foot high, 440,000-gallon standpipe had been erected
by the Millinocket Water Company near its filter station in the

Millinocket mill yard, and in 1941 new pumps and a new intake from
the canal were put in, financed by the purchase of another 100
shares of Water Company stock by Great Northern.
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this time, the Federal Power Commission, under a U.S. Supreme
Court ruling, began to make noise about the use of navigable

rivers by private interests — anything that would float a log
was "navigable" -- which was directed primarily toward the power

utilities.

While it was a little absurd, the question as to whether

the Company might be considered a utility because it furnished
current to its subsidiary water companies was raised internally,

and to be on the safe side, 60 cycle motors were installed on
their pumps, so that power from Bangor Hydro could be used.

There was, however, no F.P.C. action affecting the Company until

much later.

On September 1,1941, the Company raised its price for news

print to $50, bringing it up to the rest of the market for the first
time in four years.

This was not unexpected, and again caused

no excitement, although it did have a tendency to take the brake
off the other producers, as we will see later.
This year 1941 saw the real beginning of the wartime con

trols.

In April, the O.E.M. set up the "Supply Priorities and

Allocations Board", the operating arm of which was the Office

of Production Management (O.P.M.), and established the Office

of Price Administration (O.P.A.).

The latter, as far as the writer

recalls, made no moves, at least none which affected the pulp and
paper industry, during 1941.

The O.P.M., however, got going

immediately, the first action involving the industry being on July
17th, when representatives from mills all over the country were
called to Washington to set up an Advisory Committee, and in Sept
ember came the first restrictive order, the Government taking
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over the entire output of dissolving pulp.
By this time, the O.P.M. had already instituted a system of
priorities, which, while carefully worked out, had everybody in

a state of bewilderment.

They had seen nothing yet.

The United

States was precipitated into the conflict in December, and within
a few months the Company, along with everyone else, was confronted

by a war-born bureaucratic jungle, creating problems with which
very few in the organization had had any experience.

It would

be futile to attempt a discussion of operation under the controls
put into effect by the Government in any great detail, but we will

touch on some points.

What follows will perhaps explain why it

would be impossible to tell any comprehensive story.
A new Office of Price Administration was established under

the Price Controls Act of January 30, 1942.

The Office of Pro

duction Management (O.P.M.) was replaced by the War Production
Board (W.P.B.) in that same month.

The old National Labor Rela

tions Board was armed with new powers, and in rapid succession,

not necessarily in order, but all in 1942, came the National War
Labor Board, the War Manpower Commission, the Office of Defense
Transportation, the War Shipping Administration, the Office of
Civilian Defense, the Office of War Information, the Defense

Supplies Corporation, the Solid Fuels Administration, the Petro
leum Administration for War and the Office of Economic Stabiliza

tion.

Early in 1943 came the Office of War Mobilization.

In addi

tion the Company found itself dealing with the U.S. Employment
Service, the State Department’s Division of British Commonwealth

Affairs, the U.S. Army, the Navy’s Bureau of Ships, the Procurement
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Division of the Treasury Department, handling renegotiation of
war contracts, and the Wage Stabilization Board, which took over

some of the functions of the N.L.R.B.

Also, because it was buy

ing wood in New Brunswick, Canada’s Wartime Prices and Trade
Board and its Department of Munitions and Supply, and because it

was employing Canadian labor in the woods, several Canadian Govern
ment boards and commissions dealing with labor.

These are just

the agencies which the writer remembers, or to which he finds
reference.

There were more which he does not recall, or with

which the Company was not involved, and it was necessary, of course,

to continue to deal with the more familiar ones like the Inter
state Commerce Commission, The Federal Trade Commission, the Inter
nal Revenue Service, the Federal Power Commission, the Corps of
Army Engineers, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and

the Customs Service, all with special wartime functions; the
various State agencies, and God knows how many more.

The names of

most of these organizations were pretty much self-explanatory,

although some of their duties did not match their names, but in

the case of the War Production Board, the former O.P.M., particular
ly, the title represented only the tip of the iceberg, because
there was a network of divisions for branches of the industry, even

for different parts of different branches; regional offices; and
special sections and bureaus for special purposes; and we have

mentioned only those agencies which we associate with the Great

Northern Paper Company’s operations.

There were dozens of others

dealing with other industries and businesses.
These new wartime bureaucracies weresomething else.

In the

end, their efforts without doubt gave more headaches to the country's
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enemies than to its industry, but in the beginning there was

king-size confusion.

Consider the original order establishing

the priority system for repair, maintenance and operating supplies
(not raw materials), which was of prime importance to every manu

facturer.

This was issued as Regulation PD-1 on August 27, 1941;

amended as O.P.M. Regulation 3 on September 2d, and amended again

as Preference Rating Order P-22 some few days later.
everyone to state that he had a priority

It required

rating of A-10 when

placing orders for such supplies, but no one seemed to know how

to go about obtaining authority to use this rating, or any other,
except by individual application for each order, although it was
rumored that there would be a blanket approval forthcoming. Sup

pliers began to refuse orders that did not bear the rating, be
cause they had to have it to pass along to their suppliers, and

there began the mass pilgrimage to Washington to obtain a priority

rating to buy some needed article or piece of equipment which was
to continue throughout the whole period of controls.

20th, Sheldon Wardwell wrote:

On September

”I do not believe the Company had

better file a special application" (referring to a number of
orders in the above category, which had been held up) ’’until

we get Mr. Whitcomb’s permission.

On some of the mill stuff he

is holding back, expecting that there will be a general grant of
A-10 shortly.”

However, ten days later, Creighton Stanwood was

on his way to Washington with a handful of purchase orders and
special applications.
a mimeographed form.

On October 16th came Order P-22, Amended;

This gave everyone, with the exception of

a few enterprises which had special situations, permission to use

the A-10 rating, under prescribed conditions, which really meant

only that you had a hunting license.

You could put A-10 on your
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order, and pray.

On November 19th, the Bulletin of the National

Association of Purchasing Agents published a list of interpreta
tions of this regulation, with the comment:

"This issue certainly

pours official, unofficial and expert interpretations of P-22
at you.

That is done with malicious intent, for apparently 99

percent missed the boat or didn’t even read the order.

That can’t

continue, and regulations on the use of material will become more
intricate.

They can’t be ignored or disregarded, and we have

passed the time when they could be carelessly observed."
By this time, a host of orders had been issued.

This one

bulletin mentioned twelve others from O.P.M. alone, some of them

even then in their fourth revision; and incidentally, the issuance
of these orders was simply announced, and you had to obtain copies
from Washington, or from a regional office, if there was one and
if it had them; but getting back to P-22, Amended, people had just

begun to understand this when on December 18th it was revoked and

replaced by a new one, P-100, which made some changes in the condi
tions, and everyone had to switch signals.
So it went at the beginning.

Of necessity hastily formulated,

some functions of the new agencies overlapped, often obscurely, and
they were staffed by a horde of people, eventually 60,000, accord
ing to the Wall Street Journal of Dec. 17, 1971, most of whom
had not clue one as to the problems of the operations they were

supposed to control.

For instance, on October 24, 1941, at a meet

ing of the "Industrial Contact and Education Unit" of the O.P.M.,

one of the submerged parts of the iceberg, held to explain the
workings of the priority system as it applied to the pulp and paper
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industry, the fact was brought out that if followed strictly, the

limitations on the use of copper and copper-bearing materials
would positively guarantee a 30 percent curtailment in all paper

production, upon which the expert on copper admitted that he had
no idea that bronze fourdrinier and cylinder wires were so essen
tial to paper making!

For the most part, the new agencies were headed by capable
men, but even they could not possibly deal fairly with the dis

parate needs of hundreds of industries.

Functions were changed

from one agency to another; paper work was generated by the ton,
and the process of clearing what might seem to be the most reason

able request was sometimes a frustrating and even humiliating ex
perience.

An application early in 1942 to be allowed to buy some

new medium trucks for use in woods operations went from the Office

of Defense Transportation to the Interstate Commerce Commission to
the War Production Board and back to the Office of Defense Trans
portation, and from Bangor to Portland to Washington to Boston

to

Bangor, involving Maine’s Senator Owen Brewster on the way, before
being approved, partly, and this particular application was handled

quite expeditiously!

However, agency personnel came and went; those who remained
acquired expertise; industry advisory boards became more effective

in both directions; relationships were developed with those who
knew what it was all about; the people in industry who had to deal
with the various regulations gained understanding; some procedures

became practically routine, and while as the war went on nearly all
material and equipment got scarcer and scarcer, and regulations
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correspondingly stiffer, ways and means were gradually found to cope.

Still, life with Great Northern in wartime was rough all over, and

the effort was not to make paper "better and cheaper", but just to
make it, period.

It is of interest to note that in December, 1971, thirty

years later, industry and commerce were floundering in the uncer

tainties of the early stages of the so-called Phase 2 of the anti

inflation program which followed President Richard M. Nixon’s ninety
day price and wage freeze of August 15th, and which involved a Price

Commission and a Pay Board.

Quoting the Wall Street Journal of

December 7, 1971: "The reporting form issued to larger manufacturers

by the Price Commission contains six sections of questions which in
clude such toughies as...’describe method used to translate cost
increase to requested or reported price increase’...then a few

days ago the Commission issued ’clarifying instructions’.

These

are nearly as long as the original forms.... Pay Board forms aren’t
generating confusion because they’re not out yet.

They were to

have been distributed, but were so ’hopelessly confusing’, says
one source, that they are being redone."

Very familiar.

Plus

ca change, plus c’est la meme chose !
While it was necessary for the Company to deal with all the

agencies we have mentioned, in one way or another, we cannot poss
ibly do so, and will confine ourselves to situations and develop
ments which seem the most important, the most interesting, or per

haps the easiest to explain.

This discussion will be generaliza

tion at best, not only because official Company records of the time
have mostly been destroyed, and were probably too complicated to
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use anyway, but for the reason, which we keep repeating, that there
was constant revision in the multitude of regulations, and in the

system which produced them, brought on by various pressures, in
cluding those created by the regulations themselves, so that the

whole thing was a sort of merry-go-round, on which the calliope

played the same tune all the time, while the horses changed color,

so that you had to watch carefully to see which one your little boy
was riding, and jump on occasionally to save him from falling off.
It will also be necessary to depend to a considerable extent in
many areas upon a faulty memory and bits of information which may

get out of context.
To begin with, let us say that early in the game, newsprint

had been declared an ’’essential commodity”, which did not mean much
except that it could be manufactured.

Most other papers were "essen

tial" too, but newsprint was in a classification by itself.

As

long as it could be made, then, it was subject to the regulation
of the War Production Board, which went into high gear early in
1942, after having started out as the Office of Production Manage
ment the year before, and we will discuss some of the effects which

this fact had upon mill operations.
The W.P.B.’s instrument for control of production throughout

the war period was three-pronged -- allocation and permission to
use materials (M-orders); the priority system for obtaining

materials (P- orders) and limitation on the production and/or use
of any material or commodity (L-orders).

Perhaps as good an example

as any of how these worked can be found in their application to the
Company’s operations at the mills.

No official limitation (L-order)
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was placed on newsprint until 1943, and we will take this up later.

The use of wood pulp, however, was controlled, even that produced

by an integrated mill for its own operations being allocated

under General Preference Order M-93, first issued in March, 1942
and amended several times.

This required the Company to file

each month certain forms, with supporting information, requesting
permission to use some amounts of the various kinds of pulp, based

on estimated requirements for the following month, after reserving
a percentage of productive capacity, which varied from time to time,

to be allocated by the W.P.B.’s Director of Industry operations,
either to the Company itself or to some other company which in
his opinion had more legitimate need for it.

The Company was not

supposed to purchase pulp, use what it made, or even take from in
ventory, until the request had been processed and an allocation made

and was required to make another report on the fibre, including

waste paper, actually used against the allocation, which might, and
sometimes did affect the amount allowed to be used in the succeed

ing month.

Priority ratings did not enter into the Company’s

wood pulp picture, except as they were granted to others who were
permitted to purchase pulp from Great Northern.

The production of

paper and paperboard, with the exception of newsprint and a few
other grades like blueprint and cigarette paper, which had special,

consideration, was limited by an M-order which allowed only machines
which had been operated during some base period to be run, and the

end use of most paper, including newsprint after January 1, 1943,
was covered by L-orders.

There were methods of appeal on alloca

tions or priorities, but results of appeals were spotty, depending

upon the situation at the time, appeals on allocations often being
successful, appeals on priority very seldon being productive.
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Just from memory, the order under which the Company had its

own pulp allocated to it was M-241, effective November 1st, which

had the effect of cutting news production by about 5 percent.

This

was mostly made up, however, by the allocation of some of its

pulp production to other mills.

This was done by allowing them to

order ’’pulping stock”, a mixture of groundwood and sulphite in some

proportion, run on the paper machines and made into rolls, the

ends of which were mutilated with an axe, so that the product could
not be used as paper, but had to be re-pulped.

This method bad to

be used because the Company had no other way of preparing pulp for

shipment except on wet machines, which would have made freight

cost prohibitive on account of the high moisture content.

A

small amount of sulphite wrapping paper, named ’’Twin Lakes Fibre”

and a substantial amount of creped newsprint, used in some tex

tile process, were also made on No. 4 machine at Millinocket,
whether by W.P.B. priority order or of necessity we know not.

These grades, which accounted for a total of nearly 50,000 tons -some 2,000 tons in 1942, about 14,000 tons in each of the years
1943, 1944 and 1945, and 5,000 tons in 1946, are included in the

total production figure in the tables.

As the writer recalls,

there was a small amount of Government-ordered newsprint made at
the Penobscot mills, calling Walsh-Healey Act provisions into
effect for the first time, as far as we know, this presenting no

problem.

A number of Government orders for groundwood papers, not

large amounts, were made at the Madison mill.
We have already covered the procedure on repair, maintenance

and operating supplies.

Shortages of these caused a lot of head

aches, but perhaps the greatest difficulty in this area was with

fourdrinier and cylinder wires.

Normal inventories could of course
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not be maintained, and it was kind of nerve-wracking to be running
a machine not knowing where its next wire was coming from, or with
it in an untraceable car of way-freight somewhere between Wisconsin

and Maine.

Fuel, and chemicals like sulphur, which required special

applications and allocations, were a constant worry.

It became

necessary to ship coal all-rail by War Transportation Board order,
the Government subsidizing at least part of the extra cost over

water shipment through a complicated reporting procedure.

Such

fuel and sulphur as it was possible to ship by water was subject

to war risk insurance at very high rates, and this extra cost was
also subsidized.

Permission to purchase, and application for a

priority, which if granted at all was usually pretty low, had to be

obtained for any new piece of machinery, with the result that very

little equipment not absolutely necessary was installed after 1941
and before 1946.
This, in a very general way, outlines the application of W.P.B.
controls to industry not directly connected with the production of

war materials, and we have, we are sure, given the impression that

they were repressive.

To a degree, they were; and we should say

that the burden of coping with them, as they applied directly to

mill operation, fell heavily on Creighton Stanwood; but this agency,

particularly as understanding of the problems developed, did its
best to keep the essential civilian industries going when they had
real trouble.

The Company received consideration in many instances,

usually after fighting its way through the screening mechanism
to the head man.

In the field of direct production for military

uses, the functions of the W.P.B. were much more on the positive

side.

The Company had some experience in this area too, which we
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will describe a little later.
We might speak, briefly and at random, but a bit more specifi

cally, about a few of the conditions and happenings of the war
years at the mills.

There was a great deal of make-do.

Wood

was used instead of steel; steel instead of non-ferrous metal, when
ever possible.

replaced.

Machinery was patched up when it should have been

Drives, where changes had to be made, were concocted

out of home-made pulleys, belting and old motors, a la 1900.

were run patch on patch.

Wires

Charlie Burr, the Superintendent at

Fast Millinocket, trucked the ancient sawdust pile above Gilbert’s

Crossing down to the mill and mixed it with coal for fuel.

Dri-

ki from Ferguson Pond was hauled and burned in the shavings burners
at the Millinocket mill to make steam.

Rail cars for paper and

pulpwood were almost always in short supply and poor condition.
Hemlock, of which there was a large supply on the Indian Towns

and within 20 or 30 miles of Millinocket, was used in greater

quantity.

Labor became scarce and instantly older, but men worked

hard and willingly, and with some overtime, the mills were able to

get by, even at such times as they were able to run full.

A few

women were employed, some, we recall, running three little winders

in the East Millinocket finishing room on blasting rolls from side

run.

Wages rose steadily, the base rate in Great Northern mills

going from 56 cents an hour in 1941 to 70 cents in 1945.

To make things more interesting, 1941 and 1942 were very bad
water years, the Penobscot mills being entirely out of storage for
thirty days or so in the spring of 1942.

This had been quite easily

foreseen from the miserable conditions of the year before, and as
the Millinocket boiler plant could still squeeze out a little more
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steam, a search through General Electric turned up a 200# turbine,
with a 2500 K.W., 40 cycle, 600-volt generator for sale at the
Hudson Falls, N.Y. plant of the Union Bag Company.

good fortune.

This was pure

The unit, being second-hand, could be purchased

without priority, and after inspection by Arthur Winslow, was

bought and installed in the old steam plant.

It was old but

serviceable; very large for its capacity, with more cast iron in

it than the Brooklyn Bridge, and was promptly nick-named the ’’Graf

Spee”, for the German pocket battleship scuttled by its commander
off Montevideo just about the time this unit arrived at the mill.
In the woods, labor shortage was really serious.

Woodsmen

were not exempt from the draft, and thousands of people left the

northern part of the State for the war plants and shipyards to
the south.

Production declined, inventories became dangerously

low, and more reliance had to be placed on rail and truck deliver

ies, with all transportation scarce.

a touch-and-go situation on pulpwood.

This presented the mills with

During much of 1944 and

1945 the supply was practically on a hand-to-mouth basis, even with
machines slowed down and running a short week.

Although to the

best of our recollection they never ran out of wood completely, it
was necessary much of the time to practically ride every car from
shipping point to destination, and to blow ice in the spring to get

at wood in the water long before it would normally have been necess
ary to use river wood.

Rough wood was put into the piles for the

first time, just to get it where it could be reached.

Almost all

the wood received was green, rough, and during the winter months,

frozen.

The existing barking equipment was not adequate to clean

it properly, being intended for wood held in the water over winter,
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or at least until well into the summer months.

Dirt from poorly

barked wood; slivers and pitch from green wood, made difficulties.

Of late years, most mills have gone to day-to-day delivery of

wood, fresh from the stump, as a matter of policy, but at that
time mill operation was geared to the barking and piling out of
the bulk of the winter's supply during the summer, rail and truck

deliveries being supplementary, largely in peeled state, and the

pulping processes were based upon the use of seasoned wood.

Late

in the game, some help came from the War Production Board’s Pulp
wood Procurement Division, in the form of permission and a priority

to purchase three new Allis-Chalmers hydraulic streambarkers.

Those

were ordered in the second quarter of 1944 -- two for Millinocket
and one for Madison -- but it was not possible to get them installed
until well into the following year, and they were of considerable

assistance until wood supply got back to a more normal basis.
Small amounts of poplar and pine were used, just because they
could be cut easily by small operators along with spruce and fir.

A more important source of additional fibre, however, was waste
paper — old newspapers as far as possible -- received in car
load lots from the collections set up in the city areas.

As much

as 4 percent of the furnish during 1943, 1944 and 1945 was old news
papers, ink and all, dumped into the broke beaters.

certain problems.

It presented

It had to be inspected for foreign material --

pieces of wire, bits of rope and string, bundles of garbage, and

other such goodies,along with things like old radios and tramp

metal that would add weight to a bundle of paper.

In spite of

all precautions, and magnets introduced here and there in the

stock system, it was hard to keep some of this stuff out.
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from rope could ruin the production of several machines for hours.

Most troublesome, though, were the wire staples from comic books,
which plugged the screen plates, stuck in the wires like porcu

pine quills, and made neat little cuts in the sheet at the stack.

But it helped to make paper, its pale gray making a nice back
ground for specks of colored ink from the comic sections, but

paper.

All this is just a sort of sampling of the difficulties of

mill operation in wartime.

Everything we have told of did not

happen at once, but most of it was pretty much a part of life
We will perhaps have

with Great Northern between 1942 and 1946.

more on the subject in other places, but for now this is enough
for anyone with imagination.

As the record shows, the Company

did not make much money during this period.

Production was hurt

badly, and it could not capitalize on the additional capacity of
the recently installed new machines, with costs, notably the cost

of pulpwood, which doubled between 1941 and 1945, rising steadily.
Operation in wartime required of the work force a lot of in
genuity and a lot of good old hard work.

There were no controls

on these, and there was no lack of either.

There were hundreds

of instances of performance under difficulty and beyond the call

of duty, lost now in time, and we will give only one example which
will illustrate the spirit of the people.

That was the action of

men from the East Millinocket mill, who went out after their regular

work hours to a lot along the highway just west of town and cut

maybe 1,500 cords of pulpwood, the Company furnishing a horse to
yard the logs, and one of the big old two-man chain saws, which
some genius hung up on a counter-weighted traveler running on a
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wire cable strung over a set of skids, making a sort of slasher,

to cut them up.

This was an entirely voluntary project, organ

ized by the men themselves.

We do not remember how the wood was

paid for; probably on a contract basis.

We said that the Company was directly involved in defense
production.

This interesting development came about through

one of the first acts of the W.P.B., which was to make a survey of
all the machine tools in the country, including those in mill and
factory repair shops.

This survey showed that the Company had

a number of engine lathes capable of handling pieces more than
twenty feet long.

These of course were common in paper mills,

but in few other places except large commercial machine shops.
Some time in the spring of 1942, a very gung-ho representative of

this organization appeared in the Boston office, was referred to
the writer, and said, in just about these words, that lathes like
these were scarce, were badly needed in the war effort, and that

the Company had damn well better get busy and put them on defense
work or they would be requisitioned, snatched the hell out of there

and given to somebody who would.

in those early days.

The W.P.B. was pretty hard-nosed

This was not an idle threat, and could not

be ignored, because the mills could not operate without these

tools.

There were some who said that it would not be possible

for the shops to take on any outside work, and that ’’they can’t

do that to us”, but William 0. McKay did not feel that way, and

the writer was told off to see what could be done.
Inquiry of our aggressive W.P.B. friend led to a marine
architect in Boston, and it was discovered that what had him so
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uptight was that the Navy needed propeller shafting right now for

six ATR’s -- ocean-going rescue tugs -- already being built in
New England shipyards.

It was also discovered that he did not

know much about machine work, but that is neither here nor there.
This was no matter of a simple lathe job, but the whole schmeer.

The shaft, as the writer recalls, was about 10 inches diameter

and some 36 feet long, in two sections, the intermediate and the
tailshaft, the assembly consisting of these two pieces, connected
by a flanged coupling; a half-coupling at the engine end; a propeller-

fit taper with a threaded end, a big bronze hex nut for this, and
a bronze sleeve for the stuffing box on the tailshaft.

The material

was all ready, in the form of rough-turned forgings and castings,
which all had to be finished, the taper and thread cut, the nut

made, the coupling halves bored, the flanges faced off, drilled
for bolts and pressed on, and the bronze sleeve shrunk on, all to

Navy specifications and tolerances.

The coupling bolts were the

only thing in finished state.

This was something different from making grinder shafts or
pressing new heads into felt rolls, but the people in the Millinocket
shop, which had the best tools in general, allowed, after looking

at the drawings, that there was nothing they could not find a way

to do; the writer took the order, the material was received prompt
ly and work was started at once.

The first shaft, when completed

and shipped, passed inspection without reservation.

Work on the

other five proceeded apace, the different tool operations being

fitted into the shop schedule, and all were declared to represent

high-grade workmanship.

Meantime, the writer had been saying out

loud that having got its feet wet, the Company should not wait to

Of More Things - 48

1974
be driven into it, but should make an active effort to get more

such jobs.

This idea was not greeted with any wild enthusiasm.

However, he had been trying to get into the Navy, through the

Officer Procurement program; had just been turned down because

of earlier medical history, although he had passed the physical,
and was making motions at the Army, which was not quite so fussy.

William 0. McKay knew about this, and said that if he would lay
off trying to get into the service, he could have a free hand to
fill the shops with all the work they could handle, so, as the
Army did not seem to be interested anyway, and after consultation

with the mill superintendents and the shop people, he went out
after business.

This was no big deal.

All that was necessary

was to tell the W.P.B. that machine tool time was available, and

they passed the word to prime contractors.
Though the shop equipment had limitations, much of it being

worn, and it was necessary to be selective, it was no trouble to

get work.

During the next three years, great numbers of tie rods

(strain rods) for forging presses and powder presses -- long

shafts anywhere from 3 inches to 6 inches diameter, in matched
sets of four, threaded at each end, with steel hex nuts for them,

were made in all three shops.

Dozens of sets of propeller shafting

for LSM landing craft -- three pieces, with keyed flange couplings,
propeller fit taper and nut, and a number of sets of larger shafts

for twin-screw ice breakers, were made at Millinocket, along with

some fussy tapered spindles for some sort of centrifugal, and
track rings for machine gun mounts.

East Millinocket turned out

uncounted numbers of frames, oil pans and other parts for 50calibre cartridge loading machines, and some classified sonar
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parts -- nobody knew just what they were.

Numberless valve

bodies, the demand for which seemed to be almost endless, were
faced and drilled at Madison, the overflow, when they could not
handle the orders received, going to Fast Millinocket.

A very

large number of turning-gear cases -- the housings for a gear unit
mounted on the main drive turbines used in cruisers, so that they

could be turned over by a motor -- were machined at Millinocket.

These were weldments, and one part of the job was the removal of
copious amounts of weld spatter from the inside of the piece.
The normal method was to chip this out by hand, or with a small

air chisel, but the men in the Millinocket shop, who could not

afford this waste of time, chucked a short piece of wire conveyor

cable in an air drill, and took this stuff out so fast and so
cleanly as to draw the compliment from the prime contractor that
this was the best job anyone was doing for them.

There were other interesting developments.

One job at

Millinocket was the machining of what the men called "watch cases"

the bousing for that part of sonar equipment outside the hull of
the ship -- which when finished resembled nothing so much as the

case of a pocket watch with face and back removed, some two feet
in diameter and about seven inches thick, a short, flanged neck,
by which it was attached to the sweep mechanism, representing the

stem.

These were received completely rough, and represented a lot

of work, the neck and flange having to be rough turned and bored,
and the latter faced and drilled for bolts; the front and back

faced off; the body shaped to a true radius; the inside finish
bored on the same center, and the outside finish rounded in an arc
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The first few lots of these were received as forgings, a very
expensive piece of metal, with slow delivery.

We do not know to

whom to give credit, but the suggestion was made to the writer by

Bob Hume that as the flange was a little less in diameter than the
thickness of the body, the blank might be flame cut from steel
plate.

The writer took this up with the Navy people, who said

it was worth a try, and made arrangements with a shop in Cambridge.
A template was made at Millinocket, and the writer, with a Navy
officer, watched the first blank cut from 8~inch armor plate.

When machined, this was found to be entirely satisfactory, and
all future pieces made at Millinocket were cut in this manner.

We

do not doubt that this method was translated to other suppliers,

as it was so much faster and less costly.

It will be noted that most of this work was for the Navy,
which could be awesomely efficient.

Some time in 1943, an order

and material for six more shafts for ATR tugs was received.

The

writer had to call the local W.P.B. office and tell them that the
Company could not handle it, because the drilling of the flanges

was a heavy job, and by this time the old radial at Millinocket
was so worn that the drill could not be prevented from running

off, no matter how careful the operator might be.

The next day

he had a call from a WAVE lieutenant of the Navy’s Bureau of

Ships, who said that they had to have those shafts, and what did
he have to have to make them?

The writer explained.

She asked

if the Company would buy such a drill if one were available;

answer affirmative.

The following day, she called again, crisply

reeled off a specification, which described just what was needed;

named a price, which was reasonable, and said: ’’Send an order, with
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a certified check, to the River Rouge plant of the Ford Motor
Company, and leave the rest to us.”

This was done the same day,

and in less than a week there arrived at Millinocket a Fosdick

hydraulic five-foot radial drill, barely used, which was moved
into the shop, had 40-cycle motor equipment robbed from some
other part of the plant slapped on it, and was levelled up and put

to work without even being taken off the wooden skids on which it
had been mounted for shipment.
All this work, and there is probably some we have forgotten,

was sub-contracted, all material being furnished, with the prime
contractor’s priority providing for the replacement of tool bits,

drills and the like.

Sub-contracting of this kind gradually petered

out as commercial machine shops got geared up, along with somewhat
less urgency, and by VE day was practically at an end as far as

the Company was concerned.

It was done by the regular shop crew,

augmented by a little additional local help, with some men volun

tarily working a night shift on some jobs, and as the writer
remembers, some overtime.

This on top of an unusually heavy

schedule of regular repair work due to the difficulty of obtain

ing parts.

The writer has had many occasions to be proud of

the accomplishments of Great Northern employees, but never more

than of this crew and its uncomplaining cooperation.

Prices were negotiated on the basis of time per piece, at

a flat rate of $3.00 an hour.

By later accounting standards,

the Company was probably losing its shirt, but by that of the
period it showed a reasonable gain.

Indeed, as the shops became

more familiar with the work, rebates were made on some jobs be
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cause the profit margin looked excessive.

Some of the work was

subject to later re-negotiation with the Procurement Division of

the Treasury Department, but this amounted to no more than an

explanation of the pricing procedure, which drew no complaint.
One of the satisfying aspects of this work was that it was
so well performed.

Every prime contractor was complimentary.

There was almost no spoilage -- a few pieces only, none major,

as far as we can recall.

There was only one failure -- a trial

effort to bore 37 mm. gun barrels.

No way.

This operation re

quired special equipment, which just could not be improvised.

There

were almost no complaints; with one exception a few loose fits on
tie rod nuts are all we can remember, and the exception was so

ludicrous that it is worth taking space to tell about.
One of the late shafts of the second ATR series was shipped

to a yard in Boothbay Harbor, Maine.

It was a little behind

schedule, and the ship was waiting for it, so immediately upon
its arrival, the yard began to remove the dryer canvas protection

from the tailshaft.

Instant panic.

The bronze bushing, according

to a frantic telephone call to the mill, was badly damaged, the
symptoms described as dark discoloration and roughness, probably

corrosion, but nobody at the yard would touch it to find out, for
fear that he might be blamed for whatever was wrong with it, until

a representative of the manufacturer was present.

The cover was

thrown back over it, and it was left lying just where it was.

Jack Fahey, who was in charge of the work at Millinocket, was dis
patched by the evening train, connected up the next morning at Bath
with a Navy inspector from Boston, and the two hied themselves to
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the shipyard by the dawn’s early light.

The crew gathered around;

the canvas was turned back to expose the terrible damage, and the

imperturbable Mr. Fahey, after looking at it for a moment, took
out his handkerchief and calmly removed the hardened remains of

a large and well-masticated cud of Black B.L. and the juice there
of, with which some tobacco-chewing marksman had made a bullseye!

One interesting attempt was made at direct production of a
defense item.

This was the result of an appeal by the W.P.B. to

the paper industry at large to try to develop a container, for use

in the Pacific theatre, to hold three 3-inch (75mm) shells.

The

specifications were that it had to be made without metal, or with

a minimum of metal, and without the use of phenolic or other re

sins; withstand submersion in water for 24 hours after having
been dropped on a hard surface, loaded, from a height of 12 feet;

and be easily opened without tools.
The writer and Roy Weldon, head of the Bureau at that time,
were in charge of this project, approaching it on the principle

of laminating paper on a triangular mandrel with an adhesive.
Various papers, with silicate, wax, waterproof glues, spent sul

phite liquor, asphalt, oils and combinations thereof were tried,
and after several months a container made with Madison paper,

having asphalted wooden heads, set in caulking compound and held

in place by a metal through rod with wing nuts, which met the
requirements, was developed.

One was sent to the writer in Boston,

and the W.P.B. man, almost beside himself with excitement, because
nobody in his bailwick bad come up with anything else, dashed

off with it to Washington, from which place he returned a few days
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later, crestfallen, with the news that while the Great Northern
container had passed the tests and was declared usable, the metals

situation had eased in the meantime to the point where these things
could be made of light-gauge steel, which of course was more prac

tical, and so ended that effort.
The Office of Civilian Defense was active very early in 1942.
The first Job Records issued in that year were for a black-out of

the mills and power stations, plywood sheets being put up over all
the windows, and outside lighting discontinued.

This blackout,

we believe, remained in effect until into 1945.

Ventilating condi

tions in the mills under these conditions were sufficiently bad,
but the power houses, which had no forced ventilation, were real

sweat-boxes in warm weather, in spite of light-trap type window
protection, with overlapping plywood sheets a few inches apart.

In 1940, the Civil Aeronautics Board bad ordered the brick stacks
of the Millinocket mill -- there were two at that time -- which
were in line with the east-west runway of the airport, lighted

or floodlighted, the Company choosing the latter to avoid having

to maintain wiring and fixtures up the stacks.

This lighting had

to be shut off, and as the field became used more and more by

military aircraft, particularly Canadian ships, for one reason and

another, there was constant concern that an Anson or a Lancaster

would tangle with them, but it never happened.
In the early days of the war, there was real fear of sabo

tage, in view of the experience in Norway and other parts of
Europe.

For the first time, as far as the writer knows, employees

were issued numbered identification buttons.
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put on, and a uniformed security guard armed with rifles; a total
of some thirty men

between the Millinocket and East Millinocket

mills, as we recall, patrolled the mill yard perimeter on the night

shifts.

The Army had a hand in this, sending an officer to Milli

nocket to give instruction in guard duty.

There were stepped-up

fire and rescue drills and first aid instruction, and evacuation

procedures were set up.

The excitement surrounding these of course

subsided as time passed and nothing happened, but they continued

to be kept in effect at least until into 1945.

There was too much

at stake to take chances, even at long odds, but there was of course

no incident.
These are the largely undocumented things, some important,

some merely of interest, that the writer himself remembers in
connection with mill operation under World War II conditions.
Others, more conversant with certain aspects, would perhaps

remember them differently, or would remember other events, but

we do not believe that further reminiscing would add greatly to
this part of our story.
The next item in the writer’s file is a copy of a letter
from Sheldon Wardwell to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachu

setts, dated January 31, 1942, which begins:
”My dear Senator Lodge:

I would very much appreciate it if you would
send me a copy of the new Price Control bill.

I hate

to bother you, but unfortunately the congressman from
my district is a Democrat and a New Dealer."
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He was not usually so direct, but like his father, he was
a political animal, and this sometimes got the better of him.
Anyway, this leads us to consideration of the complicated matter

of price controls, which affected the figures in the foregoing
tables.

As we have noted, the year 1942 started out with everyone on

the same price basis; $50.00 a ton, New York, but a number of the

Canadian mills, when Great Northern came up to the market, had

announced that their figure for 1942 would be $53.00, starting
April 1st.

After some preliminary investigation by the O.P.A.,

which did not make the mistake this time of thinking that it

could exercise any control of newsprint price without Canadian
cooperation, this announcement led to a meeting in New York on

January 29th between its representatives and representatives of

Canada’s Wartime Prices and Trade Board to consider the situation.
In the meantime, R.M. Macy, an ex-textile-industry man, the Admin
istrator of the Paper Section of O.P.A., had turned up unexpectedly

at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Newsprint Manufacturers
of the United States, held in New York, at which the Company was

of course not represented.

Here be conferred with a number of

U.S. producers, expressing himself as being very pleased with

their attitude toward price control, and allowing that he was in

favor of trying to handle pricing under a voluntary agreement, an
option provided for in the Price Control law, rather than by

Government imposition, and that any price set should allow margin
al mills to operate.

On February 20th, Leon Henderson, Adminis

trator of the Office of Price Administration, in a letter to U.S.
newsprint manufacturers, announced that the United States and Cana
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dian control agencies were cooperating on the problem of price

stabilization; stated that a questionnaire on cost increases was
being sent to manufacturers in both countries; requested that
U.S. mills announce no new prices until some guidelines had been

reached; complimented the industry on its cooperative posture,
and said that the O.P.A. was in process of selecting an Advisory

Committee for newsprint.

Beautiful.

However, this harmony did

not last long.
In spite of the soothing tone of this letter, there was
immediate suspicion of what lay behind it.

Good authority had

it that the questionnaire had been in the works even before the

Price Control law was passed; that the industry had been promised
a hand in its formulation but had not been consulted, and that
it purposely had been made so complicated that it would automatic

ally head off any action during the first six months of the year.

Nevertheless, on February 27th the Company notified its customers

that it was complying with the request, with the hedge that any
change announced later would be retroactive to April 1st.

Mean

while ’’due to a mixup in the O.P.A. office in Washington”, as it

was explained, the letters appointing the members of the Advisory
Committee, of whom William A. Whitcomb was one, and calling a meet
ing in Washington for March 16th, was not mailed until about
March 5th, leaving nobody much time to prepare.
Sheldon Wardwell made notes on this meeting.

Its purpose

was to make, or make a start, on a price regulation procedure,
under one of the provisions of the law, but it did not get far.

The O.P.A. people admitted that they had not studied the question
naires, and indicated that they might issue another.

There was

a general run-through of the situation in wood, fuel and labor
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supply, and of the increased costs in these areas and in freight,
which last introduced the O.P.A. to the zone price system, about

The O.P.A. attorney went into an ex

which it expressed doubt.

planation of bow the War Production Board in effect subsidized
marginal plants doing ’’war work”, which had nothing to do with

the case.

The alternative methods of price-fixing under the law

were explained, and it was indicated that the O.P.A. would cooperate
with its counterpart in Canada, but when the meeting got down to
brass tacks, it just naturally came apart, and closed with the

understanding that the Committee would be called together again
later.

This first meeting could hardly have been expected to produce
an answer to so complicated a problem, but it might have done

better had it not been for the obstreperous William Arthur Whit
comb, who had come with a chip on his shoulder.

Before R.M. Macy

could even open the meeting, he had demanded to know why they were

there at all, and insisted upon a grant of immunity from the Sherman
anti-trust law in writing.

During the discussion, he took excep

tion to the implied subsidization of marginal mills with tax-payers’
money; wanted to know why the Government did not provide the
’’militia”, as Sheldon Wardwell called it -- probably the Company’s

guard force -- with arms and uniforms; requested a statement as

to who was using the zone price system; and upon receiving no
satisfactory answers stomped out of the meeting before it ever

got around to talking about price control at all.
Whether or not William A. Whitcomb's cavalier treatment of

the O.P.A. had anything to do with it, the Advisory Committee
was not consulted again about a voluntary agreement.
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after a meeting with Canadian officials, a temporary 60-day

freeze, setting the price at $50.00 "Port” (New York City was
a "port"), with the usual zone differentials, was ordered on
March 26th, forestalling the projected $3.00 Canadian increase.
This was followed on April 29th by a permanent order holding the
price basis to $51.00 Zone 4, with the usual differentials, which

was the same as $50.00 New York, for an indefinite period.

This

of course stirred up a hornet’s nest, the manufacturers feeling
that no consideration had been given to the substantial cost in

creases which had already occurred, and which had been reported

in the first questionnaire.

Provision for protest by individuals

or groups was contained in the law.

William A. Whitcomb did not

feel that the Company should lead, as it had not announced any

increase.

He agreed that the Company could join with others, but

as the basis for protest was of course for increases in cost, no
body wanted to expose his figures to the others.

This was resolved

by an agreement among at least some of the United States companies

to have Price Waterhouse & Co. act as coordinator and prepare con
solidated figures, based on their own questionnaire.

The second

O.P.A. questionnaire bad not been issued as of April 22d, leading
Sheldon Wardwell to point out that the Advisory Committee by law
had the right to make recommendations to the Administrator, and

to ask:

"Is it not possible that the O.P.A. may be contented to

leave matters as they are instead of seeking further information?

If the industry does not choose
fault."

to make the move, it is its own

At this point, there is considerable confusion.

Price

Waterhouse obtained information from nine companies, but all of
these did not make only newsprint, and while they continued to

collect it, it could be used only as back-up for individual
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filings.

A joint New England protest by Great Northern, St. Croix

and Maine Seaboard was prepared, but not filed.

In the end, Great

Northern entered its own protest, against Temporary Price Regu
lation No. 16, on May 23d., on which date Edwin deT. Bechtel,

who had become No. 1 legal advisor, wrote:

”I did not ask that

the protest be kept confidential, for my experience has always been
that if such a request is made of a government department, the

government officials seem bound to disregard it.”

adding that

as it was only a formality, perhaps it would pass unnoticed (by

the press).

At this same time, both St. Croix and Maine Seaboard

separately protested both the temporary order and the permanent
order, Maximum Price Regulation No. 130, and the writer believes
that some other U.S. companies, notably Finch Pruyn and Crown

Zellerbach also filed.
The protests submitted by the other mills against M.P.R.

130 apparently asked for elimination of the ’’port” differential

of minus $1.00, on the ground that there were no longer any
’’ports” for newsprint, as there was no water shipment.

Follow

ing the filing of the first protest, the Company had asked several

times for a conference with O.P.A. officials, feeling, with some
reason, that before there was any further action more explanation
of the situation was required than could be put into a formal

protest.

The O.P.A. agreed that there should be such a meeting,

but stalled it off, although Sheldon Wardwell did get to talk with
J.R. Atwater, head of the Printing Paper Division, on June 3d,
as a result of which conversation it was decided that to protect
itself the Company should also file against M.P.R. 130.
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On June 10th, the O.P.A. held a meeting with a publisher
group, which, as reported by the New York Times, of course ob

jected to the elimination of the port differential, and indicated
also opposition to the substitution of a straight f.o.b. mill

price basis for the zone system, which the O.P.A. seemed to be

doubtful about.

Argument about the content of the Company’s

second protest was bucked up to William A. Whitcomb, who on

June 15th wrote to Edwin Bechtel:

”It seems to us here that to freeze the price
of newsprint without regard to the increases in cost,

and based on a period during which the costs have very
radically advanced, is not fair.

This freezing of the

price is a function of this Price Administration, and

as such is disastrous to the manufacturers of newsprint

in the United States.
That is as far as we have gone.

It does not

seem wise to us to mix into that general fundamental
proposition the question of port differential.

The writer prefers sticking to the main issue."

Action was hastened by a notice from the O.P.A. on June
17tb that a hearing would be granted on June 25th to those who
had protested M.P.R. 130, and the Company’s submission, hastily

prepared, saying nothing about port differential but requesting
that the price be raised to $54.00, Zone 4, was mailed about

June 20th, allowing Great Northern to be effectively represented

at this hearing.

An amendment, containing additional information

on cost increases, was submitted early in July, with the permission

of O.P.A.
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Newsprint consumption was dropping a little in 1942, due to

the publishers’ voluntary efforts to conserve paper, and although
the Canadian mills actually increased their exports to the United
States slightly, they anticipated a further drop in 1943.

They

also were confronted with problems of wood and labor supply, and

with the further complication of heavy demands for power by that
country’s burgeoning production of war materials.

This resulted

in a revision of their pooling system, the closing of a number of
mills, and curtailment of production in some others, under a new
subsidy program.

It was now October, 1942, near the time when customers should
be advised of the next year’s price, and there had been no action

on the various protests.

Rumors began to fly that the War Produc

tion Board, having consulted with the Canadian authorities, was
about to order a curtailment of newsprint production in the United

States.

On October 22d, the O.P.A. issued an un-numbered order

incorporating additional "economic data" to support its original
price ruling, stating that any rebuttal must be submitted within

ten days.

A request by the Company, Maine Seaboard and St. Croix

for an extension of time was denied, so one representative from

each of these companies, plus Finch Pruyn and Crown Zellerbach,
hied themselves to Washington on October 28th.

Tom Allen, Sheldon

Wardwell’s partner, represented Great Northern, and Royal S.
Kellogg, as secretary of the Association of Newsprint Manufacturers
two or three others.

After listening to introductory presentations

by John Hobson of St. Croix, President of the Association, and
Roy Kellogg, James D. Perkins, Price Administrator for the Paper

Section of O.P.A. made a pronouncement which must have been hard
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for his audience to take.

Boiled down, this was to the effect

that no ceiling price would be set which would allow the industry
better profits than in the period 1936 to 1939; that while it was
recognized that there had been cost increases before the freeze,
an effort would have to be made to offset these by economies;

that it was known that the price of pulpwood had gone up, but

that the O.P.A. understood that the consumers did not want a
ceiling on it, as that would tend to reduce the supply, and that
anyway they were using increased wood cost as a reason for demand

ing higher paper price; that there probably would be an ordered

curtailment of production, but that no price increase would be

considered on that account until unprofitable operations had been
shut down, and then only if those that were left were unable to

equal 1936-1939 profit; and that the O.P.A. was frankly skeptical
of any increased costs now projected by the newsprint companies,
because their forecasts during the past year had not held up.

Each company, however, was allowed to present such projections
for 1943.

In speaking for Great Northern, Tom Allen made the

point that the industry had been given no help by a ceiling on

wages, either in the mills or in the woods, to which the answer

was that that was tough luck; that when a ceiling price had been
set it was up to the manufacturers to keep his costs within it,
and that nothing said he had to give wage increases!

So much

for voluntary price-setting.
At this point, a question by one of the O.P.A. attorneys
spilled the beans, and it came out that the real problem was the

fact that the Canadian mills were making 75 percent of the news

print consumed; that they had not furnished any cost figures, al-
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though they said they had them made up in the form requested by
O.P.A.; that even if they were willing to supply them the Canadian

Wartime Prices and Trade Board would not let them; that the O.P.A.

really felt that from the figures given by the U.S. mills (which
they had just said they did not believe) an increase in the ceil
ing price might well be warranted, but that they were not about to
raise it on the basis of information from 25 percent of the industry

nor to give the uncooperative Canadian industry the benefit of an
increase based on U.S. figures; that it would not be practical to

raise the ceiling for U.S. mills only, and that unless the Cana

dians got in line the U.S. mills were stuck with the $50.00 price.

On November 1st, the Company announced that its price for 1943

would be $50.00 New York, or whatever higher or lower ceiling
was fixed by the O.P.A.
Following this, some of the companies suggested that the pro
tests be withdrawn, but not only would William A. Whitcomb have
no part of this, but continued to put together material with which

to go back into battle.

This was in the form of a formal rebuttal

of the ’’economic data” and was submitted on November 13th.

On

top of this, preparations were made to file a second protest.

On

December 12th, the New York Times published a statement by W.G.
Chandler, head of the Printing & Publishing Division of the W.P.B.,
addressed to the American Newspaper Publishers’ Association, that

the O.P.A. was about to relax its position on price.

No confirma

tion could be obtained from O.P.A., but preparations for the new

protest were held up, and the Company requested that no action be
taken on its original protests pending developments.

About this

time, Leon Henderson, Administrator of the Office of Price Adminis
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tration, was replaced by Prentiss M. Brown.

On December 22d, the

two O.P.A. members of the Newsprint Industry Advisory Council

(neither of whom, incidentally had any connection with paper
manufacturing) met in New York with people from St. Croix, Maine

Seaboard, Finch Pruyn, Southland and Great Northern, William 0.

McKay representing the Company, to discuss the situation.

This

did not get much of anywhere, the O.P.A. now admitting that there

had been delay in making decisions, one of them saying that this
irritated him to the point where "at times he had to put on his

hat and walk around the block to cool off”; that the resignation
of Leon Henderson had fouled things up, and that "as a matter of
fact we are in a hell of a dilemma."

However, they promised to

try to get some action, saying that they were not in favor of

sacrificing the U.S. industry for the benefit of an industry in
a foreign country.

On December 31st the W.P.B., after consulta

tion with the newspaper publishing industry, whose voluntary res
traints were not producing the desired reduction in the use of

newsprint, the production of which required a lot of material and
labor, issued Order L-240, limiting consumption of paper in each

quarter to an amount not greater than that used in the same quarter

of 1941.

This was intended to effect about a 10 percent cut.

It

was not a very strong order, in that it depended more upon self

regulation than on actual allocation, and it allowed rather gener
ously for supplemental quotas, but it was at least an official re

straint.
By January, 1943, everyone was in a sweat, partly due to

developments in the area of wood supply, which we will go into

later.

Sheldon Wardwell wrote to Edwin Bechtel on January 21st:
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’’You will remember that I thought we had reason to expect an
advance prior to February 1st, but the story now is that Brown,

the new Administrator, is going into seclusion for a while to
study the problems of price control and nothing can be expected

before February 15th at the earliest.

What I am afraid of is

that there will be an attempt to stall the decision beyond March
1st in the hope that it may interfere with an announcement for

the second quarter .... The principal increases in cost...will
be effective as of January 1st, and curtailment of production

soon thereafter.

Revised Procedural Regulation, Section 26,

contains the provision that any protest based solely on grounds

arising after the date of issuance of a maximum price regulation
shall be filed within a period of sixty days.......... If this provi

sion is legal, therefore, a company not filing a protest might
condone all these increases in cost.

It does not seem to me

that this amendment to Procedural. Regulation is warranted by
Section 203 A of the Act....but do we want to take the chance?
I hate to file a new protest, fearing that it might do some

harm to the cause, but yet do not feel quite comfortable.”

was finally decided to go ahead.

It

While this was in the works,

inquiries through Senator Owen Brewster developed the information

late in the month that there would be a decision before the end of
February.

The Canadian industry had been putting pressure on

Prentiss Brown.

On February 19th, in connection with the prepara

tion of the new protest, Sheldon Wardwell wrote:

”I have just

heard that the Canadians are very sore and will make an announce
ment of price next week if the O.P.A. does not act.”

It acted,

late in the month, amending M.P.R. 130, as of March 1st, allowing
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an increase to $54.00 in the New York price.

On March 11th,

official notification was received that the file on the old
protest on M.P.R. 130 was closed, on the ground that the request
ed relief bad been granted, and the new protest, which had been

put in final form, was held up.
The hope had been that in view of all that bad happened since

cost increase information had been submitted eight months before,
that the increase allowed would be greater.

The Canadian industry

openly expressed displeasure, and Great Northern’s new protest

went back to the drawing board.

Some fine legal points arose here.

Protest bad to be made within sixty days of the order, which tech
nically was M.P.R. 130, and the docket on this had been closed.

However, it was finally agreed that it would be in order to proceed
against the amended M.P.R. of March 1st, Edwin Bechtel saying:

’’The language. .. .could be tempered so as not to offend the Office

of Price Administration.”

Meanwhile, the O.P.A. had broken out

with a rash of new reporting forms, probably in anticipation of
such action.

The new protest -- we refer to Great Northern’s, although
other manufacturers also filed separately -- asked the O.P.A. to

take into account cost increases in 1942 and early 1943, which
amounted to about $7.00 a ton, and to grant a further rise of $5.00

in the ceiling, and was filed on April 28th.

On May 26tb, the

O.P.A. advised that more time was needed for study, but promised
a reply by July 19tb.

However, a new labor agreement negotiated

in April called for higher rates starting May 1st, other costs,

particularly wood, were still rising, the July 19th date was too
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late, even if action was favorable, to allow of putting out a

new price for that month, and rather than file a supplement to

the protest, as had been done before, it was agreed by letter with
the O.P.A. on June 10th that no action would be taken until cost

reports for the second quarter were filed, and that these would
be taken into account as if included in the original protest.

The effects of Order L-240 began to be felt at the mills, with

some machines shut down at intervals at both Millinocket and Fast
Millinocket.

Even at that, the newspapers were not living up

to what was expected of them under the order.

From the New York

Times of May 20, 1943, under the head ’’W.P.B. WARNS PRESS TO SAVE

NEWSPRINT”

’’Either newspaper publishers must curtail their
consumption of newsprint or the War Production Board

will have to do it for them, W.G. Chandler, Director,
and H.N. Bitner, Deputy Director of W.P.B.’s Printing

& Publishing Division announced today.....”

We will quote only part of the joint statement, which was

concilliatory in tone:

’’The newsprint situation in the United States is serious.
It was expected that W.P.B. General Limitation Order L-240,

issued last December 31st, would effect a saving in news
print of approximately 10 percent.

This expectation is not

being fulfilled.

The latest American Newspaper Publishers’ Association
figures indicate only a 5 percent reduction from 1941 for

the first four months of this year.... only about 2-1/2
percent under the first four months of 1942.
for further curtailment now is urgent..........
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Requests for additional tonnage in the present quarter
filed in accordance with Order L-240, which seeks to prevent

undue hardship, are in many instances higher than relief
afforded in the first quarter, which was an adjustment

period.

Unfortunately, it is not possible for newspapers

to continue......... without making additional sacrifices...........
Therefore we appeal to newspapers generally to accept the

reductions in their current requirements which the Printing
& Publishing Division has been forced to make.

We appeal

to newspapers generally to ’play the game’ and voluntarily

reduce their requests.... We believe that failure to recog
nize the urgency of the present curtailment objective..........

will lead the publishing industry into a critical situation

where more drastic limitations will be inescapable."
A week later, O.P.A. and W.P.B. representatives went to
Canada to consult with industry and Government officials there.

Earlier, the Canadian industry, with the approval of its Wartime
Prices and Trade Board had agreed to ship to the U.S. about

240,000 tons of newsprint per month.

They now informed the W.P.B.

that they would ship no more than 210,000 tons.

As to the O.P.A.,

it was told that the Canadian industry insisted upon a further

increase in price of $6.00 a ton.

Sheldon Wardwell commented in

a memo on June 28th:
”My diagnosis is that (they) are especially dissatis

fied with the port discounts and have been unable to per
suade the O.P.A. to change the relationship - even to that

of the normal zone price.

As you will remember (they) with
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cheap water transportation, grabbed most of the port

tonnage all the way to Texas - all at the original fifty
dollar port level.

They are now faced with something like

an $18.00 freight rate to many of the southern ports....

Undoubtedly they would be willing to let the U.S. mills
take part of the loss and place Canadian tonnage at nearer

delivery points.”
This had validity, but more concrete was the fact that

Canada was very short of woods labor, its government not having
declared the production of pulpwood an essential industry.

the face of this, Great Northern was carrying on its own

In
fight

to get woodsmen from Canada, its only source of woods labor in
certain areas.

We will go into this in some detail later.

It

was also agonizing over additional evidence to be presented in
support of its price protest, when some time very close to the

July 19th deadline, the O.P.A., without any further consultation

with the industry, raised the ceiling price another $4.00, to
$58.00 New York, effective September 1st.

This again was not as

much as either Great Northern or the Canadian industry wanted,

but it was near enough for the Company, for the time being at

least.

It technically did not answer the protest, as it did not

give the relief asked for, but to allow the O.P.A. to issue a
blanket dismissal and not have to go through separate proceedings,
the three Maine companies, by agreement, formally withdrew their
petitions late in July.

The newspaper publishing industry did not object, as a whole,
to either of these price increases.

Its concern was for a supply
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of paper.

It bad been expected that with less consumer goods

available demand for advertising space would drop, but it did

not.

Circulation bad naturally increased, due to the war.

In

July, Order L-240 was amended, calling for a further 5 percent

reduction in use, but this did not accomplish much.

It was

not that the publishers were not willing to be cooperative, but the

pressures on them for news and advertising space was very great;
the permissive provisions of the limitation order were a tempta
tion to apply for supplemental quotas, in spite of Mr. Chandler’s
exhortation; the W.P.B., not wanting poor publicity,was still too
generous in allowing them, and there was just not enough paper.

The United States industry was operating at about 78 percent of

capacity, although Great Northern was up to 88 percent.
Canadian mills were averaging around 69 percent.

The

The basic

problem on both sides of the border was shortage of pulpwood,

and in spite of wishful predictions from some sources early in

the year that this would be alleviated, it was getting worse.
It would be practically impossible, within the scope of

this story, to analyze the witches’ brew that was bubbling by

the middle of 1943.

We can only make a pass at it.

The A.N.P.A.

and the W.P.B. were sending delegations to Canada, imploring the

industry and the Government to find ways to increase the supply

of paper.

The Canadian Newsprint Association and the Wartime

Prices and Trade Board were sending delegations to Washington to
show why it could not be done.

The United States manufacturers,

Great Northern in particular, were pulling every string in sight

to get more Canadian labor for their woods operations, and the
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Canadians were resisting, quite successfully.

The industry had

also begun to talk to the War Department about the use of prisoners

of war to cut wood, but the Army was not reacting enthusiastically.

The A.N.P.A. had raised the proposition of 30-lb. basis newsprint

instead of the standard 32-lb., and had created a Pulpwood Committee
of its own to try to be helpful in getting more wood cut, both in

the United States and in Canada.

The War Production Board had

set up a Pulpwood Production Board, with a lot of regional offices,

in a well-intentioned effort to aid in the procurement of pulp
wood through a series of specialized divisions -- transportation,

equipment, manpower and so on.

nothing but confusion.

This in the first instance caused

The writer attended the meeting at which

the Northeast Regional set-up was explained, and after six solid

hours of exhortation by five representatives of the various ser

vices offered or imposed, he came away not one whit enlightened,

except by the remarks of the last speaker, Lt. Curtis Hutchins,
of the Dead River Company, who had been given leave from the Navy

to act as bead of the Pulpwood Procurement Division, who talked
for only about ten minutes, and made a great deal of sense.

The

O.P.A. was talking about ceiling prices on pulpwood, which at this
point was counterproductive.

Everybody and his dog was after the

agencies in both countties controlling manpower to recognize, or

recognize more fully, the essentiality of newsprint, and provide

more woods labor from anywhere by allocation and deferments.
The Company was buying every stick of wood it could get its hands

on, in Maine and New Brunswick, and was advertising in every news

paper in the State for more.
Right in the middle of all this was the Boren Committee,

formed early in the year under the chairmanship of Congressman
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Lyle F. Boren of Oklahoma, to investigate the activities of Govern

ment production control agencies.

This spawned a sub-committee

on newsprint, also known as the Boren Committee, which proceeded

to rip into everyone concerned, criticizing the publishers for
not meeting their obligations under L-240; the W.P.B. ditto; the

various agencies controlling the supply and allocation of man

power in the United States and Canada; the Canadian industry for
not doing enough toward meeting the demand for paper; the Army
for dragging

its feet on P.O.W. labor, and the manufacturers in

both countries for not embracing the proposition of 30-lb. paper.
It was very active over the next couple of years; did not care
whose toes it stepped on, and was instrumental in forcing decision

and action.

One result was another amendment to L-240, knocking another 5
percent off the newsprint quota to publishers, making a total re

duction of 20 percent from the 1941 base period.

up for the first time by a tightening of order

This was backed

M-241, limiting

the amount of pulp that could be used in the manufacture of news
print.

This was something different from the system of allocating

pulp to fill orders for paper allowed to be placed under L-240, but
by its terms it was more for psychological effect than anything,

as it allowed for the allocation of more pulp than was actually

being used, and to the best of our recollection it caused no
difficulty as far as the mills were concerned -- at least no

more than was being experienced anyway.

The further cut in news

print allowance was mentioned by Harold Boeschenstein, Director

of the W.P.B. Production Contois Bureau, with a special assign

ment to the pulp, paper and lumber industries because of the
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difficulties they were in, who was called before the Boren sub
committee on October 7th, and said in part, in a long statement
and reported in A.N.P.A. Bulletin No. 60 of October 14, 1943:

”We have been living in part on our inventories at
least since 1941... Inventories of wood and wood pulp

in this country are now generally at a minimum working

level.... Canadian inventories will be in a

similar

situation by next spring if the present differential
between income and outgo continues...We cannot afford

to run the risk of prolonged interruptions in the opera

tion of newsprint or pulp mills and certainly not of
newspapers...,We must attack this overall problem at

the source, namely the amount of labor in the woods...
The production in this country depends on the flow of

pulpwood to the mills.

This supply of raw material is

currently inadequate by about 25 percent to permit full

operation of newsprint capacity.... The W.P.B. must look

to the Canadian government for a major share of any in

creased supply of pulpwood, which can only be provided
if the Canadian government arranges for the employment

of additional men on the task of cutting wood.

To

increase our own national supply...the W.P.B. must look

to the War Manpower Commission and the United States Army
as well as the individual farmer who might engage in wood

cutting as incidental to farm operation...."
He then went on to

outline a program for the coming season --

the establishment of a combined United States-Canada-United Kingdom
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Pulp & Paper Committee; exemption of farm labor from the draft;

the use of prisoners of war; expanded use of waste paper; the

encouragement of wood cutting by farmers; the reduction of news
print basis weight and stimulation of production by raising

price ceilings -- all old hat to producers, who were away ahead
of him -- and followed with a dissertation on the difficulties

faced by the W.P.B. in the area of pulp and paper production
because of the competition for manpower, which also was no news.

On October 15th, as reported in A.N.P.A. Bulletin No. 63

of October 19, 1943, Matthew G. Sullivan, Ass’t Director of the
Printing & Publishing Division of W.P.B. and Administrator of

Order L-240 was up before the Boren Committee, going into a long

explanation of why poor judgment in formulating the order, rather

than loose administration or violation was the reason for its lack

of success, the whole amounting to little more than a defense
of the performance of his division, about the only thing bearing

remotely on a solution being the profound statement: "Newspaper
publishers are grateful for your quick perception that what is
needed is increased production of pulpwood.

The W.P.B., having

allowed the newsprint situation to get well and truly fouled up

was pretty defensive as 1944 approached.

The Canadian industry was aggressively defensive.

On October

16th, Paul Kellogg, Acting President of the Newsprint Associa

tion of Canada wrote an open letter to the A.N.P.A., which began:
”It is with considerable concern that I have seen and
heard criticism by some American publishers to the effect
that Canadian newsprint manufacturers have failed in their
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obligation to their good customers on the other side of
the line.

I am concerned, not only because of apparent

lack of appreciation of the really heroic" (albeit
selfish) ‘'efforts being made by the Canadian industry

to keep up newsprint shipments but chiefly because these
utterances show such a complete disregard, or lack of
knowledge, of the actual facts in the case.’

He then went on to show that Canadian shipments of news to
the United States were several hundred thousand tons greater

in 1943 than in 1939, whereas U.S. mills were shipping 15 per
cent less to their customers, and that moreover Canada had been
supporting the U.S. industry by shipping to it more pulp and

pulpwood than in 1939, adding:
'I submit without any apology that Canada’s performance

during the time of war has been superb.

We have literally

rescued that portion of the American market which had pre
viously purchased its paper overseas.

Under these condi

tions and with these facts in front of me I just had to
display them to you, to whom I can speak without restraint

in justification of the performance of the industry which,
up to date, I repeat has been outstanding......... We now have no

pulpwood reserves to use for our customers, but no matter
what may be the degree of curtailment in 1944 I think you
will find when the year ends that Canada will be found to be

its usual reliable source of supply for United States pub
lishers .

God Save the King !
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His figures were perfectly good, but the publishers had been
led to believe that they could use at least 90 percent as much

paper as they had in 1941, when the Canadian mills had shipped

to the United States some 300,000 tons more than in 1939.

He

also did not mention that the U.S. industry which he belittled

had, except for the single shot in the arm given by the advent
of Southland in 1940, been going downhill for 20 years under the

circumstances which we have described.

He did not note that it

also was sharing its pulp, and at that, was running much nearer

to capacity than the Canadian operations.

He did not mention

that about this time Canada had indicated that it would cut its

shipments to the U.S. in 1944 to about 180,000 tons a month,

instead of the 210,000 tons it had been providing, this being
largely responsible for the latest order of another 5 percent
reduction in allowed consumption under L-240.

(This figure was

a little later raised to 200,000 tons, and the W.P.B. proposed

to put the difference into a pool, or

stockpile’ , from which it

would make distribution to the needy, but this proposal was never

implemented, and we will not go into it any further.)

And while

Canada actually did a little better than its forecasts in both
1943 and 1944 as to newsprint shipments, be did not mention some

other matters in which it was being anything but cooperative

in keeping the United States press supplied with paper, but we will.
In spite of Paul Kellogg’s assurances, everyone involved in

the manufacture, use or regulation of newsprint had at this point
come to the common recognition of the fact that the situation

was going to get worse, unless something was done about it, and
quickly, because the 1943-1944 cut was coming up, but nobody had
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the answer.

As far as Great Northern was concerned, it was fairly

simple -- more Canadian woods labor, and there was labor in Canada
which was ready and willing to cut for Great Northern and not for

the Canadian mills --

but getting it was another matter.

More

Canadian wood, from areas which normally exported it, was also

part of the answer, but not much less difficult to obtain.

We

will take that up later.
As we have noted previously, labor for the North Branch area,

from which the Company obtained about one-third of its wood, was
almost entirely French-Canadian.

Before 1917, there were no

United States restrictions on this labor, which came and went

across the border at will.

In this year, a head tax of $8.00

which allowed a man to remain in the United States as long as he

liked was imposed, which caused no problem.

In 1924, the visa

system, a formal individual permit to work in the United States,

was established, and in 1941 the "bonded labor"

program, under

which the employer had to obtain permission from the U.S. Depart

ment of Justice, through the Immigration and Naturalization Ser

vice, to import labor for a specific purpose, and guarantee that

every man returned to whence he came at the end of a specified
period, went into effect.

Although the wood cut in this area

was mostly harvested by contractors, the Company was responsible
for their observance of the labor laws established some years
before, and consequently their labor was technically Great Northern
labor, imported and bonded by the Company.

Permits to import or

retain specified numbers of men had to be applied for twice a year,
once in the spring and once in the fall.

The writer is not sure
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when the Canadian government began to place restrictions on the

number of men who might thus leave the country, and require them

to obtain exit permits, and this is not important to this part
of our story, but at the time of which we write, with Canada at
war, such restrictions had been imposed, and that was right and

proper.

In the 1941-1942 season, the Canadian authorities had

allowed 7,400 men to cross the border, practically all to cut
pulpwood.

Great Northern had permits from the U.S. Immigration

and Naturalization Service for 1250 of these, and in this season
obtained, from all sources, 382,000 cords of wood, which was about

normal.

The permits, which normally would have expired earlier,

had been extended to July 7, 1942.

By this time three new ele

ments, the War Manpower Commission in the United States, which

had the power to allocate the work force, both domestic and

alien imports approved by

the Justice Department; Canada's

National Selective Service Board, and the Canadian Employment
Security Commission, which among other things could control the

exit of labor from that country, had entered the picture, and
what had been more or less routine became suddenly very complicated.
It is hardly necessary to say again that the Canadian news

print industry was a very powerful political force north of the
border, although not always in agreement with the policies of its

government, and it was losing its woods labor to the military and

to war industry.

In the spring of 1942, according to a report

made by William Hilton, a group of representatives from the U.S.
paper mills conferred twice in Montreal with a similar Canadian

Of More Things - 80

1974

industry group, and an agreement was made that the United States
industry —

Great Northern was of course not the only applicant --

could have 3700 Canadian woodsmen; half as many as it had had the
year before.

This was unofficial, but apparently effective with

the Canadian authorities, and acceptable, at least to Great Northern
because it was allowable to replace a man who left, and while some

1800 men had come and gone under the permit for 1250, the Company
had never had more than 900 working at one time.

Application for

625 men was duly made by Great Northern to the Justice Department,
who turned it over to the War Manpower Commission.

This agency,

under its own peculiar formula, reduced the quota to 517, and on

the basis of a later head count which found only 507 Canadians
actually in the camps, promptly reduced the allowance to that

number.

There were some small individual allotments to contrac

tors, notably Tom Pinkham (this was the elder Pinkham) in Aroos
took County, working for Great Northern, but these did not amount

to a great many men, and to avoid complicating the complications
we will confine ourselves to Great Northern figures.

The Company’s

cut, including purchased wood, in the 1942-1943 season, totalled

303,000 cords.
This was where matters stood on March 1, 1943, when William

Hilton applied for permission to retain the 507 men be had.

Be

fore this time, it was clear that it just might be difficult to

get any quota at all.

In November, 1942, Senator Brewster who

had been keeping in touch with the War Manpower Commission, the
State Department, the Immigration Service and the War Production

Board, had learned that the Canadian government was objecting to

the employment of Canadian citizens in Maine, at that time on the
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ground that a lot of them were not taking the trouble to obtain
exit permits, and that they did not stay in the woods, but went

to the ship-yards and other better-paying jobs, but there were

other considerations, as it turned out.
From this point on, it is hard to tell who was negotiating

with whom.

So many people were involved that it became ridiculous,

and we will not try to follow all the names.

In January, Sheldon

Wardwell had been talking about getting the whole New England

Congressiona1 delegation involved; the Northeastern Pulp Producers’
Committee said that things were progressing, and to cool it.

W.G.

Chandler, of the Scripps-Howard organization, at that time Director
of the W.P.B.’s Printing and Publishing Division, endorsed William
Hilton’s application in a letter to the War Manpower Commission on

March 9th.

On May 10th, there had been no decision, but Senator

Brewster advised that War Manpower and Canadian officials were
conferring on that day.

At this point the cat got out of the bag.

It developed that Paul V. McNutt, head of the War Manpower Com

mission,had dropped a wrench into Great Northern’s works by agree
ing with the Canadian Minister of Labor on April 28tb, in writing

yet, that no Canadian labor allowed to come to the United States
would be permitted to cut pulpwood to be used in the manufacture

of newsprint -- other papers yes, news no way -- the Canadians
having made the statement, referring to Paul Kellogg’s letter

which we have quoted, that they could supply all the newsprint
needed, therefore the manufacture of news in the United States

was not "essential"; and Mr. McNutt bad bought it.

Sheldon Ward

well immediately went to bat on this with the W.M.C., stating in
a memo dated May 13, 1943: ”I pointed out the illogical position
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of having a foreign government decide what was essential or nonessential in this country (and) called attention to the fact that

this was directed solely against Great Northern and obviously
stimulated directly or indirectly by competitors.'
he wrote to Senator Brewster:

The next day

’’The newspapers of May 12th carry

a statement by Mr. Cullen, President of International, that power,

labor and transportation situations in Canada are in perfect condi

tion to supply an undiminishing supply of newsprint to American

newspapers throughout this year and well into next year, so it

seems obvious that the Canadian attempt at curtailment of labor to
this country, particularly the attempt to discriminate against the
Great Northern, is not warranted by conditions.’

However, subject to the condition that they not be used to
cut wood for newsprint mills, Canada had agreed that a limited

number of men would be provided.

This number turned out to be

2700, but the open-ended provision was cancelled.

That meant that

if a man went home, another could not be recruited to take his

place -- a very serious restriction.

On May 12th, William Hilton

was advised by the Immigration Service that the 507 men on his
existing permit all had to be out of the country by June 8th, and

that he must make a new application, which he did on May 26th,

asking for the same number to be allowed to remain until January

8, 1944, but because of the reduced number available, his allot
ment was only 360 for the sumner period, or until October 31st.

Sheldon Wardwell went to Washington to expostulate with the War

Manpower Commission.

He did not get to see Paul McNutt, but was

assured that the threatened discrimination would be looked into.
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At this time, the question of importing Labor from Newfound

land, then a Crown Colony, not part of Canada, was brought up and
explored, it being the impression that the completion of work on

military installations there would release a lot of men.

However,

upon investigation, which straggled along into November, it was

found that most of this labor had gone back to regular jobs, and
that there was little unemployment on the island, so that no help

could be looked for in that direction.

The War Manpower Commission

also made some talk about labor from Puerto Rico and the Bahamas,
but this went nowhere.

Meanwhile, Donald Nelson, then head of the War Production

Board, had by direct intervention got agreement to withdrawal
of the War Manpower Commission’s promise that Canadians would
However, in William

not be used to cut pulpwood for newsprint.
Hilton's view, the harrassment continued.

to Sheldon Wardwell that

On June 22d he wrote

"the Canadian officials are putting in

about all the trigs they can find to bother the Immigration
Service”, and on August 4th he wrote to John Hobson, President
of the Newsprint Manufacturers' Association:

”This year while Canada has agreed to give us a
limited number of men they have instituted regulations

which almost nullify the whole procedure.

For instance,

it is impossible to bring across...men of military age

or farmers.

In talking with the W.M.C. in Boston yesterday,

they claimed that Canada is not going to draft these men
(farmers) into military service, and will not allow them to

leave the country, hoping that this will drive them into

the Army, which......... will probably not accomplish their purpose."
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His argument was that the labor upon which the Company had
always depended were Quebec French farmers from the Eastern

Townships adjacent to the border, who could travel between their
homes and the North Branch camps in a matter of hours; that

they were exempt from the draft; would not enlist in the service;

would not go into the Canadian woods operations, which were mostly
on the north side of the St. Lawrence River, far from their homes;
that if they were working in a Great Northern camp they were not

so far away that they could not easily be policed and readily
recalled if needed, but that otherwise they would farm a little

in the summer, and sit in their kitchens all winter, represent

ing a complete waste

of labor and a loss of cash income, and

that these facts were so evident that there ought to be some
way to get sensible people on both sides to see them and work

out a deal that would benefit both.

About this time the United States industry received another
jolt when the Canadian government announced that it was contem

plating a one-third reduction in the amount of pulpwood that
might be exported, and word got around that pressure was being put

on it again to stop the exit of all woods labor, on the same ground
that it was being used for non-essential purposes -- and Sheldon

Wardwell drew from the W.M.C. the admission that this was barking

back to the proposition that newsprint was not essential -- with

the added reason that it provided a chance for draft-dodgers to
get out of the country.

This stirred new activity, not only to get

this attitude changed and obtain a larger quota of woods labor for

the fall and winter, but to improve the whole deteriorating rela
tionship in the area of pulpwood supply.

The various Maine com-
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panics were not working too well together, either.

Great Northern

largely pursued its own interests, although it did not neglect

those of others where they coincided.

In this part of our story,

we will stick with the labor aspect as far as possible, taking up

direct pulpwood supply from Canada later.
William A. Whitcomb appealed to W.G. Chandler, who got in
touch with R.M. Fowler, General Counsel of the Canadian Wartime

Prices and Trade Board, who on September 17th wrote that his
organization had nothing to do with labor, this being in the hands

of National Selective Service, and that National Selective Service
had not received any request for labor for the fall period from

the U.S. War Manpower Commission.
September 22d:

Sheldon Wardwell wrote on

’’Now it strikes me that this is the usual run

around, as I am pretty confident that War Manpower would like to

obtain all the Canadian labor they can and that (National) Selec
tive Service knows it perfectly well."

The War Manpower Commission

said that the Canadian Ministry of Labor, not National Selective
Service, determined the quota, and that it had been working on the

matter and had a meeting arranged in Ottawa to discuss it, having
delayed until this time because it had been indicated that there

might be a larger allotment after the farming season had ended.

Coming into October, 1943, the situation was just as confused
as we are sure we have made it seem, and things began to get hectic.
We will have to leave out many of the steps which followed, but

will try to put in those which best tell the story.

The scheduled

meeting of the War Manpower Commission with the Canadian authorities
was cancelled by the latter, with no reason given that we can find,
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and the former threw up its hands and said that it appeared that
the Company would have to look after itself.

Senator Brewster,

who was working closely with Great Northern, prevailed upon the

State Department to try to do something, and the State Depart

ment asked that everyone lay off for a week or two while it tried

to straighten things out.

William A. Whitcomb enlisted the help

of Cranston Williams, General Manager of the A.N.P.A., who offered

to lay the matter before the Boren Committee, which had hearings
coming up, but it was decided not to explode anything like that

until the State Department had been given a little time.

Pro

bably at the instigation of the Company’s French contractors, the
mayors of four Quebec towns in the border area wrote letters stat
ing that there were at least 2,200 men right in their communities,
who could not go far from their farms, but wanted to work in Maine

and that if the restrictions
great hardship.

were not lifted, there would be

A petition was signed by a large number of Quebec

farmers in outlying areas, to the same effect.

These were sent,

not to the Canadian authorities, but to William Hilton.

Copies

of translations were given to the W.M.C., the W.P.B. and Cranston
Williams on October 13th, with instructions not to use them until

they could be filed with the appropriate Canadian agency.

In its

October 14th issue, the Paper Trade Journal reported on a blunt

address by Howard Smith, President of the Canadian Pulp & Paper
Association, in which he blamed his own government for the short

age of woods labor -- the Canadian mills were hurting too -- say
ing that the farmers would not go into the woods; the ’’bush” in

Canada; to cut wood, for fear of losing their draft-exempt status.

With the State Department in the game, the whole matter had worked
up to Canadian Cabinet level, if that is not where it had been all
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along, and on October 19th Senator Brewster telegraphed Sheldon

Wardwell that it looked as if some progress was being made.
Senator Brewster was a real optimist.

Cranston Williams had been

in touch with W.G. Chandler, and on October 20th the latter tele
phoned William 0. McKay and offered to arrange to give the situa
tion wide publicity, but he also was asked to hold off to see what

came of the State Department’s efforts.

On the same day, Gov.

Sumner Sewall of Maine offered to issue a proclamation laying the
principal blame for the sad situation in the pulp and paper in

dustry on the Canadian authorities, and Senator Brewster agreed
that this might not be a bad move, but we have no record of its
being done.

On October 22d, Frank Pearson, the then Assistant

Manager of the Spruce Wood Department, after cooling his heels

in Ottawa for 24 hours, personally delivered the Quebec petitions
to H.A. McNamara, Deputy Minister of Labor, and those who had

copies were released to use them any way they liked.

On October

23d, Sen. Brewster wired Sheldon Wardwell:

’’STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISES CANADIAN CABINET DECIDED

AGAINST CLOSING BORDER WOODSMEN WILL BE ALLOWED
TO ENTER REPRESENTATIVES IN CANADA NOW WORKING

OUT DETAILS”.
Very interesting.

Great Northern had been pretty much holding

back, awaiting just this word, but some of the natives were rest
less.

On October 20th, Tom Allen had reported that a group of

the eastern manufacturers, acting under the guidance of the American
Pulp & Paper Association, had arranged a meeting with the War Man

power Commission in New York for October 27th, and that if they
did

not get results, they were threatening to engage counsel,

which they had all picked out, to ’’start fireworks before the

Of More Things - 88

1974

Truman Committee".

This was the "Senate Committee to Investi

gate the National Defense Program", chaired by Senator, later

President Harry S. Truman.

By October 25th, word was out that

3500 Canadians would be allowed to come over to work in the
woods in the northeastern United States, applications to be
made during the first half of November.
meeting with the W.M.C. in New York.

This was announced at the

William A. Whitcomb had

allowed Tom Allen to attend this meeting, but bad refused to have
anything to do with the projected legal action, saying that Great
Northern would face its own problems in its own way.

Obviously

no great progress had been made in improving cooperation.

The

figure of 3500 was disappointing, and again the rumor was about
that none of these men could be used to cut wood for newsprint

mills.

This came from another letter written by Paul V. McNutt

to the Canadian Minister of Labor, read at the New York meeting,
which contained the statement: ‘'These men will be allocated in
accordance with the essentiality to end use."

Which could be

subject to the above interpretation, but was not.

Apparently

this time newspapers, rather than newsprint, were considered
the "end product".
The W.M.C. said that it would allocate the number of men

allowed on about the same basis as the year before, and that

after they were over the line they would try for more.

At just

about this time, the Boren Committee, which had been talking with

producers, publishers and the various government agencies involved
took matters into its own hands, Lyle Boren writing to President

Roosevelt a letter in which he said that the newsprint shortage
was growing worse so rapidly as to threaten the continuation of
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a free press; that: the cooperation given the Committee by the
various agencies of government was not all that it might have

been, and outlined a number of steps that might be taken, most

of which, except the exemption of some number of woodsmen from

the draft, and direct action by the W.M.C. to take skilled
cutters out of less essential jobs and put them back in the
woods, had already been taken, however unsuccessfully.

The

essential content of this letter was published in the Paper

Trade Journal of November 4, 1943.

It drew little more than

a brush-off from the President.
The next unpleasant development was that 1000 of the 3500-

man quota were assigned to the cutting of saw-logs, and the
Company’s allotment by the W.M.C., as of November 15th, was re

duced from 360 to 300 men.

On November 16th, the United States

Pulpwood Producers’ Association filed a formal protest with the
W.P.B. against the inadequacy of the recently announced allot

ment of 3500 men, on behalf of the northeastern mills, stating
that the restriction on replacement recruiting would make it im

possible to keep anywhere near this number in effective employment,

and that a survey which it had made in the border townships of
Quebec showed at least 10,000 experienced workers available.

This

of itself did not produce any direct results, but it contributed

to the obtaining of a small additional quota which was supposed
to offset the restriction against recruiting to fill vacancies,
which remained in effect.
ments for the year 1943.

This was the end of woods labor develop
Great Northern's acquisitions of pulp

wood from all sources in the 1943-1944 season was only 216,000
cords.

It cost $22.61 per peeled cord, delivered at the mill,
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against $12.15 for the 1940-1941 cut.

Inventory of wood in the

mill piles and in various stages of delivery, was 290,000 cords,
about 40 weeks' supply, on January 1, 1944, as compared with
517,000 cords, or 79 weeks’ supply, at the start of the year
1941, and the Penobscot mills went down to five days a week.

At this point, it might be appropriate to look back at the
first ring of the circus, where the newsprint price act was going

on.

We left this with a figure of $58.00, New York, set as of

September 1, 1943, and in effect on January 1, 1944, with the
Company’s protest, which had some bearing on the establishment

of this price withdrawn, and nobody happy.
Great Northern began to make figures for Protest No. 3.

The question immediately arose as to what to do about the im

pending manufacture of 30-lb. newsprint.

It was decided to

ignore it, Sheldon Wardwell saying in a letter to Bryan Seelye on
January 7, 1944:

”lf we try to go into the refinements of 30-lb.

newsprint, we will never get this done on time and it will com

plicate the issue.

We can file on that later if necessary".

As

we have noted, everybody but the manufacturers had suggested this
remedy, and it will not take too long to tell what happened to
this proposition, which was at the pressure stage at this time,

with a bill introduced by Senator Boren to revise the definition
of standard newsprint to allow 30-lb. paper to enter duty-free,

because to be of any great benefit, the Canadian mills would have

to agree to make it.
In explanation, let us say that the idea of 30-lb. newsprint

was to get more yardage out of the same number of tons, hence more
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white space from the same amount of wood; or, if you like, the

same white space from less wood.

This was fine for the news

papers, although it presented certain technical problems in
printing, like strike-through and show-through, but it made a pro
blem for the mills.

It not only reduced the production of a

machine in tons, if run at the same speed as 32-lb., but being
inherently weaker, either the machine had to be slowed down for
safe running, or more long fibre had to be used, or both, all of

which cost, and more chemical pulp partly offset any saving in
wood.
On February 8th, the Production Committee of the Canadian

newsprint industry presented to the War Production Board in Wash

ington a long memorandum ’’prepared at the request of the W.P.B.”

This, summarized, stated that the demand for 30-lb. paper was
based on a natural but erroneous assumption that the supply could
be increased by its manufacture; that if the customers were will

ing to meet the extra cost the change presented no mechanical

problems and no serious disadvantage to the manufacturers ”as long
as customers are prepared for possible ill-effect on supply and
will take the responsibility for the consequences of their choice.'
We will not go into all the argument, which took up many technical

and economic factors, and set up three hypothetical situations
which might develop, all equally unpalatable, ending: ’The Cana
dian manufacturers wish to be under no reproach, from any direc

tion, for ill-results....and the possibilities of discrimination
between customers.

'These are the reasons which impel the manufacturers to provide
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all available information and which lead them to hope that a
period for adequate study....may help all concerned to avoid

wrong conclusions and mistaken action.11
Their argument had been anticipated by the International
Printing Pressmen and Assistants’ Union, which issued a state

ment printed in the American Pressman of November 1, 1943, vio
lently opposing the use of 30-lb. paper from the point of view
of its technology.

Great Northern, while not enthusiastic about it, went along
with the request of some of its larger customers for a trial of

the light-weight, and in December, 1943, wrote letters to all its
accounts, offering to ship it as a substitute for standard news
print on their contracts during the months of January and February,

1944, at a price of $5.00 above the maximum for the standard sheet,

this figure having been unofficially approved by the O.P.A. for a

trial period.

However, on December 16th, the O.P.A. switched its

ground, issuing an amendment to M.P.R. 130 (Amendment No. 5),
allowing a premium for light-weight only to the extent of the in

creased cost of manufacture, determined under a specified procedure.

This of course was considered by the Company to be a double-cross,
and Sheldon Wardwell, accompanied by John Hobson, was dispatched

to Washington on December 30th to argue the point, which he did
with vigor, reporting in a memo dated December 31st that they
were told that the O.P.A. did not intbnd to let anybody make any

profit out of the 30-lb. paper, to which he had replied that he

was less interested in the immediate dollars and cents than in
a proper method of determining a standard differential, which

the order, in his opinion did not provide; that if it was an unfair
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differential the Company could not afford to cooperate; that

nobody wanted to make the paper, but were willing to try their

best to assist in the war effort and that the Canadian mills
insisted that they would not make the paper anyway.

He then

wrote:

nThe atmosphere was quite warm at this point and I
told Mr. Atwater that I was going to New York to meet

Mr. Bechtel who would be responsible for advising the
Great Northern, and that in view of what he had said I

was going to suggest as a possibility that the Company
notify customers that it would carry through their January

orders on the standard (price) basis, without any advance,
but cancel all future commitments until there was a fair

method of determining the differential.

This caused a

real explosion."

We should say that this matter of disagreement with the O.P.A.
over its standards for determining cost or cost changes was per

ennial.

There was altercation about the cost of wood, the method

of charging it to the mill, the cost of freight allowed, repair

costs, overhead, depreciation, the cost of power and what if any

taxes to include or exclude, every time price was argued.

These

controversies were much too complicated to even begin to explain,

and on some of these things there was never any agreement.
Edwin deT. Bechtel proposed going right to the top, with a
letter to, or an eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation with Chester
Bowles, the new Director of O.P.A., or even a formal protest,
but while this was being considered, W.G. Chandler advised William

A. Whitcomb against it, saying that he would see what he could do.

However, nothing further was heard from him.
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Croix and Maine Seaboard began shipping 30-lb. paper in January,

1944, on orders, as they had agreed, charging the $5.00 extra.
The West Coast mills also began making the light-weight at the
same time, setting their price $7.50 above the regulated price.

The Canadian mills were not accepting orders, having been told

by the Newsprint Administrator of the W.P.T.B., as reported in
the Paper Trade Journal of March 9, 1944, not to make any light
weight news before April 30th, while the matter was studied.

In

the meantime, Senator Boren’s bill, with amendments by Senator
Arthur Vandenberg limiting its life to the duration plus six

months, had been passed by the Congress.

To make a long story

shorter, the O.P.A., after consultations with the Advisory Com

mittee, issued, on April 1st, Amendment No. 6 to M.P.R. 130,
allowing $4.00 a ton differential, and the Canadian mills began

to take orders, but the experiment was abandoned along about June,
when the War Production Board, finding that some of the news

papers were ordering much larger quantities of the light-weight

paper than their allocations called for, negating the whole pur
pose of the thing, amended L-240 again, requiring that orders for
30-lb. paper be reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage

difference between 30 lbs. and 32 lbs., upon which, of course,

everybody stopped ordering 30-lb. paper, and that was the end
of it.

Protest No. 3 against Amendment No. 4 of M.P.R. 130, filed
on January 17, 1944, asked that the ceiling price be increased

to $63.00, Zone 4; another $4.00.

The Company had just applied

for approval of an increase in woods wages, which was included

in the projected increased costs, and this raised a technical
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problem as to whether to file for an "amendment" of the order,
or make a protest.

The legal people were a little confused.

A request for amendment had to be made within 15 days of the
application for a wage increase, and if turned down was in

contestable.

A protest, which could be appealed, had to be

filed within 60 days of the last price order, and this period

had passed.

It was decided to file a protest, but the importance

of this technical difference seems to have been overlooked, and
there was a great rush to get it filed within fifteen days.

It was carefully explained to the O.P.A. that no "precipitate

action" was wanted, in the hope that reports for operations
during the first quarter would get into the record and be taken

into account, Edwin Bechtel writing Sheldon Wardwell on January
28th:

I hope that there will be enough time and consideration

of the protest so that no arbitrary decision will be made."

As

On February 14th the

it turned out, there was lots of time.

O.P.A. requested and was granted an extension of 60 days in which

to act, but on the 24th, Chester Bowles dismissed the protest
because it was a protest, and had not been filed within the re
quired 60 days after the last amendment to the order.

However,

he allowed it to be entered as a "petition for amendment”, on
which no action would be taken until after the expiration of the
extension which the Company bad allowed.

Within this time, sub

mission of additional information and a petition for reinstate
ment of the protest would be allowed.

the deck.

This was really shuffling

William A. Whitcomb was all for going to Washington

immediately and raising a disturbance, but Sheldon Wardwell got
him cooled off, his feeling being that there was not going to be
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any consideration given to a further price increase anyway, un
less the Canadians got into it, which they had not yet done, but
for protection, arrangements were made in April for another 60-

day extension in which to file an amended form of protest.

However,

there were second thoughts about this, too, and on June 6th the
protest, or ’’petition for emendment", as it had become, was with
drawn without prejudice.

The price of newsprint remained at

$58.00, New York, through 1944.

There was no further action until January, 1945, when a new
petition for amendment of M.P.R. 130, Amendment 4, prepared in
December, was filed after a conference with O.P.A. officials in

Washington on January 8th.

This again asked for a $63.00 Zone

4 price, to be effective February 1st.

While nothing was heard

from Canada, at least publicly, other United States Companies
had been making themselves heard in one way or another, and on

April 1, 1945 the O.P.A. raised the ceiling to $61.00 port,
which was $62.00 Zone 4, a $3.00 increase.

We have latterly

been using the official "port" designation instead of New York,
but port price was New York City price.
On May 7, 1945 the war in Europe came to an end, and not long
thereafter, the limitation orders on the use of all papers except

newsprint were lifted.

L-240 remained in effect, but was liberal

ized, since the production situation in Canada improved almost
at once.

In 1944, the Canadian industry had operated at just

about the same rate as in the previous year, although its exports

to the U.S. were somewhat lower.

In 1945, its production got up

to 77 percent of capacity, while United States output dropped to
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74 percent.

As we have pointed out, it was not easy to convert

a Canadian newsprint mill to some other grade, but in the U.S.,

the older and smaller mills had been moving gradually to other
papers, their capacity to produce newsprint dropping from some

1,100,000 tons per year after Southland bad gone into operation

in 1940 to about 950,000 tons in 1945, and with the lifting of

restrictions on more profitable grades, this process was accelerat
ing to the point where there began to be concern that the industry

was about to become extinct.

Further representations were made

to O.P.A. during the summer, resulting in the tentative sugges
tion that perhaps a further $2.00 raise might be allowed, but

at a meeting of the O.P.A. Newsprint Advisory Committee in New
York on September 7, 1945, it was agreed that this would be

entirely inadequate and that "if the United States mills are to
continue to produce this grade, a substantial price increase is
required by January 1, 1946; otherwise the executives of these mills
who are responsible to the stockholders, cannot conscientiously

further recommend that newsprint be produced in preference to other
grades.”

It further agreed to gather together cost information

and meet again on October 23d to lay this on the O.P.A.

Creighton

Stanwood was at this time the Company's member on the Advisory
Committee, and it was not fooling.

As the result of its recom

mendations, based on actual costs for the last three quarters of
1945, partly estimated, and projected ahead into the first quarter

of 1946, the O.P.A., almost apologetically, after consulting with
the Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board, on December 6th again

amended M.P.R. 130, raising the price of newsprint another $6.00

as of January 1, 1946, making it $67.00 port, or New York City if
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The publishers raised little or no objection, but

this increase did not satisfy the Company, which in informal dis
cussions with the O.P.A. had been urging an increase of $9.00.

However, let us leave it at this point, and go back to the woods
labor ring.

There was a lot of action here during the two years

we have been discussing, and Great Northern was in the forefront
of it, not only because of its distaste for "joining", but, more
importantly, because it was the largest newsprint manufacturer,

and the only one heavily dependent upon Canadian labor.

What we

will write, then, is all pertinent to the Great Northern story.
We will try to cover most of the angles, although it will be

necessary to leave out a lot of detail.
We left this part of our story on January 1, 1944, with the
Company and the northeast segment of the pulp and paper industry

in general up in arms over the refusal of Canada to allow woods
labor which could not be used in that country to work in the pulp

wood and lumbering operations in the United States, except in
limited and inadequate numbers -- 3500 men of non-military age
and non-farmers; less than half the pre-war figure -- in spite

of the efforts of the individual companies and the various organiza
tions representing them, the American Newspaper Publishers' Asso

ciation, the War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board,
several U.S. senators and other Congressmen, the Boren Committee

and the United States Department of State.

The Company had up to

this time pretty much worked through channels, and had tried to be

reasonably polite, but it was running out of patience as well as
wood.
The Northeast Pulp Producers’ Committee had just contacted
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Sheldon Wardwell, urging him to turn on the heat through Congress

ional connections to get the War Manpower Commission beefed up

to negotiate with Canada at high level, stating that the situation
had gone beyond the point where the Committee had any effective
ness.

On January 3, 1944, be wired Senator Brewster:
" I AM ADVISED WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION WILL CONFER
SHORTLY WITH CANADA CONFINING NEGOTIATIONS TO

REPLACEMENTS ONLY THIS A RELATIVELY MINOR ISSUE
WE. NEED MEN PERIOD.”
The telegram went on to say in effect that the W.P.B. had

tried to be helpful, but had been stymied by the W.M.C., and that

the time had come to throw the whole weight of the Congressional
delegation from the northeast on the latter.

His letter of the

same date, confirming the telegram, ended:

”Your diagnosis has been right from the beginning,
and the industry - including the writer - has been weak

and vacillating.”
(On December 20, 1943, the Senator had written ”I wish to repeat
again to you that I can see no real increase in Canadian alloca
tions over and above the present agreement until the industry asks
for and gets a Congressional Committee to go to Ottawa for the

express purpose of taking the matter up with MacKenzie King and
the Secretary of Labor and all concerned.

This recommendation,

as you will recall, I have been making for some two years now.”)
W.L. MacKenzie King was Canada’s Prime Minister.

On the same day, Sheldon Wardwell wrote to Rep. Robert Hale,
of Maine, suggesting, as he had to Senator Brewster, that tbe New

England Congressional delegation start putting pressure on the
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War Manpower Commission and on the State Department to get tough;
but being informed almost immediately by some unidentified source

that the delegation the W.M.C. was preparing to send to Ottawa

the second week in January was high-level, he back-pedalled,

asking Senator Brewster to hold bis fire until the results of
the conference were known, saying that the main difficulty now
seemed to be that the Canadian Ministry of Labor, having said that
there were no men available, had to save face, and that ”if we

bust out, negotiations may be harmed."

He was too late.

In the

intervening 24 hours, Senator Brewster and Senator White, of Maine,

had laid the matter directly before Cordell Hull, Secretary of
State, asking him to contact the Canadian Ambassador, to pave

the way for the W.M.C. delegation, and to have the U.S. Ambassador
at Ottawa ready to assist.

The

only fruit of this conference was permission from the

Canadian Government to allow recruitment of replacements for men

who had left and not returned, which was what Sheldon Wardwell
was afraid of.

Moreover, the manner in which it was announced

produced utter confusion.

Senator Brewster thought it meant one

thing, the W.M.C. gave Sheldon Wardwell a different impression,

which brought on a little rhubarb between him and the Senator,

to whom he wound up apologizing all over the place.

Some border

points were not given any new instructions, and to make matters
worse, the rumor, unfounded, got around as usual that the quota

would be raised from 3500 to 4200 men.

Actually,the writer has

not been able to make out what the agreement really was, but as far

as he can determine, what happened was that

a temporary

increase of 200 was made in the quota, raising it to 3700 men until
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April 15, 1944, in lieu of open-ended replacement.
On January 24th, Senator Brewster introduced into the Senate,

and Rep. Philbin of Massachusetts into the House, bills which would
have allowed U.S. draft boards to exempt certain agricultural and

woods workers.

On January 26th, the Boren Committee began hear

ings on the situation.

On February 1st, the Boston Herald came

out with a blast at Canada for the conditions along the Quebec
border,which was a compendium of what we have written about them.

This was circulated in the A.N.P.A. bulletin, and Rep. Foster
Stearns of New Hampshire read it into the Congressional Record of

February 4th.

It was re-printed in the Toronto Globe & Mail,

which on February 5th defended the position of the United States

industry, in part thusly:
’’Tuesday last this newspaper published a story

written by a staff correspondent of the Boston Herald
reporting that ’hundreds of able-bodied young men (were

seen) loafing in the streets, in garages and stores’ of

the Quebec towns adjacent to the Maine woods where a
critical shortage of manpower exists.

The story pointed

out that, while these men had been rejected for military
service, they are prevented by Government restrictions

from taking work in the Maine woods.
Yesterday on this page Mr. W.A. Delehey, Manager of
the Ontario Forest Industries Association, gave figures

to offset the impression that Canada had any idle men

to spare for woods work..........with unwarranted optimism be

supposed that if there were men available....National
Selective Service would have sent them to Canadian camps.
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If N.S.S. had shown efficiency in the control and place

ment of manpower the story by the Boston newspaperman,
which undoubtedly has a factual basis, would not have men
idle by hundreds.... But there is more to it than the

alleged idleness of men or the severity of the Canadian
regulations.

................ The Boston Herald story...has been .... carried into

virtually every newspaper office in the 48 States.

With

it was printed the very lame and ineffectual reply credited

to a 'Labor Department spokesman'....But the American
people, having accepted conscription for service anywhere

in the world cannot be expected to understand or make
allowances for the weaknesses and bungling of our man

power policy.

They know a few simple facts: That 'surpluses' of
manpower have been found along their border; that because

of some technicality their ally won’t allow these men to

cross the border and aid them.

They cannot be expected to

accept such conditions as purely local when they know
that we have between 65,000 and 80,000 men conscripted out

of jobs into idleness and whom the Government refuses to

send, abroad to fight alongside their men.

They know they

are being rationed by Canada on newsprint....

What must they conclude but that ours is a half
hearted effort?

Worse, that unwilling to go as far as

they have in fighting the war, we are playing dog-in-the-

manager with the manpower we have at hand.

How does one

counter or explain away such impressions?..........”
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This was politically motivated, having to do with certain
aspects of conscription and military service as it applied to
the Province of Quebec.

We quote it for reference a little later

when we try to analyze the reasons for the Canadian position, not
in belittlement of Canada's magnificent war effort.

Sheldon Wardwell reviewed all the foregoing in a letter to
Senator Brewster on February 7, 1944, in which he stated that the
plans of the W.P.B. outlined to the Boren Committee diverted
pulp from northeastern news mills to containerboard mills, and

did not allow them to meet the requirements of their customers
even at the officially limited rate of use, and that the differ

ence was being supplied by Canadian mills, causing concern that

loss of contract tonnage might be permanent, saying further:
"....new Canadian permits (for woods labor) are due

to be granted about April 1.

If we can't have a reason

able supply of men for the spring drive and summer cut

ting, the pulp mills in Maine are going to have mighty
tough sledding.

I am guessing that they will be down

to four days’ operation by summer....You can imagine the
effect of this on mill labor."

In a later letter, he took pains to point out that the Com
pany had not instigated the Herald investigation, and to the best

of the writer’s knowledge it had nothing to do with it, although
it had made no secret of the situation.

The article, and the

statements made by the mayors of the Quebec border towns were the
subject of a flat point-by-point contradiction in a speech by
Canada’s Minister of Labor to the House of Commons on February

7th, reported in the press, and as a result of this Herald man,

Of More Things - 104

1974
Arthur Stratton, went back to the area to confirm his findings,

telling William Hilton on February 9th that he had found no
reason to change his mind, but Canada was still sticking to its

policy of exporting newsprint, not men.

On February 10th,

Senator Brewster telegraphed Sheldon Wardwell:

’’HAVE WIRED THE INDUSTRY AS FOLLOWS STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY
ADVISES NOTICE FROM CANADIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WAR CABINET
DEFINITELY REFUSES TO INCREASE WOODS LABOR ALLOCATION ABOVE

PRESENT THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED ALL HERE STUDYING AS TO WHAT
NEXT MOVE IS TO BE.”

Sheldon Wardwell replied that he did not know what to do.
However, in a desperation move, he explained the situation to
and invoked the aid of Joseph B. Fastman, Director of the Office

of Defense Transportation, an agency heretofore not called into

action, explaining that if labor could be had to cut on the North

and West Branches it would greatly help to ease the transporta

tion problem in Maine, as all this wood was river driven, while
from any other source it had to be delivered by rail.

Joseph

Eastman, an old friend, did get in touch with Senator Brewster,

the W.M.C. and others about it.

He died shortly after this,

and bis successor followed up, but this effort probably did little

to affect the situation.
It will be noted that this was all high-level stuff, as

far as the Company was concerned.

down the line.

It was not left to someone

Throughout this account, we have given a great

deal of prominence to Sheldon Wardwell.

He and Tom Allen were

the workhorses in these quasi-legal proceedings, but everything
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they did was in consultation with William Hilton, William 0.

McKay and William A. Whitcomb, with the last pretty much making
the determinations, and keeping the Directors informed.

Creighton

Stanwood, Frank Pearson, Frank Keenan and the writer were also
constantly involved in one aspect or another of the wood and

labor problem.
On February 18, 1944 Sheldon Wardwell wrote to Senator
Brewster:

’’Have talked with Mr. Hilton on the telephone.
They would be very glad to help Mr. Haven Sawyer

in any way possible.
I have from several sources an opinion that the
Canadian authorities are getting worried over their

action.

The opposition party is showing an interest

and I think the Canadian manufacturers are getting
an earful from some of their customers.

They are cer

tainly not enjoying the publicity, and I feel that your
suggestion would very likely bring about a complete

reversal of their policy."
This letter was occasioned by a telegram of the same date

from Senator Brewster, in which be said, in part: ’’TRUMAN
COMMITTEE SENDING MR. SAWYER TO CHECK ON AVAILABILITY IN ORDER
TO SUSTAIN OUR CONTENTION” and asked that the Company give Mr.

Sawyer a guide, transportation, copies of the petitions from the
mayors, and arrange interviews with people in other Maine com

panies.

The pot was beginning to boil over.

The Montreal Daily

Star of February 15th had come to the defense of the Minister of
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Labor’s statement, saying: ’’Perhaps, in the circumstances, the

Boston Herald would now like to send another reporter to Quebec

to report the truth.”

Upon which the Herald had invited the Star

to send its own reporter to make his own observations, but in an
article published on February 26 it quoted the Star as replying
that such an effort to substantiate the facts reported in the

Herald would be "undesirable from the standpoint of Canadian-

American relations."
On March 4th, the Truman Committee, as reported in the Boston
Sunday Post of March 5th, issued a statement which among other

things said that surveys had found 2500 or more men available

in Canada for work in the woods in the northeast, and mentioned
the statements made by the Quebec border town mayors, with which
it said the Canadian Government did not agree.

It would appear

that Haven Sawyer had given at least preliminary findings to
the Committee at this time.

Anyway, as reported in the Boston

Globe of March 15th, his investigation was discovered by the

Canadian Government, which lodged a protest with the U.S. State

Department, which lodged a protest with Senator Truman, who said
that one of the committee members (Sen. Brewster was a member)
had borrowed a committee investigator to make an inquiry for a
group of New England congressmen from both Houses; that upon being

advised of the Canadian complaint he had been immediately recalled,

and that he considered the matter closed; but that while the in
vestigation was not made for his Committee, it did throw some
light on the manpower situation into which it had been inquiring.

It is this last comment that leads us to conclude that, officially

or not, the Truman Committee had received the information from

Of More Things - 107

1974
this investigator.

Credibility gaps are no new thing.

We do not know all that was going on or had been going on

in various places.

It was not known at this time, but developed

later, that as early as January the W.P.B. had made a confidential

report to the State Department.
naturally enough of it

This was not made public, but

leaked to indicate that it backed up

Great Northern’s position 100 percent.

Cranston Williams and his

A.N.P.A. were busy; Senator Brewster continued to needle the govern

ment agencies involved, and the New York Daily Mail sent a repres
entative to the border to make an investigation, his report being

turned over to the A.N.P.A.

William Hilton wrote William A.

Whitcomb on March 22d that the National Selective Service agent

at Thetford Mines, who was friendly, had told him that, at some

risk to his job, he bad had his own investigation made in the

border towns, and that perhaps as many as 7,000 men might be
allowed in the new quota.

He was a dreamer.

But anyway, at this

same time word came out that neither the State Department nor
the War Manpower Commission were putting forth any real effort, in

spite of all the pressure.

William A. Whitcomb was "seeing red",

but still insisting that the Company fight its own war, according
to a letter that Sheldon Wardwell wrote to Edwin Bechtel on April

8th.

He began to swing a little wild, suggesting that a Canadian

law firm be engaged to act ostensibly for the U.S. industry, but

covertly for Great Northern, which seemed to be the principal

reason for Canadian intransigence, but saying that he did not

want William A. Whitcomb to know anything about it, as he pro

bably would not like it.

Edwin deT. Bechtel said he was sure

the President would not like it, and the thought went no further.
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Earlier in the year, Frank Pearson, who was a great wheeler-

dealer, conceived the idea that it might be possible to get one
of the big Canadian wood producers to come over into Maine,bring

ing labor with him, to conduct a large operation in Northern

Aroostook County, or on the North Branch, on the order of that
carried on some years before by Edouard Lacroix in the Churchill

Lake area, which we will describe in another place.

He approached

one of the largest producers in Eastern Canada, who said that
on account of his large commitments to Canadian mills he was not

anxious to go to bat with the Canadian manpower authorities in
an effort to get men to take to Maine.

However, after thinking

it over, he felt that while he could not handle such an operation,

the idea had merit, and suggested a man in Montreal who could do

such a job.

This man, who was already operating in the northern

part of Maine for another United States company, was approached,
and agreed to give it consideration, but to the best of our know
ledge nothing came of it.

If the Truman Committee did not have the results of its
non-investigation in March, it did in April, when its full re
port, which included a memorandum on Haven Sawyer’s findings,

and was pretty rough on Canada, was submitted to the State Depart

ment, which gave a copy to someone in the Division of British
Commonwealth Affairs, who showed it to the bead of the Canadian
Embassy on April 10th.

The latter was so incensed that he threat

ened another formal protest by the Canadian Ministry for External

Affairs, but was finally convinced that this would accomplish

nothing, as the Truman Committee was not controlled by the State
Department.

However, Cordell Hull told Senator Brewster that it
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would not be in the interest of relations with Canada to allow
the Sawyer memo, which the Senator told Sheldon Wardwell on April
27th was "a masterpiece’’, to be made public, in whole or in part,

in view of the fact that a reasonable agreement had been arrived
at.

This last was news, but apparently some sore spots had been

hit, and on April 18th Senator Brewster revealed to Sheldon Ward-

well an exchange of telegrams between General Rose of the W.M.C.
and H.A. McNamara, the Canadian Deputy Minister of Labor, in

which the former suggested a deal for a quota of 3850 men on an
open-ended formula, to which the latter tentatively agreed, on

the condition that assurance be given that pressure and publicity
on the matter would be stopped.

This is where the summer allot

ment wound up -- 3850 men to September 30, 1944, for whom replace
ments could be recruited when the number working dropped to 3150.

Criticised in Canada as too liberal, this did not seem like any

where near enough, but it was figured out that through quick re
placement an average of 3500 men could actually be kept at work;
a very substantial improvement, estimated to add 40 percent to

pulpwood production in the areas involved, and the Company, to

gether with those working directly with it, decided to abide by

the agreement not to put on more heat, and to let it ride at
that until the fall quota came up.

We do not know whether or not Senator Brewster’s exemp
tion bill passed, but before June, 1944, Selective Service was

deferring woodsmen, and the War Manpower Commission added logg

ing to the Production Urgency list, which gave the industry some
priority in the offices of the U.S. Employment Service, which was

of some help.

It had not hurt any that by this time the pulpwood
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industry in the northeast had begun to get some meaningful back

ing from the War Production Board.

Curtis L. Hutchins, of the

Dead River Company became Chief of the Pulpwood Branch of W.P.B.’s

Paper Division, and James L. Madden, of Hollingsworth & Whitney,
Deputy Director in Charge of Pulpwood Production.

Fred Mears was

in the W.P.B. in Washington, and Benton R. Cancell, of the A.P.P.A.,
a very effective administrator, became Director of W.P.B.’s
Forest Products Bureau.

There began to be some very interesting

revelations about the infighting that had been going on between

the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board, the
former emerging as the villain, in the opinion of inside infor

mants, being accused of having done a snow job on the industry,
and of having been less than fair with the Great Northern Paper
Company in the allocation of available labor, in the face of W.P.B.
intercession.
Tn a long letter to Fred Mears on June 8, 1944, Sheldon

Wardwell laid out a lot of this, and said that while the Company
would abide by its promise not to stir things up further for the

moment, it would make preparations to continue the fight later,

and as a first step would try to get some better understanding
with the W.M.C.

Being careful to explain to Sen. Brewster what

he was doing, he then laid the whole history of the case before

Sen. David I. Walsh, of Massachusetts, a very powerful figure,
and friendly with many of the Company’s New England customers.

Senator Walsh arranged for Sheldon Wardwell to meet with General
Rose, and on August 3d he advised the Senator that he had had a

good meeting, which he thought gave him reason to be hopeful.
However, Gen. Rose, in a letter dated August 7th, in which he
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referred to their meeting, was really not very helpful, passing

the buck, in effect, back to the War Production Board.

This

meeting served a purpose, however, being followed by a lot of

correspondence which shows that study indicated that while it
could be agreed that there had been some discrimination against
the Company, it had not been quite so badly treated in the allo
cation of the quotas as had been generally supposed, and this sort

of changed the tone of things a little.

On August 21st, at the instance of the War Activities
Committee of the Pulpwood Consuming Industries, a meeting of
industry representatives, the A.N.P.A., the W.P.B., the W.M.C.

and other government agencies, was held in Boston to discuss the

general wood situation in the northeast and what to do about it.
The Company was not represented.

Sheldon Wardwell had just re

turned from vacation and did not know about it.

William A. Whit

comb knew, but said that the Company had attended enough meetings.

Canadian labor was not discussed, the emphasis being on ways and
means to get more wood harvested by the manpower available, and

was not particularly productive.
It was now September again, and time for the new fall quota

from Canada to be announced.

There had been a lot of desultory

correspondence with everybody, mostly rehashing old arguments,

but as promised, no more pressure.

However, the W.M.C. and the

W.P.B. now began to prod the Canadian authorities to make a
decision and get things moving, but as usual, did not get any

where, although the border was opened late in September for
recruitment of replacements, and men were found to be plentiful.

Things began to warm up again, with Senator Bridges of New Hamp
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shire and Reps. McCormick and Martin of Massachusetts getting

interested in what was going on, along with the faithful Senator

Brewster, and there is more or less confusion in the records as

to who was doing what, but along about the middle of October
word was received that the new quota would be 4200 woodsmen, plus

400 men to be recruited from workers laid off mostly from the air
craft factories in the Montreal and Quebec City areas, with pro
vision that replacements up to 10 percent could be recruited.

Originally, Canada had demanded that all the additional 1100
men (the old quota being 3500, plus 200 in lieu of replacements)

would have to obtained from this source, but as many of them

were of doubtful value as woodsmen, Curtis Hutchins, who was in
on the negotiations, had been successful in getting the 400
figure established.

on October 21, 1944:

As Sheldon Wardwell wrote to Sen. Brewster

"The curious part of the negotiations

was the attempt to fill the whole additional quota with workers

from airplane factories.

I am very glad that Lieutenant Hutchins

was able to bold this down to 400, but it just shows that Canada

is not as hard up for manpower as statements during negotiations

had indicated."
This time there was no kick on the W.M.C. allocation of men

to Great Northern, which Sheldon Wardwell said in congratulatory
letters written to most of the New England Congressional delegation

on October 31st was very fair.

Unfortunately, he had not read the

fine print, which said that the 400 men from the Montreal-Quebec
City area had to be recruited first.

Four companies and contrac

tors, after ten days of canvassing, had found 42 men, of which

the Company had 15, none of whom they expected would stay on the
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job, if they ever got there.

The War Manpower Commission then got

the Canadian authorities to agree that 200 of these 400 men could
be hired from the Madawaska, N.B. area, 135 of these being

assigned to Great Northern, and the rest to Hollingsworth &
Whitney.

This was a bitter joke.

Madawaska was a long, long,

way from the North Branch and the Kennebec, a two-day train
ride at that time, and while the Madawaska men were good woods

men, they had no more intention of going there than the Quebec
farmers, thirty miles from Great Northern’s North Branch opera

tions bad of going up the Saguenay or the Gatineau.

The result,

as nearly as we can determine, was that the Company finally got

70 or 80 men for Aroostook County railroad operations, and after

more negotiations the quota became 4660 woodsmen from the border
area and 200 from Madawaska, making 4860, plus 200 more if they

could be found in the Montreal-Quebec area, a total of 5060,

with a limited replacement provision.

By this time the season

was half over, and much of the benefit of the increase in work
force had been lost.

Sheldon Wardwell was apoplectic.

In a

number of letters to various people he castigated H.A. McNamara
for his tactics and General Rose for his lack of firmness, and

on November 16th, in a letter to Dick Caspar, giving him a run
down on the situation which be could use with his customers,

said: ”As you know, I am a cross old man, but everyone agrees -including some Canadians, I understand -- that this has been

wretchedly handled over the last three years.

I am sure the

Woods Department has done the best they could under the circum
stances, and just hope that our Government agencies may take a
firm stand at the next conference.''
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This "slick deal", as the Boston Herald called it on Dec
ember 1, 1944 in an article chiding the Canadian authorities

for not acting in good faith in trying to work the Montreal caper.
The A.N.P.A., in its Bulletin No. 95 of December 8th complimented

the Canadian newsprint industry on its performance, but reported
that a resolution had been passed urging the Department of State

to again present the need of still more manpower for the north
east to the Canadian Government.

A delegation from the north

east industry met again with the War Manpower Commission in Boston

on December 20th, with General Rose present, in an effort to get
them to go after full replacement recruiting, more men, or both,
but this was just another rehash, although Frank Pearson reported
that at last the W.M.C. was beginning to get some real understand

ing of what was happening, and it was agreed that all that could

be done was to make another effort in the spring of 1945.
The Company’s Penobscot mills continued to run on a five-

day basis through 1944, about 76 percent of capacity.

As we

have noted, the production of wood in the 1943-1944 season was
only 216,000 cords, and while, with the curtailment in production,

inventory as of January 1, 1945 actually rose slightly, to about
332,000 cords, only about 64,000 of this, less than half as much

as the year before, was in the piles or in the mill bolding

grounds.

All the rest was up-river or in the woods along the

railroad, and the mills remained on five-day operation.

Actually,

the rate at which the mills ran was determined by the orders re
ceived from the customers, who were limited in the amount of

paper they might order by L-240.

However, the amount of paper

available for use under L-240 was pretty much determined by the
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wood supply, and it was bard to keep enough wood coming in to

even meet the orders received.
round.

So the music went round and

Madison, entirely on purchased wood, was in one way

or another able to maintain six-day operation, but at a reduced
rate of production.

As the time approached for the 1945 summer quota of Canadian
labor to be set, everyone seems to have become reconciled to

accepting the existing figure as the best that could be done for

the summer months.

During January and February the matter was

tossed back and forth between all the parties and all the agencies
on the U.S. side.

Cranston Williams, for the A.N.P.A. tackled

the State Department again, but on January 23d was advised that
it was in agreement with the W.P.B. and the W.M.C. that ”it

would not be desirable to reopen the question at present and
that an attempt to do so might prejudice later efforts".

This

seemed to reflect the general feeling, except that it was the

opinion that an attempt should be made to get permission for

open recruiting, so as to be able to keep the number of men
working up to strength, and this was the thought expressed

by Sheldon Wardwell to Senator Brewster in a letter on February
21, 1945.

On the same day the writer prepared a report on the

wood situation at the Penobscot mills, which ended:

”We are faced with a most serious delivery problem
right through the coming year, and it is obvious that

even if we get hauled and delivered all the wood cut....

we will be faced with the same difficulty next winter
of having insufficient wood to pile and of having to
deliver and bark a very large amount of rough wood
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during the winter season....In other words, hand-tomouth operation, winter production depending upon
deliveries of wood and trouble-free operation of

barking equipment.

The only means of alleviating this

condition in the coming year is the cutting of large

amounts of peeled wood, which does not seem possible.
Furthermore, we will have the same situation indefinite

ly until a large cut of North Branch and Northern Aroos
took wood can be made which can be delivered to the mills

for summer barking, to allow us to make full piles and

leave some wood in the water to start spring operations...

With the Canadian labor problem pushed to the back burner,
the other large Maine manufacturers, St. Croix, Hollingsworth &

Whitney and Maine Seaboard had been placing emphasis on getting
more Canadian pulpwood, upon which they depended to a far greater

extent than Great Northern.

St. Croix in particular was in a

desperate situation; so bad that later in the year it hired Frank

Pearson away from the Company to get them out of it;

but while

Great Northern had also been working on purchased wood, and we

will go into this briefly a little later, it refused to join in
making any issue of it which might complicate the labor mess, be
cause the two were beginning to become entangled.

It confined

itself to keeping the W.P.B. and the W.M.C. informed about the
labor situation, putting on no great pressure anywhere.

On

April 19th, Jim Madden advised that the summer quota was favor
able, and had been arrived at with little trouble; 5,060 men
until October 31st., the same as it had been, but with provision

for continuous recruiting to keep the work force up to strength,
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subject only to going easy on this during the farm harvest season.

Sheldon Wardwell wrote to Cranston Williams on April 20th, advising
that while there might be some strings he did not know about, "just

wanted you to know that I am feeling better than for the past
three years, and that we all believe that your interest and

assistance has been very helpful5 , and there is little doubt that
it had.

He wrote about the same thing to Senator Brewster on the

same date.

There was some effort on the part of the Canadian

authorities to require replacement recruiting to be in the Montreal
area again.

This was quickly squashed, in view of past experience,

but in May, in spite of the fact that the fighting had just ended

in Europe, they were still putting difficulties in the way of re

cruiting -- refusing exit permits to men of military age, open
ing the border offices only one day a week, and so on.

Brewster, advised of this, wrote on May 21st:

Senator

"It seems passing

strange that so many hazards arise in connection with this project no one seems to know what Canada has in mind now that the European

war has come to an end."

However, these difficulties had largely

been ironed out, through the efforts of the War Manpower Commission,

by the middle of June.
To close the year 1945, the fall and winter quota was

established in September, with very little fuss, at 6000 men,

with recruiting and replacement procedures back to normal.

This

number was still considerably short of the pre-war figure, but

with recruiting sharpened up and better use being made of avail
able labor, it was somewhat more productive.

The War Manpower

Commission was dissolved shortly after this, and its functions
in the area we have been discussing were taken over by the United
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States Employment Service.

By one means and another, the Company

obtained a total of 379,000 cords of wood in the 1944-1945 season,
at a cost of between $25.00 and $26.00 a cord, delivered, and as

of January 1, 1946, inventory was up only a little; 371,000 cords,
or just about a year’s supply, again almost all undelivered, but

the tide had turned, and while the rebuilding of inventory remained

to be accomplished, the immediate cause of the wood shortage, the
refusal of Canada to supply normal amounts of labor, ata time

when it could not be replaced, had been removed, at least partly
and for the time being.

The problem never really went away, per

sisting to this day, but in an entirely different context.

We may have given entirely too much space to all this about

Canadian labor, but it resulted in conditions which absorbed much

of the time and energy of the Company’s management during the war

years, and it is all true.

to protect anybody.

None of the names have been changed

The attitude of Canada toward the plight of

an ally in one small segment of its economy may seem incredible,

but that’s the way it was.

Another incredible thing is that no

where in the mass of information available is there any indication

that anybody on the U.S. side really understood what it was all
about until late in the game.

If they did, it does not show.

Even the Canadian authorities, at least publicly, simply stuck
throughout to the excuse that there were no men to spare.

Per

haps the writer does not know what it was all about either, but
it seems to him that basically the problem was a product of Canadian
politics, and not of ill-will toward the United States.

They were

just caught in a position from which there was no way that they
could gracefully retreat.

There is no question that somewhere
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between 3000 and 5000 experienced woodsmen sat out the war in
the Eastern Townships, thirty or forty miles from what should
have been Great Northern’s most productive operations, doing
no good to anybody, and the clues to why this happened are con
tained in the Toronto Globe and Mail article, which we have quoted,

and in an article published in the Vancouver Province of August
23, 1944, discussing an analysis of the proportional contribution

by provinces to the armed forces of Canada, and quoted in part:

’’Nova Scotia has the place of honor, with an enlist

ment of 56,127 of its 123,000 males of military age, a
The other provinces follow in this

percentage of 48.6.

order of percentages:

British Columbia 44.4, New Brun

swick 43.6, Manitoba 43.5, Ontario 43.3, Alberta 40.1,
Saskatchewan 38.9, Prince Edward Island 38.4.

And Quebec, after five years of war, undeniably in
a class by itself, comes far behind in the procession,

with a total of 154,503 of its 699,000 men of military

age enlisted in the military forces of Canada, a per
centage of 22.1”

Quebec men did not enlist in great numbers, and while they
did not greatly object to conscription as such, they were opposed
to it for overseas service, as pointed out in ’’The Canadian Letter”

Vol. II No. 6 of May 5, 1945, and this is what the Toronto Globe

& Mail meant by”men conscripted into idleness” -- home duty.
It is not hard, given the above facts, the Canadian parliamentary

system and the knowledge that the head of the Wartime Prices and

Trade Board was then and

in political life continued to be anti-

American, to see that the incumbent Government could have lacked
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the political courage to allow any large number of Quebecois to

leave the country and earn high wages in the United States.

The

feeling expressed in the epigram variously worded and still used,

to the effect that "Canadians shall not become hewers of wood and
drawers of water for foreign interests" may have been there, and
it is possible that in the early stages the Canadian newsprint
industry used some muscle in the hope of putting that thorn in
the flesh, Great Northern, out of business, but the writer feels
that the effective cause was as he has stated it.

However, the

Bretton Woods agreement had called for the sharing of resources in
the war effort; there were joint committees to effect this agree
ment, and it is possible that had men instead of boys been sent

to Ottawa early something might have been done.
wrote on April 11, 1943:

As William Hilton

"Senator Brewster hit the nail on the

head when he recently recommended to Mr. McNutt that be send some

body to Canada who was big enough to deal with the men up there."
As it was, the "men up there" just dug in their heels, and little

was accomplished until Canada began to have unemployment, to which
work in the United States provided a partial answer.

In the mean

time, everybody had gone through a lot of grief.

Now having disposed for the time being of what our friends
did for us, let us turn to our enemies, and as the Company’s

employment of prisoners of war in its woods operations took
place during the period we have just been discussing, and had

political beginnings, we will tell about it here.
By the summer of 1943, there were in the United States a

considerable number of P.O.W.’s, taken in the North African cam
paign, a large number of them Italians, and under the Geneva
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Convention, they could be employed in a number of occupations,

including woods work.

As early as June of that year, with the

shortage of labor which we have described, and at about the same

time as men were being sought in Newfoundland, the question of
the use of P.O.W.’s, Italians specifically, was brought up, but
none could be obtained for Maine, although they were already
being employed in other areas.

However, the paper companies in

the northeast continued to needle the War Manpower Commission,
and by September, application forms for prisoner labor were made

available, and Great Northern filed for 250 men.

Late in that

month, Frank Pearson and the writer visited the office of the

Provost Marshall, First Service Command, in Boston, and were given
general information about the terms and conditions under which

prisoners might work, but were told that maintenance was so much

cheaper in the South that it was not likely that there would be
any allocation of men to the northeast.
However, Senator Brewster went to work on the matter, and
on January 25, 1944, representatives of the War Manpower Com
mission and the Provost Marshall’s department were haled before

the Boren Committee, to which they explained rather vaguely that
some consideration had been given to making an allocation to the
northeast, but that the matter had been shelved awaiting the re
sults of negotiations with Canada.

The Company continued to press

the point with the W.M.C. and the First Service Command; reports
of Senator Brewster’s efforts in the same direction appeared in

the Boston papers, and by February there were indications that
they might loosen up with some men for Great Northern at least
during the summer months.

Apparently some had already been
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assigned to nearby areas, as Sheldon Wardwell was not particularly
enthusiastic about the proposition, writing to Edwin Bechtel:

"Others who have tried prisoner labor are not having good results.
Companies have to furnish men to cart them around, etc., and these

employees could cut as much wood as all the prisoners.5
In these places, men were apparently drawn from a large com

pound, to which they were returned at night, which was not very
efficient.

The Company wanted a camp of its own, and in February

Boy Weldon and the writer met several times with the First Service

Command, reaching an agreement that if men were made available a
branch camp could be established.

The Seboomook Farm was tenta

tively approved as a location, and work was started on plans for

the alterations necessary to meet the Army’s requirements.
On March 8, 1944 Senator Brewster wired Sheldon Wardwell

that 2,500 German P.O.W.’s had been allocated for logging opera

tions in Maine; that they would be based at the airports

at

Bangor and Houlton; that side or work camps could be established,

and that details were being worked out for presentation to con
tracting woods operators.

Things then moved very quickly.

On April 3d, the First Service Command notified the writer
that 250 P.O.W.’s had been allotted to the Company, and that con
struction of the camp facilities, in accordance with the discussions

held earlier, could proceed, and on April 14th a contract for this

construction was made with T.W. Cunningham, Inc., of Bangor. This

did not spell out the scope of the job, which was to be completed

in six weeks, except by reference to Company drawings, but the
writer knows about what was done.

The upper barn, a fine big
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white-painted Hardy Ferguson-designed building, 46 ft. wide and

117 feet long, was made into barracks for the prisoners, with
electric lights and stoves for heat, and was surrounded by a wire

stockade.

Temporary buildings were put up to serve as barracks

for the guard detail, and the nearby office and store, which had
sleeping space for ten men and work space for six was used as

the headquarters building and officers’ country.

Washrooms and

sanitary facilities were of course provided for both the prisoner

and guard barracks.

A "Right of Entry" permit, signed on April 26th

allowed the Army to inspect the job and move in equipment which it
was to provide, and the work was completed about the middle of

June, under the direction of Roy Weldon, at a cost of about $45,000.
There was a lot of detail connected with the contract under
which the Army agreed to provide P.O.W. labor on a man-hour basis

from this camp.

Most of this was handled by the writer, and it

was signed on May 20th, seven supplements having to do with one

thing or another being added at different times.

On May 26th the

Seboomook Farm and the improvements made thereto were leased to
the Army for one dollar.

These agreements, which were naturally

complicated, put the Army somewhat in the position of running a

contractor’s camp cutting wood for the Company, although the latter

was referred to as the contractor, and we will note only one pro
vision, which was that Great Northern would furnish transportation

between the camp and the operations, and for this purpose six
second-hand buses were purchased in the Boston area and driven to
Seboomook.

The prisoners, if the writer remembers correctly, arrived
late in May, before the camp was entirely completed, and were put
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to work immediately.

They were all from Rommel’s Afrika Korps,

about half Germans and half Czechs.

The two groups did not get

along too well, and while they had to live together in barracks,
they were kept separated as much as possible while in the woods,

where they worked in small crews, under guard, in areas in Seboomook
Township and around Lobster Lake, as we recall, completely separated,

of course, from any civilian operations.

A very few of them had

some experience that qualified them for woods work, but there
were all kinds, including musicians and scientists.

A curious

thing about them was that while most of them were tank men, not
one would admit that he knew anything about machinery, or even

that he could drive a car.

By and large, they were a pretty good bunch of men, but they
were not very good pulp cutters.

Their production, when they first

started work, was about .30 cords, rough, per man day.

The best

they ever got up to was between .60 and .70 cords, and that,

William Hilton said, was "tops for all prison camps here in the
northeast."It was, however, not more than half of what an

ordinary cord cutter could produce.

The work schedule was nine

hours a day, but this included an hour for lunch, so that it was
really eight hours a day, six days a week.

The Company provided

a supervisor, and paid the Army the prevailing market price for

wood cut, out of which the Army paid each prisoner, again from
memory, 80 cents a day, the rest going toward maintenance.

While

it produces a sort of anti-climax, we do not have any official

figure for the amount of wood cut.

It was estimated that the

Company would be fortunate to get 12,000 cords out of this camp,
as the chance was not too good, and a regular operation would
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never have been conducted there, and cost estimates were set
up on that basis, but the best we can do is to say that what
ever the actual production may have been, it was very expensive

wood.

There was a very little trouble.

The regulations originally

required that the men work within square or rectangular areas
around which wide lanes had been cleared to provide a field of

fire for machine guns located at two diagonal corners, but this
requirement was waived in July as being impracticable.

A small

hassle occurred in the same month, when some expert decided that

up there where there was all that wood, it should be used for
cooking and heating.

There were 45 space heaters in this opera

tion, in which the Company had figured to use coal, of which the
Army had originally agreed to provide 900 tons.

It was calculated

that it would take 7300 man days, at a loss of about 3700 cords
of production, to keep these stoves supplied with wood, and a de

mand was made that the Army either supply the coal or 53 more men
at its own expense, to cut firewood and tend stoves, these men

to be housed in winterized tents.

To the best of our recollection,

there never were any tents, so the coal must have been forthcoming.
The existing water supply, from a well on the premises, which it
had been thought would be adequate, was not, and the Army put in

a new pump to take water from Seboomook Lake, the Company later

agreeing to pay for this and the additional piping.

The generator

supplied by the Company was also inadequate, and the Army brought

in one of its own.
There was one mutiny, late in 1944.

The Major in command had

gone out for Christmas, and the prisoners, apparently thinking to
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take advantage of this, decided one morning to decide that it

was too cold to work.

They did not reckon on the reaction of

the hard-nosed Captain who had been left in charge, who threw a
heavier guard around the stockade, and announced that if they didn’t

work, they didn’t eat.

By the next morning, they allowed that it

was not too cold after all, and that they would go back to work,
to which he replied: "The hell you will.

Which they did.

You’ll go to work first.”

There was one ’’escape”, some time shortly after

this, two men getting away from a work detail somehow, but after

walking half way to Rockwood and finding nothing but woods, snow

and cold, they decided that being a P.O.W. was better than being
D.O.A., and came back.
This was the only P.O.W. camp operated exclusively for the
Company, which was meticulous in its dealings with the Army and

with the prisoners, even going so far as to determine such things
as whether they should be covered by Workmen’s Compensation or

other insurance in case of accident, and came very near to being
a model operation.

General Rose offered it at least another

200 men, but there were very few locations where there was wood

available at which facilities to meet the requirements could be

located at any reasonable expense; good foremen could not be
spared for such low production per man, and William Hilton refused

any expansion

of the program.

In October however, another con

tract was made for labor from the large P.O.W. camp at Houlton,

small groups, as we recall, being assigned to contractors cutting
for the Company in the area.

This camp was run by the Government,

was full of troublemakers, and was a bad scene, production never
getting above one-third of a cord per man day.
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Company did get some wood, some part of which was barked with
draw-knives, under supplemental contracts.

A camp near Princeton,

which we believe was under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Pulp

wood Company and perhaps another firm, was also full of trouble,
and had some escapees, all of whom were captured.

The Seboomook P.O.W. operation ran until about the middle

of March, 1946.

On November 29, 1945, the Army gave notice

that it was the intention to discontinue furnishing labor on or

about February 15, 1946, but for some reason, perhaps because
that date was in the middle of the hauling season, the contract

was extended to March 19th.

The Army did not officially relin

quish the lease, however, until August 21st, at which time the

Company paid the Government some $1,500 for equipment which it
did not remove from the premises.
To close this episode, we note as a fact that after the

repatriation of the prisoners following V.E. day, the Company

received two or three letters from individual men, and one signed
by a group of five, expressing appreciation for the treatment they

had received, and asking for help to get back to the United States

to cut wood for Great Northern, which of course had to be denied.
It is a more curious fact that within a few weeks after the P.O.W.'s
had left, the Seboomook upper barn burned to the ground.

Even though the Canadian quota had been raised, the imminent
departure of the prisoners of war, who, while not very productive,
were getting out some wood, caused a little concern.

A rumor in

January, 1946 that there was some labor available in West Virginia

prompted an inquiry of Cranston Williams, of the A.N.P.A., whose
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reply, in part, was:

”As one who knows a little about the South, I

would say that it is fantastic to talk about getting
labor in West Virginia to go to New England to cut

pulpwood.“

He was right.

The matter was explored a little further

with the U.S.E.S., but while some West Virginia labor was placed
in jobs out of that state, none of it ever came to Maine.

In September of that year William Hilton reported that be

understood that the Canadian Government was making contracts with
soldiers from a Polish army stranded in Italy to come to Canada

to work on farms for two years, as they could not get their own
returned men back into agriculture, and he asked Sheldon Wardwell

if there was

any way that the Company could get men for woods

work from this source.

Actually there was some discussion in

Washington also about bringing some of these people to the States;

there were even application forms for allotments; but there was
some kind of hang-up about housing for them, of which Bill Hilton

was advised.

On November 2d he wrote Sheldon Wardwell:

’’Whenever there is a fair business in the State

of Maine we are always short of labor and we have always
depended upon the Canadians.

With so much fuss

over

Canadian quotas we would be in a terrible position if

anything should happen that they would not be allowed

to come across the line.

If we could just have single

men from the Polish Army and put them right into the

woods.... there would be no housing problem and we cer

tainly could work a bunch of them.
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It is.... probably something we ought not to go

into too fast, but looking back to the time when we
bad a lot of these Polish men in this country and

knowing what kind of men they were it would seem to
me that it would work out alright.”

He was talking about 600 to 800 men.

Sheldon Wardwell

took the matter up with a friend in the Congress, and went so

far as to file application forms, but none of these men ever

got to Maine either.
The Company had always bought a substantial part of its wood

supply from independent small producers along the railroads -’’farmers wood”, so-called -- although much of it was obtained
through dealers who could put together enough production to con

tract for anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand cords.
With the shortage of labor for the large operations, Great Northern,
along with everyone else, made every effort to encourage this type

of production, with considerable success.

There is not really

much to be said about this aspect of the wood supply, but there
were a few points of interest, about which, unfortunately, there

is not much information, but which we should mention.
Early in 1943, that very bad year, there began a controversy
with Canada, much like that on labor; more understandable as to

cause, but less easy to follow.

The Company had been buying in

the New Brunswick market wood area about 25,000 cords a year for

quite a number of years, some of which was hauled across the border

and shipped via the Bangor & Aroostook.

It had not been of great

importance previously, but had become so, as at this time it was
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the major source of supply for the Madison mill, to which it could
be delivered on a C.P.R.-Maine Central haul more cheaply than it

could to the Penobscot mills.

This figure was the Company’s

allocated share of a 3,000,000 cord quota set by Canada for ex
port, With the outbreak of the war, Canada had understandably

begun to cut this quota, the wood being needed for use in its
own mills, and in 1942, it was down to 2,200,000 cords.

However,

the Company’s allotment by the W.P.B. bad remained at 25,000 cords.
In March, 1943, the quota was cut again, to 1,550,000 cords
for the area east of the Rocky Mountains.

This figure was the

subject of an agreement between Canada's W.P.T.B. and the W.P.B.

Allocation to the various United States companies importing wood

was made by the War Production Board without reference to the

Canadian authorities, although the figures were communicated to
and acknowledged by the Canadian Department of Munitions and

Supply after they had been established, and the Company was satis
fied with its allotment of 25,427 cords.

There had been a brief

scare, early in May, when a trade paper account indicated that
none of this wood could be used for the manufacture of newsprint,

and although little of it was being used for this purpose by
Great Northern right at this time, there was a lot of corres

pondence with Senator Ralph 0. Brewster, who now insisted upon
being called "0wen", and the matter seems to have cleared up

quite quickly.

The Madison mill began to use quite a lot of pine

and poplar, buying for that mill was stepped up in nearby areas

of Maine, and the New Brunswick wood was shifted to the supply for

the Millinocket mill, regardless of the increased cost.

The

Company happily proceeded to make contracts and advances on the
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basis of its allocation, but within 30 days of the establishment

of the quota, the Canadian Timber Controller, without warning,

undoubtedly as the result of bureaucratic reasoning, but as far
as those on the receiving end were concerned, out of pure cussed

ness, notified individual Canadian producers, by Bulletin No. 20,
that they could each ship to U.S. customers in 1943 only 80 per

cent of the amount that they had exported in 1942.

This was serious,

as due to the prevailing conditions the Company had developed a
number of new suppliers, some of whom bad exported little or no

wood in 1942, had increased contracts with existing suppliers, and
this ruling would result in shipments short of the allocation by

nearly 50 percent.
their suppliers.

Customers got word of this change only through
William Hilton complained bitterly to the W.P.B.,

the Canadian Department of Munitions and supply, the Timber Con

troller and the Boren Committee, but there was no immediate ac
tion.

On September 20, 1943, he laid out the problem in a letter

to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, saying that there appeared
to be a direct violation of an internationa1 agreement, and ask
ing for help in getting the quota back on its original basis.
This letter was answered on September 25th by Adolf A. Berle, Ass’t
Secretary of State, who said that he was turning the matter over

to the Chairman of the American Section of the Combined Production
and Resources Board, who was to take it up with the American

member of the Combined Pulp and Paper Committee of the above
Board, which was precisely equivalent to putting it in File 13.

On September 28th, or thereabouts, a resume of the whole situation

was presented to Thomas Farwell, Chairman of the Pulp & Paper Com
mittee of the W.P.B. in Washington, along with an argument on the
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labor problem; and William 0. McKay wrote to the Pulpwood Divi

sion of the W.P.B., giving them the same information, and
pointing out that the Company was making a substantial amount
of paper on direct orders from the Government.

However, the

previous appeals had apparently taken effect, as the Company was

advised by the Timber Controller on September 29th that the bal
ance of its 1943 allocation would be allowed to be shipped.

So

the whole thing was just the usual bureaucratic bungle; or was it?
Up to this time, no ceiling price had been established on

export wood, which was bringing somewhat higher prices in Canada
than wood for domestic use.

Early in January, 1944, the O.P.A.

called two meetings of pulpwood consumers, one in Bangor and one

in New York, at which it was announced that the Canadian W.P.T.B.
had said that if the O.P.A. did not immediately set a satisfactory

ceiling price, it would take action.

There was general agreement

that it would be advisable to have a ceiling price, in view of

the scramble for wood which bad developed, assuming both govern
ments could agree on it, and provided that Trade Regulation No. 20

regulating exports was cancelled; aid the industry jointly sug
gested prices.

Frank Pearson, as the Company's representative, was

not happy about this development, as nobody seemed to know exact

ly what was back of it, and he felt that the Company should
oppose the fixing of prices in Canada by the O.P.A.

However,

as reported in the New York Times of February 3, 1944, the re
sult of these conferences was that Regulation No. 20 was lifted,

the O.P.A., by Order MPR 530 set ceiling prices that could be paid
for pulpwood to be exported from Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova

Scotia, and the W.P.T.B. announced an immediate increase in the
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ceiling price for market wood for domestic use.
At this point, things became very confused.

It appeared

that the O.P.A. bad had one put over on it again, and that

export prices had been lowered, while domestic prices had been

raised above them.

A protest which mentioned a roll-back of

$3.00 in the export price was fired off by the Company to the
War Production Board, and this was backed up by a flock of tele

grams from other importers.

However, as nearly as we can deter

mine, it was all another misunderstanding, and things quieted

down.

Also, while Regulation No. 20 bad been cancelled, the

overall export quota was reduced again to 1,250,000 cords for
1944.

However, there were provisions for supplemental allot

ments if market wood production increased, and special export

provisions for exporters who owned and operated lands in Canada.
This gave Frank Pearson another idea, and in August, 1944,
he and the writer obtained from the Directors permission to pur

chase for $40,000 a lease on a piece of Crown land near Tracy,

N.B. -- as the writer remembers this was about 7,500 acres --

on which there was said to be about 22,000 cords of wood, and put

a local lumberman on the payroll to operate it.

At this time, in

order to find its quota of wood, had opened an office in Frederic
ton, and was buying not only in its usual areas close to the border
but south at least as far as Sussex and north to the Caraquet

Coast, which was as far away as you could get.

This raised the

question as to whether the Company was ’’doing business” in New
Brunswick, in which case it should be registered in that province,
but while Frank Pearson started action in 1945, there appeared to
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be no legal definition of what constituted ’’doing business’ , and

it was left hanging when he resigned on October 15th of that

year.

In June, 1946, Roy Weldon brought the matter up again,

and although the meagre correspondence available does not clear

ly say so, we believe that the Company did register.

The Fred

ericton office was maintained, incidentally, until into the I960's,
under Dean Chase.

The Tracy purchase did not work out too well,

the operator not being very energetic, and the wood expensive,
but it did provide some additional cords, and the writer believes
that the Company was able to slightly increase its supply of wood

from Canada through the crisis period of 1944 and 1945, getting
up to as much as 28,000 cords; somewhat more perhaps, including a
bit from Quebec.

In the course of all this, it acquired a few

woodlots in New Brunswick for the same purpose; freehold land
which was later sold.

The Tracy lease, as we recall, was dis

posed of in 1947 or 1948.

These, as far as we know, were the

only land interests, apart perhaps from land or shore rights con

nected with holding grounds on the St. John River that the old

Company ever had outside of the State of Maine.
We have noted the effort by the W.P.B. and other agencies

to increase the production of market wood in Maine.

In May, 1943

the War Production Committee of the Pulpwood Consuming Industries

was organized.

We do not know much about this one.

Apparently

another, the War Activities Committee of the Pulpwood Producing

Industries was formed a little later, and in September, 1944,
the Company agreed to contribute to this organization on the

basis of 5 cents per cord of wood consumed, on a quarterly
schedule, to be used in financing the "Victory Pulpwood Cam
paign” to stimulate production.

Although there was an increase
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in the amount of wood of this kind produced in the State,
William Hilton did not give much credit to the efforts of any

organization.

In March. 1945, Governor Horace Hildreth called

a meeting, at which the War Production Board, representatives of

the last above organization and individual consumers were present,
the purpose supposedly being to educate the Governor and State

authorities on the problems of the industry in the area of wood
supply, so that they could be of help if needed -- pretty late
in the game for that.

William Hilton attended this meeting, which

he said in a letter to Sheldon Wardwell on March 21st was ”a wash-

out”.

We quote from it to make a point:

"The Governor did not seem to be interested.

He

read one or two letters from contractors who might have
cut 500 cords of wood and then turned the meeting over

to Mr. Hutchins and went out.
As far as I can see, nothing was accomplished.

The only thing that we could have done was to get into an

argument with the advertising men,

(this would have been

the people carrying on the advertising campaign for the
War Activities Committee) which would not have helped

any.....They feel that they have cut about all the pulp
wood which has been produced in the northeast......... They
claim that the great increase in the farm and small lot

production is directly due to their advertising, which is

not the truth of the matter at all.

Men could not be in

duced to leave home and go into the big camps, there
fore, everybody promoted production from small camps and

we put on extra pulpwood buyers which caused this big
jump in this type of production -- and it was not caused
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by advertising.

Undoubtedly the advertising....

caused some people through sentimental reasons to go

out and cut some wood, but to my mind it has been a

minor factor....I suppose if we told them this fact
they would think we were not cooperating, therefore,

I said nothing and nobody else said anything.
The writer, who carried on the Company’s own advertising

campaign for wood and labor agrees that it had little if any
visible result.

The very substantial increase in market wood

supply came from just plain hard work, beating the bushes to

turn up anyone who could produce some wood, no matter how little.
Ceiling prices were established for market wood in Maine by

the O.P.A.

(MPR 361) some time in the fall of 1943, and these

prices were revised more than once, but we
from which to follow the changes.

have no information

Apparently the prices were

sufficiently high to produce wood, but there was a lot of con

fusion in the regulations, particularly in the area of transporta
tion charges, which the O.P.A. itself admitted.

This got the

Company into a ridiculous, time-wasting and production-slowing con
frontation with the O.P.A., which lasted all through 1944.

At

the beginning of this year, the ceiling price for rough spruce and
fir was $10.25 per cord "roadside"; $13.25 delivered to the mill

by truck, and the Company had a lot of small contracts on a
"delivered" basis.

By December, 1943, it had become obvious that

a lot of these contractors, mostly people in the 1000 to 1500
cord bracket, could not deliver.

They could cut the wood, and get

it out to the highway, but they had no trucks to haul it, and

could not beg, borrow or steal them.

As Frank Pearson told Les
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Kewer at this time; ”We must devise some means of getting this
wood into our mills if we are to keep them running”, and after
consultation with Louis C. Stearns, the Company put its own

trucks to hauling for some contractors for the Madison mill,
charging them the actual cost, which figured out to $2.00 a

cord, and paying them the "delivered” price -- $3.00 over the

"roadside” figure.

On complaint from some who were not getting

this service, this brought a charge in April, 1944, from the

O.P.A. of "purchasing pulpwood at over-ceiling prices", the con
tention being that the contractor who had made an agreement to

deliver wood, but could only get it as far as roadside, wound
up being paid, in effect $1.00 more than the roadside ceiling
price.

The Company immediately ceased hauling.

At a meeting

with the local O.P.A. officials on May 8th, it developed that

the rules made no provision whatever for this situation, and
that no matter what the Company did to get this wood delivered,

it was wrong.

In other words, if it had a contract for wood

"delivered", it could not touch it at roadside under any scheme

that could be devised, without being in violation of something
or other.

This meeting resulted in a general investigation, which

disclosed that everybody in the State had the same problem, and
were all in violation one way or another.

The matter dragged on

into October, when it appears that the O.P.A. went to court for
an injunction against the Company and Hollingsworth & Whitney.

Lou Stearns was not worried, saying in his Weekly Letter of
October 9, 1944:

"It would seem footless to enjoin us against an

action which we are not now engaged in and expressly disavow in
tention of doing"; and as nearly as we can determine, the court
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threw out the action.

We do not know how the matter was finally

resolved; perhaps by re-writing all the ’’delivered" contracts to
’’roadside".

The wood eventually was delivered, one way or another,

but some production by small contractors was lost because of the

uncertainty.
We have noted the larger cut of 1944 - 1945, and with more
wood available, despite the difficulty in getting it delivered;

the new barking equipment of which we have spoken, and excellent
water conditions, the Penobscot mills, while continuing to run

on a five-day schedule through 1945, were able to squeeze out a
few extra days and to improve efficiency, and production for the

year was pushed up to 81.5 percent of capacity.

Let us turn our attention now to the third ring, where what
we suppose might be called the normal activities of the Company,
if anything is normal in wartime, were going on.

The Directors,

Officers and Executive Committee were the same after the Annual
Meeting of 1942 as they had been for the past five years, except
that Charles 0. Small, of Madison, was officially added to counsel;
he had been serving in this capacity for some time; but in July,

John Hay Whitney resigned from the Board, having reported for
active duty with the U.S. Army Air Force in June.
replace him was Samuel C. Park, Jr.

(1903 -

Elected to

), a native of

Salt Lake City, Utah, graduated from Yale in 1925, with an M.B.A.

from Harvard in 1927; associated with J.P. Morgan & Co. from
1927 to 1934, and with Baker, Watts & Co. of Baltimore in 1935.

In 1942, he was a financial assistant to Jock Whitney, and was
later a partner in the J.H. Whitney Company, a Trustee of the
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United States Trust Company and of the John Hay Whitney Founda

tion; a director of Parade Publications, New York Airways and a

number of other companies, and a Governor of the New York Hospi
tal.

A relatively young man at this time, he was the first of

the new generation of financial people on the Board of Directors
who were later to change the face of Great Northern entirely.

There was no further change in the Board of Directors until 1946.
Early in 1942, another 27 acres of land was sold to the Town
of Millinocket to further enlarge the airport.

The Philadelphia

Ledger, as we believe we have reported, was in financial trouble,

and it was voted to charge off 80 percent of its debt of some

$54,000.

A small debt of the old Bangor Commercial was liquidated

at 50 cents on the dollar.

The Company had stopped selling to

this publication in 1940, because of the credit risk.

A special

bank account was opened in the Millinocket Trust Company in which

to deposit funds from employees purchasing U.S. Savings Bonds

under a newly-instituted voluntary deduction plan.

With more

freight being paid on Canadian wood, the balance carried in the
Royal Bank in Fredericton was increased ten-fold.

Interest on

employee stock loans remained at 2 percent.

The position of Secretary to the Board of Directors was

established in 1943, Dick Caspar being the first to hold the post.
This of course was not a full-time job, and was carried on in
addition to his regular duties.

Previous to this time, he had

performed the same job as Assistant Clerk, the Clerk, B.L. Seelye,
being located in Millinocket.

Coincidental with this change,

Leslie G. Newer was made Assistant Clerk, so that the Clerk and
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his assistant were both located in Maine, and the position of

Assistant Clerk no longer carried the responsibility of com
piling the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors.

It was decided, after several months of investigation, to adopt

the ’’last in, first out” (LIFO) method of charging off pulp
wood for the purpose of establishing cost and earnings for the

year 1942 and thereafter.

We are not going to attempt to explain

this, or the effect which it had in later years, except in the
most simple-minded manner, as it is beyond the scope of our

knowledge.

Since the cost of wood had been relatively stable for

a number of years, the old method of charging wood to the mills
at the average cost of the inventory was not much different from
’’first in", but with rapidly increasing cost, there was an ob

vious tax advantage in charging out the new, higher cost wood

first.

It will be recalled that at this time the Company was

preparing a protest against the existing newsprint price ceil
ing, which would be helped by including a higher wood cost, but

there was a question as to whether the Internal Revenue Service
would accept the change, and the outside auditors had in the first
instance suggested keeping, at least temporarily, two sets of

accounts, one on the old basis, for tax purposes, and another
on LIFO basis for internal cost and stockholders’ reports, and
presumably for the O.P.A.

There was nothing illegal about this.

The argument was that the future of tax rates was uncertain, and
that any immediate saving might be more than offset later on

should pulpwood prices begin to decline.

However, this did not

seem too probable, and the decision was to go for broke.

The

part of the inventory which was at the mills was frozen at a
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figure of $12.10 per cord, it being considered impossible to reach
any agreement with the Treasury Department on the value of wood

in process, and the wood being currently received and used was

charged on the LIFO basis.

It was not anticipated at this time

that it would be necessary to go into the mill inventory, but the

very small cuts in the 1943 and 1944 seasons resulted in heavy
withdrawals, so that the effect of the adoption of the new system

was not as great as hoped for.

Replacement of the wood withdrawn

from inventory later caused an argument with the I.R.S. which
lasted for years, and we will explain this situation as well as

we can when we come to it.
complications.

The change also caused more immediate

The misbegotten-looking Annual Report which was

still in use for 1942 carried a note by the outside auditors stat

ing that as the result of the adoption of LIFO, earnings after
taxes were some $180,000 less than they would have been under

the old system, but that the change had not been approved by the
Treasury Department, and that this was holding up an anticipated

refund, under the Revenue Act of 1942, of a large part of the
’’excess profits” tax of $300,000 paid on 1941 income.

The Treasury

Department did not accept the Company’s use of the LIFO method until

1944, although the books were kept on that basis, and the refund of

excess profits taxes, which with interest amounted to about $205,000,
did not materialize until 1945.

Before 1943, rationing of food, gas, fuel and a lot of other
things was in effect.

The Company, like everybody else, had to

have coupons to obtain certain supplies, and under a new amend

ment to the O.P.A. order, it was necessary in this year to open

"ration book accounts” with banks, which transferred coupons
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each month to the O.P.A.; the Millinocket Trust Company hand

ling this for the Millinocket and East Millinocket mills and the
Great Northern Hotel; the Depositors’ Trust Company for the Madi

son mill, and the Eastern Trust & Banking Company for the Spruce
Wood Department, the specific items mentioned at this time being

gasoline, processed foods, sugar and coffee, with provision that

other things could be added if required.
In May, 1943, the Company purchased, from the Maine Central

Railroad, the power rights, estimated to represent about 4,000
h.p., and 600 acres of land at Allagash Falls, in T.15 R.ll, for
$25,000.

There was no use in sight for this small amount of

power, and it was probably bought to prevent it from becoming a
nuisance should somebody else acquire it.

In the same month,

Great Northern purchased the old Mountain View Hotel on Penobscot
Avenue in Millinocket where the New England Telephone building

was later constructed.

This had become a nuisance at that time.

Early in 1944, an account was opened with the Irving Trust
Company of New York for the deposit of funds from tax withholding

and other payments deducted from payrolls (not including funds for

Savings Bond purchases) and some other earmarked moneys.

The inter

est rate on employee stock loans had been reduced to 1 percent at
the beginning of 1943, and remained at 1 percent in 1944, and in
July of this year, coverage under the Aetna Group Life Insurance

policy which had been in effect since 1923 was broadened to take
in 107 lower-salaried employees, giving them $1,000 of life in
surance.

Up to this time, premiums had been paid entirely by the

Company, but at this point the plan became contributory, each em

ployee covered being assessed 60 cents per month per $1,000 of
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coverage, the Company paying the balance.

A little later in the

year, in connection with the drive for purchased wood which we

have described, Spruce Wood Department bank accounts which had
been opened in Houlton, Guilford, Ashland, Island Falls and Fort

Kent were beefed up, and an account was opened for the same pur

pose in Madison.

This was a bank-account oriented period.

In

this year the account in the Royal Bank in Fredericton, which

had started out with an authorized maximum balance of $2,000 and

was up to $25,000 in 1944, was increased to $50,000, and a new
account, to carry a maximum balance of $25,000 was opened with the
Banque Nationale in St. Georges

Beauce.

We are not quite sure

of the reason for this one, but it was probably for recruiting
expenses, and for the purchase of a little Quebec wood bought along

the border further north.

The Company had begun to make regular

contributions to such organizations as American Red Cross, the
U.S.O. and the State and National war funds early in the war --

not large amounts; two or three thousand dollars a year to each.
These are the odds and ends of the years 1942 through 1945, and
it can be seen that very little was being done that was not the

result of wartime conditions.

We have not said anything about the controls on the price of
wood pulp of various kinds, which affected the Company to a small

degree, and were subject to the normal foul-up.

Between July 1940

and April 1942, the O.P.A. relied upon a voluntary agreement with

the pulp producers, but this was beginning to fall apart, with the
loss of the supply from the Scandinavian mills, and the lack of
water transport from the West Coast; and effective April 20, 1942,

the O.P.A. issued MPR 114, which we will not go into in detail, but
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which covered in one order all grades of wood pulp, the prices

established being based on a study of 1940 and 1941 operations,
taking into account increased production costs -- wood, labor
and so on.

An advance bulletin released on April 16th stated

that the order did not change the ’’overall prices” on chemical

pulps, because a study by geographic areas showed profits on
pulp sales in the South high, on the West Coast not as great,

but still high, and in the Lake States and the Northeast ”adequate”.

Not counting the ’’pulping stock” produced on the paper
machines, the Company was selling a very small amount of sul

phite pulp from the Millinocket mill.

The only market pulp

which it was producing in any quantity, and that was not very

great, was the Mitscherlich sulphite from the Madison mill.
There were, as we have said, only a few Mitscherlich mills;

two in the northeast, as far as we can recall, at this time;

Madison and the Dexter Sulphite Company mill in New York State,
and this pulp, as we have explained, was all used for special pur
poses, like the manufacture of glassine and parchment.

The price

which applied to Dexter and Madison, established by the order,

was $72.00, F.O.B. mill, freight allowed, and in Madison’s case,

the freight amounted to around $13.50 a ton, the pulp being not
more than 50 percent air dry.

This order was protested immediately, like the next day,

by Dexter, and in July its ceiling price was raised to $72.50,
f.o.b. mill.

For some reason, this was not made public, and it

was not until late in August that Sheldon Wardwell was able to get
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a copy of a decision, through a Washington law firm, saying in

a letter to William A. Whitcomb:

"I have at last succeeded in

securing the copy of the opinion in the Dexter case.

Repeated

efforts at the O.P.A. failed, so I guess it was intended to be

a secret.”

At any rate, it left the Company with a price $8.00

to $13.50 a ton below Dexter, depending upon the freight.

At this

time, the profit on the Madison pulp was only about $6.00 a ton,

with an increase in wood cost coming up which would just about
have wiped this out, and William A. Whitcomb said he was not going

to give away two cords of wood with every ton of pulp sold.

How

ever, preliminary inquiries of the O.P.A. about relief were not
encouraging, and the Company did not get around to filing a for

mal protest until April, 1943, at which time profit had dropped
to between $1.00 and $2.00 a ton.
price of $72.50 f.o.b. mill.

The protest asked for Dexter’s

This was backed up by a number of

letters from customers saying that they bad to have this type of
pulp, and were willing to pay a higher price.

On June 3d, the

O.P.A. denied the petition, on the ground that it applied to

such a small part of the Company’s total operation, but left the
door open for a re-examination.

Great Northern thereupon advised

the O.P.A. that it would prefer not to make the pulp at all, but
was continuing to do so only because the W.P.B. was stressing its
essentiality.

At this time it was learned that a number of State

of Maine mills making other market pulps and dissatisfied with their

prices were threatening to close down, and the Government established

a program of subsidies rather than price increases.

However, as

regards Mitscherlich, the O.P.A. simply removed the ceiling, and

allowed the mill to charge whatever it felt was fair, subject to
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review of cost figures, but while the Company put its price up

to about $72.00 f.o.b. mill, which it felt was fair to its cus

tomers, wood and other costs went up so fast that by December,
1944 it was losing about $8.50 a ton.

At this point, the O.P.A.

decided to include this pulp in the subsidy program, using Recon
struction Finance Corporation money, disbursed through the Defense

Supplies Corporation.

This was fine, but following the rules of

bureaucracy, the Defense Supplies Corporation switched signals
on January 1, 1945, requiring that the results of the Company’s
entire operation, not just the sales of Madison pulp, be taken

into account, after one payment had been received, for pulp
shipped in December.

This killed off the subsidy.

By March,

1945, the loss was up to $11.00 a ton, with the War Production
Board calling for shipments of about 600 tons in the second

quarter.

At this same time, new methods of figuring costs approved

by the O.P.A. restored the Madison pulp to the program, and
payments, which seem to have allowed for a profit of 6 percent

began to be received, and were continued until the end of that
year, when sales of this pulp dropped to an inconsequential figure.
It is probable that the cost of time spent in making figures and

reports, preparing presentations, travelling and arguing ate up

most of the subsidy.
Having gone at perhaps too much length into the matter of

newsprint price control, we will not attempt any discussion of the

problems arising from controls on the prices of the Madison specialty
papers.

In a way, these were not as complicated, as far as the

Company was concerned, as those on newsprint, because Great North

ern was a small factor in the specialty field, and while it had

to make some protests on its own account on certain grades, it in
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general let the larger producers carry the ball, and followed
the price ceilings which they were able to obtain, these apply

ing to grades rather than to individual manufacturers.

However,

we will say that the prices for No. 1 machine grades rose about
30 percent, and those for No. 2 papers about 25 percent in the
five years 1941 through 1945, while the margin of profit on both
machines dropped materially, No. 2 taking the worst beating.

We have now arrived, as far as this part of our story goes,
at the year 1946, which we will consider, as far as possible, all

by itself, because it marked the end of an era.

What we have

called the old Company lasted in its visible form

for quite a

while longer, but 1946 was the last year of management in the image

of Garret Schenck, with the officers to all intents and purposes

in control of policy and the Directors acting in an advise and
consent capacity.

The working management did not cease to ini

tiate action and recommend programs; it was not completely domin
ated by the Board of Directors -- and policy changed again to

some extent later -- but the real power moved from Boston to New
York, and after this year, as we have said, the changes which re
sulted in Great Northern as it became began to occur.

There was

no instant happening, and we will try to explain as we go along.

We will take up first the developments in newsprint, start
ing with price, which on January 1, 1946 was at a controlled
ceiling of $67.00 a ton, New York.

This was up $17.00 from the

figure at the beginning of the war, but the cost of the wood alone
in a ton of news, going into 1946, had increased almost that much,
and the rate of earnings, as the year began, was at a very low point.
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On March 1, 1946, Edwin deT. Bechtel, as he reported in a

letter to William A. Whitcomb, dated March 2d, went alone to Wash

ington for a discussion of the Company’s situation with the O.P.A.,
presenting figures to show the unfairness of using the 1936-1939
basis for allowed profit.

He pointed out that no company could

long operate on a return as low as that currently being realized,

and that if this condition continued it could only lead to more

United States companies abandoning the newsprint field, and that
it was obvious from the history of the past five years that the
American industry was being destroyed.

He also noted that Great

Northern had always acted on its own, without conferring with other

manufacturers, and without any concerted plan.

The O.P.A. people stated that they knew this, and admitted
that Great Northern figures had been the most accurate that they
had received during the past several years; that a number of

United States companies would probably be in the red in 1946;
that they were waiting for the recommendations of the Newsprint

Advisory Committee, which was to meet the following week, but that
no increase in price would be considered before July 1st under any

conditions.

He reported that the conversation was repeatedly inter

rupted by telephone calls, and that ”he (a Mr. Remley, presiding
at the meeting) was not able to give sufficient time to the con
ference to have any connected idea as to what our case is or our

worries are.”
Upon inquiry as to what action the Company could take, he

was told that the only thing that could be done was to wait for

the report of the Advisory Committee.

He then wrote:

”lt

seemed to me clear....that be (Remley) and the members of bis
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division had been instructed to do nothing for the present to
give or suggest any definite relief to the manufacturers in the
United States.”; adding "My exploration of the subject was not

satisfactory, and I should like to discuss with you...the question
whether...we should not consider filing a protest.

Perhaps we

ought to do the very thing the O.P.A. would not welcome in order
to have our facts seriously considered.”

Later, it developed

that Mr. Remley was head of the Fine Paper Division, filling

in for the head of the Newsprint Division, who was threatening
at this time to resign; but did not; and was not familiar with

the background of the newsprint situation.
Following this meeting, there was some discussion of simply
raising the price by $3.00, and attempt to justify it later if

the O.P.A. objected.

This procedure was allowed under a 1945

amendment to MPR 130, but it seemed a rather doubtful course,
and anyway, the whole thing was confused by uncertainty about the
future of the O.P.A., which was then being studied by the Committee

on Banking & Currency, in connection with a House bill to extend

the Emergency Price Control Act, due to expire on June 30th, to

March 31, 1947.

Sheldon Wardwell, in a letter to Rep. Robert

Hale on April 1st, pointed out some of the faults in O.P.A. per

formance that he hoped this committee would take into account if

this agency was to be continued, to which Robert Hale replied:
"I am hopeful that something constructive and even useful can be

achieved.

However, even in the absence of statutory reform I

hope that the views of more tolerant men in the O.P.A. may be

allowed to prevail instead of those of the least tolerant...”
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The Newsprint Advisory Committee met on April 11th, and

made, not a suggestion for a price increase, but the flat re
commendation that all price controls on newsprint be suspended.
C.B. Stanwood was again the Company's representative on the Com
mittee.

The O.P.A. said that it would consider the matter.

Follow

ing this action, considerable support began to develop, even from

a good many publishers, for suspension, and this seems to have
shaken up the O.P.A.

Edwin Bechtel went on Washington again the

middle of June, at which time he got a much better reception than

he had before, and practically a promise of some action on price;

as he said:

"I do think it will be a price 'pulled out of the

air’ and my only fear is that it will not be sufficient...”

In

the meantime the Canadian manufacturers had come to life and also
demanded an immediate substantial increase, with no immediate

result.

The Emergency Price Control Act was extended, but with direc

tion to the O.P.A. to de-control progressively.

was effective July 25th.

The new bill

In the meantime, the Canadian Govern

ment, early in July, had re-valued its dollar, which had been at a
10 percent discount, to parity with the United States dollar.

This

automatically knocked the net return to Canadian newsprint mills

back by $6.80 a ton on the Zone 4 base price, and on July 11th,

without ceremony, they had raised their price by this amount,
perhaps anticipating the demise of price controls at the end of

the month.

This price lasted exactly two weeks, when it was

wiped out by the new legislation.

However, it was now clear,

even to the O.P.A., that with Canada supplying the bulk of the

newsprint used in the United States, and with markets in Europe
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beginning to open up with the end of hostilities, something bad

to be done about this, and on August 8th it issued SO 174, allow
ing open billing, pending a new price to be set shortly.
died hard.

But it

The new price, granted by Amendment 13 to MPR 130,

issued on August 22d, allowed an increase of $7.00 a ton, which

was to all intents and purposes a 10 percent jump, just offsetting
the loss of exchange by the Canadian manufacturers .

They did not

take advantage of the full $7.00 at once, but billed at their

$73.80 price from August 8th, the date of SO 174 until August 25th,
when they went to $74.00.

Great Northern also raised its price

to $73.80 on August 8th, but let this figure stand.
While this increase was manna to the United States producers,
the Canadian mills lost no time in pointing out that it was of no

help to them.

There now appears in the record for the first time

(unless it was the original body, formed when the O.P.A. was new)

the ’’Overall Advisory Committee for the Pulp & Paper Industry”,
which seems to have been joined by the Boren Committee, and curiously

in a way, by the A.N.P.A., in preparing ”An Outline Petition for
Decontrol of Wood Pulp, Paper and Paper Products’’.

The Company

was not represented on this committee, but Sheldon Wardwell on
August 27th obtained and sent a copy of the petition to Edwin
Bechtel, saying that no action had been taken on it, but probably

would be shortly, and that such action would be backed by the
Advisory Committees of all branches of the industry.

Edwin Bechtel

replied, in part:
”It seems to me that the general argument for decon

trol should appeal to the advisory committees of the various

branches of the paper industry.
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My only comment on the statement is that the
arguments per se are so given that the petition should
be kept strictly in the objective domain.

It does not

seem to me to be helpful or useful to say that the argu

ments which favor control....are an absurdity, as stated

at the end of the petition.

Actually, the whole attempt

to regulate prices under the present O.P.A. law is an ab
surdity, but that argument does not help the oppressed

manufacturers.

It would be better to pound away at the

facts which show the absurdity, without using the word.”
We do not know the history of this petition, but on October
2d and 3d, as reported by Royal S. Kellogg of the Newsprint Ser

vice Bureau, in his ’’Newsprint Paper in North America”, the

Boren Committee held a hearing at which the decline of the United
States industry was again in the spotlight, and the thrust of the

argument directed at the O.P.A. was that a price high enough to
encourage production to meet the demand for newsprint should be

established.

Under this pressure from all directions, and the

mandate of the new law for gradual decontrol, the O.P.A. gave one

last gasp, allowing a $10.00 increase, effective October 14th,
making the New York price $84.00.

this figure immediately.

The industry in general went to

Great Northern waited a month, not put

ting the $10.00 increase into effect until November 18th, bringing
its price to $83.80 New York -- 20 cents under the market as the

year 1947 began.

In the meantime, the O.P.A. had decided to call

it a day, and all price controls on newsprint and other paper had
been lifted on November 10th.

Order L-240 and other W.P.B. pro

duction controls were dropped about the same time, but we do not
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have an exact date.

Late in the year the Justice Department got into the act

with an investigation of monopolistic practices in the newsprint
industry.

On December 18th an F.B.I. agent went through the

files in the Boston office, finding, as he told Sheldon Wardwell,
’’nothing of importance”.

A similar search was made of the Sales

Department files in New York about the same time, and copies of
a few letters having to do with the zoning system were taken.
On January 13, 1947, Sheldon Wardwell wrote to Edwin DeT. Bechtel:

”In 1917, when the Department of Justice was investi

gating the newsprint industry, Mr. Schenck had a conference

with someone important in the Department.

I know none of

the details except that there was a blanket indictment of
most of the companies.

Then, as now, the policy of the Company was entirely

independent.

I think the only danger at present is that

the Department, following a not unusual policy, might decide,

on inadequate information, to indict everyone in sight and,
with nothing to conceal, the policy of giving the facts to

whoever is in charge should be considered.
If it then appeared that there was any danger, I believe
that some of the important customers would be willing to

assist. ”
We will have a little more on this investigation later.

With more labor, both Canadian and domestic, available, and

the wood-buying organization in high gear. Great Northern produced
415,500 cords of pulpwood in the 1945-1946 season, the largest cut
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in ten years.

The mills went back to six-day operation, the three

new machines were speeded up, and newsprint production for the

year 1946 was at the rate of 94 percent of capacity.

At the year

end, total inventory of wood was up to 445,000 cords, although

much of this was still undelivered, and the amount in the piles
and mill holding grounds was still far too low, the mills being
heavily dependent upon rail and truck receipts throughout the

year.

The United States industry as a whole was not far behind,

at 92 percent of capacity.

The Canadian industry jumped up to 97

percent, and consumption of newsprint in the United States in this

year was almost 1,000,000 tons more than in 1945.
It had been possible to put substantial increases into effect

on the Madison No. 1 grades, mostly the groundwood sheets that had

gained popularity during the war, the average selling price of the

papers made on this machine in 1946 being about 16 percent higher
than that of the year before.

Poor old No. 2, however, with all

its shortcomings, did not fare so well.

In spite of an average in

crease of some 13 percent in the price of its product, it did little

more than break even, while the other machine was making a reason
able profit.
While there was no change in the slate of Directors and

officers elected after the 1946 Annual Meeting, F.S. Rollins,
who was getting along in age (he died later in the year) re

signed in March, the Directors memorializing bis

faithful, loyal and helpful service."

'many years of

His place on the Executive

Committee was taken by Samual C. Park, Jr., and in May, Richard G.
Croft was elected to fill the vacancy on the Board.
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Richard Graham (Dick) Croft (1901 -

) was a native of

Pittsburg, and a graduate of Princeton in 1924.

For the next

twelve years he was employed by the brokerage firm of Hayden,
Stone & Co. of New York, and from 1937 to 1941 was Executive

Secretary to John Hay Whitney.
J.H. Whitney Company.

In 1946, he was a partner in the

We will not attempt to list all his many

interests, but among other things he was at this time or later a
director of a number of other companies, a Trustee of the American

Museum of Natural History, the Pomfret School and the Manhattan
School of Music, and like so many Great Northern directors, a

Governor of the New York Hospital.

A handsome, well-built, quiet-

spoken man of great ability, he was to become most important to

the Great Northern Paper Company, as we will see.
William A. Whitcomb died on Monday, June 10, 1946.

We have

simply mentioned as fact the deaths of many people in the course
of this story, but the bizarre circumstances surrounding the

President’s passing have caused so many questions over the years
as to how what happened could have happened as to make it seem

necessary to tell of it as well as we can.

accurate.

We cannot be completely

Because of the sensationalism of some elements of the

press, much that was written about it at the time, and afterwards,
is grossly exaggerated, and is unreliable.

Some of the reporting,

even in the most reputable publications, is distorted and contra
dictory.

No press account that we have read is, from our own know

ledge, entirely correct, and from this point intime, the recollec

tions of some of those who were there differ somewhat.

Actually,

nobody is sure of exactly what took place, but the writer probably
knows a much as anyone, and his account of what happened, as far as
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it needs to be given here, will be as close as be can get to the

truth.

The story begins the previous week, when a polite, scholarlylooking, middle-aged man, wearing a Panama hat and carrying a

briefcase, came into the Boston office, gave his name as "Mr. Homans”,
identified himself as being "from the Treasury Department" and
asked for Mr. Whitcomb.

unimportant.

The day of this visit is uncertain, and

It so happened that the President had been out most

of the week due to a slight illness, and never came in on Saturday.

Upon being told that Mr. Whitcomb would not be in until Monday

morning, be said that he would come back then, and left.

He

did not go beyond the outside office, and was seen only by the
girls there.

A number of names other than the above, all similar,

have been mentioned.

best remembered.

We have chosen the one which seems to be

This also is unimportant.

There is a report that

there had been a telephone call from a man giving the same name and
asking for Mr. Whitcomb, on the previous Saturday, June 1st, but

we know nothing about this.
The geography of the Boston office was at this time just as
we have previously described it.

However, Creighton Stanwood was

now in Dick Caspar’s office; Sally Whittam, then William A. Whit

comb’s secretary, was in the small office at the end of the cor
ridor, and Lester Smith had moved into the corner room previously

used by A.P. Lane.

William A, Whitcomb's desk stood midway between

the two windows on the Franklin Street side, his chair between it
and the wall, so that he faced toward the entrance from the corridor.

William 0. McKay’s desk was on the side of his office next to the
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President’s, beside the connecting door, his chair between it and

the wall.

The writer’s desk was in this same office, against the

opposite wall, so that he sat with his back to the Vice-President

and the connecting door.

We should add that these connecting

doors were in the corners next to the corridor, and that only a

very small part of any office could be seen from any other.
The door between these two particular rooms was hung so that

when open, as it almost always was, it lay against the wall in
William A. Whitcomb’s office almost behind William 0. McKay’s

chair.

These details will help in understanding what took place.

On the morning of June 10th, probably between 10:15 and

10:20, ”Mr. Homans” appeared again.

William A. Whitcomb, who

was alone in his office, was told that he was there, and after a
few minutes wait the visitor was shown to his door, and went in.
At this time there were four girls in the outside office.

Sally

Whittam, the President’s secretary was with Lester Smith, leaving
her office vacant.

Ashton Gourley was with Fred Dolbeare in bis

office, William 0. McKay and the writer were at their desks, and

Frank Keenan was in Creighton Stanwood’s office.

The writer did not see the man, but was conscious of some
one having passed the connecting door, and automatically glancing

over his shoulder saw a straw hat that he did not recognize lying
on top of a filing cabinet beside the entrance from the corridor

to the President’s office, the only part of that room visible from
his position, so he knew that someone, probably a stranger, was in
there.

For perhaps six or seven minutes there was the sound of
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voices from the President’s office.

No words could be distinguished,

and there was no loud talk and no cornmotion; just ordinary conver
sation; interrupted by an explosion, sharp but not very loud.

The speed with which thoughts can pass through the mind at times
like this is incredible.

Anyone who has read Ambrose Bierce’s

’’Occurence at Owl Creek Bridge” will know what the writer means.
To him, familiar with firearms since he was five years old, this

noise sounded like the discharge of a small-caliber pistol, but

the thought was dismissed immediately as preposterous, and it
occured to him that the visitor might be putting on a model
demonstration of felling trees with an explosive, or something

like that.

However,

he thought he had better take a look, but

as he turned in his chair there were three more reports, followed
at once by the tinkling sound of empty cartridge-cases falling on

the bare linoleum, and he was then sure that what he had heard
were shots.

He ran across the room to the connecting door, but

just as he got there, it swung shut.

Leaving it closed, he went

out into the corridor and down to the open door to the President’s
office.

Straight ahead of him was a window, and against the light

stood a heavy-set man, side-to, bis features blurred by the light

which shone through his thin hair and flashed on his glasses.
He held a small break-open revolver, which he was reloading from

a handful of cartridges.

He had apparently kicked the connecting

door shut, as he was standing within foot-reach of it, and within
a few feet of the body of the President, which bad fallen forward

to the right of his chair, at the corner of his desk, and was just
coming to a stop on the floor.

Now at this point the writer might have made like a hero with
a flying tackle or something, but the stranger was a lot bigger than
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he was; he had just shot one man; he had a gun at least partly

loaded, which could be ready for action in an instant; and there
were a lot of people, including half a dozen women, in the office.

He figured that if he started anything, somebody else was almost
sure to get hurt; that the way to deal with a gun was with another
gun; that there was a traffic officer on the street right at the

corner of the building; that if he did not raise any alarm the
chances were that the man would get by the people in the office

before they had time to do anything foolish; would have to go
down to the street lobby, the only way out; and that if he could

get to this officer quickly they might catch him there.

He

started back toward the outside office, fast, but not running.

All

this in a matter of seconds, while everyone else was wondering what

had happened.

The writer had moved first because he knew there

had been shooting when brass bit the floor.

The others had only

heard the sounds.

In the outside office he met Frank Keenan coming; and said

to him in a low voice: ’’Call the police.

Mr. Whitcomb’s been hurt”.

Probably the understatement of the year; not ’’shot”, but ’’hurt”.

The iron discipline of the Boston office did not allow of loose
remarks based on assumptions, no matter how valid.

Frank Keenan

stepped into Creighton Stanwood's office, dialed the police emer-

gency number, and putting what the writer had told him and the
noise he had beard back to back said:

’’There's been a shooting

at 201 Devonshire Street”; gave the room number, and started back

toward the President’s office.
The writer, once outside the door, ran to the elevators,

catching a car which happened to be on the way up and which
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arrived at the top floor almost immediately.

He said nothing

to the operator about what had happened, feeling that explana
tions would only cause delay, and the car stopped once on the
way down.

From the lobby, be ran out the Devonshire Street en

trance, less than a hundred feet from where he expected to find

the officer, who was not there, nor, when he got to the corner

of the building, could he see one at the intersection of Federal
Street, a block down.

It was about 10:35.

at 10:30, as he found out later.

They had gone off duty

He then went up the Franklin

Street side of the building and turned into Arch, where the police

often chalked the tires on cars parked in the morning, but there

was no officer in sight, and as he came back into the building
through the Arch Street door, the men from a prowl car, which the
police radio had caught in Haymarket Square, a few blocks away,

came in the Devonshire Street entrance.

All this did not take

more than perhaps five or six minutes.

In the meantime, ”Mr. Homans” had picked up his briefcase,

put on his bat, stuck his hand, holding the gun, into his coat
pocket, gangster-fashion, and simply walked straight out.

fully, nobody tried to stop him.

Thank

As Frank Keenan wrote us in 1971:

”I was only 3 to 5 strides from W.A.’s door when he came out and I
backed all the way down to Stan’s door with the above picture fac

ing me every step of the way -- and he didn’t gain a darn inch on

me!”

He was probably out of the office before anyone else dis

covered what had happened.

Lester Smith ran to the door and shouted

after him, bringing at least one witness, who later assisted in

identification, out of a neighboring office.

However, the man

reached the end of the corridor unmolested, went down the stairway,

and probably came out of the building as the writer was going around
it.
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A doctor located close by was called, arriving, as we

remember, almost at the same time as the police.

He found the

President dead, it being his opinion that he had been killed

The stranger had emptied his .32 caliber five-shot

instantly.
revolver.

One cartridge had misfired, accounting for the slight

pause between the first shot and the last three.

the floor with the ejected shells.

It was found on

There were three wounds on

the President’s body, and in the judgment of the Medical Examiner,
the first had been fatal and death instantaneous.

The fourth

bullet bad gone into a wall.

Word spread rapidly, and there was pandemonium in the office
after the writer got back.

People from other offices on the floor

bad come in, more uniformed officers and plain-clothes detectives

arrived.

Reporters were not far behind, but were not allowed in.

Vowing not to leave without a story, which they got, but not until

very late in the afternoon, two of them sat on the floor outside
the door all day.

cleared out.

However, everyone but the staff was shortly

The police photographers, fingerprint men and what

not did whatever it is they do; the President’s body was removed,

and the inquiry began in the midst of the confusion of telephoning

the family, the mills, other Company offices and some of the Directors.
Formal statements were not taken until later in the day, but
a lot of questions began to be asked immediately in an attempt to

establish identity and motive.

Although the President’s office

had already been gone over, it was Frank Keenan, in there some
time during the late morning to supply some information, who pointed

out the evidence that identified ”Mr. Homans”.
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tidied up bis desk before receiving visitors, and it was nearly
bare, but on it, all by itself, was a blue-paper backed, legallooking document, which he knew was nothing of the Company’s.

On it lay a fountain pen which was not William A. Whitcomb’s.
What purports to be a facsimile appears in the November issue,

year unknown, of a magazine called ’’Vital Detective Cases”, and
we quote this in full, for its interest.

The writer is reasonably

sure of its authenticity, although much of the theatrical story

with which it appears is entirely inaccurate.

However, he saw

and read the original, and this pseudo-legal language and content
are as he remembers them, mis-spelling and all.

"ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT made the

day of June One

Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Six.
Between WILLIAM A. WHITCOMB, His Heirs, Suc
cessors, Executors, Administrators and Assigns, who is
PRESIDENT of and acting for THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, THE

OFFICERS, THE STOCK HOLDERS, Their Heirs, Successors, Execu
tors, Administrators and Assigns, of THE GREAT NORTHERN PAPER

CO, Its SUBSIDIARIES, and all other Holdings.

NOW AND HERE

WITH shall be known as THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, and
GFORGE E. HARDY bis Heirs, Executors, Adminis
trators and Assigns, NOW AND HERE WITH shall be known as THE
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART.

THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART AGREES, to Employ
THE PARTY OF THE SECOND PART as EXECUTIVE GENERAL MANAGER.
IN COMPLETE CHARGE of all Operations, Activities and Holdings,

of THE. GREAT NORTHERN PAPER CO. its SUBSIDIARIES and all other

HOLDINGS.
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AND IT FUTHER AGREES THAT the Party of the

First Part will in no way Interfere, Dictate, Censor, or be

in Discord with any or all decisions made by THE PARTY OF
THE SECOND PART in carrying out his Activities.

AND IT IS FUTHER

AGREED

THAT The Party of

the Second Part shall receive a salary of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000.00 ) Annually, Plus Income Taxes,

and Expenses.
THE PARTY OF THE SECOND PART AGREES to take
complete charge as EXECUTIVE GENERAL MANAGER of any and all

Operations, Activities and Holdings, of the Party of the
First Part.
BE REMEMBERED THAT this agreement shall be in
force as of November First, One Thousand Nine Hundred Forty

Five, and held in force for the Natural Life of THE PARTY
OF THE SECOND PART.
_______ PRESIDENT______________
FOR
THE GREAT NORTHERN PAPER CO.
THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART

THE PARTY OF THE SECOND PART

The police now had a name which appeared to be genuine, and
a probable reason for the shooting — the President’s wrath at

or ridicule of an attempt by someone with a disturbed mind to try

to force him to sign this ridiculous agreement.

A reasonable

theory was that the man was a disgruntled employee, past or present,
or someone who had had dealings with Great Northern.

There was no

one by that name currently on the payroll, and the mills and other

offices were set to work at once to comb the history records for a
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past employee.

As to people of that name outside the Company

who might have had dealings with it, two immediately came to mind;
George F. Hardy, the paper mill engineer, who was in his 80’s at
that time, lived in the middle west and was not considered a sus
pect; and a George Hardy, connected with the family operating the
Hardy Screen Plate Company of Fitchburg, Mass., a former supplier

with which the Company had discontinued doing business some time
before.

The impression was that this man, or someone in the family,

had a history of mental illness, and the police turned their atten
tion to him.

The end of the case came as strangely and as violently as its
beginning.

About 1:00 P.M. the writer answered a call from Bob

Hume at Millinocket, who reported that a foreman at Fast Millinocket,

had remembered that at one time bis wife’s sister had been married

to and had long been divorced from a George F. Hardy, who had
been in Millinocket a few times, giving a description which in

general tallied with that of the man who had been in the office,
and his last known place of residence, New Brunswick, N.J.

This

was a long shot, but the writer telephoned this information to Lt.
Fallon of the Boston police, in charge of the investigation, at
about 1:30.

It is his recollection that the police, feeling that

they had a good lead in Fitchburg, were concentrating on that, and

were not able to trace the new suspect to an address in Westfield,

N.J. until the next day, Tuesday, June llth., when a call to the
police chief there disclosed that he was investigating the suicide

of a man by that name, which had occurred the evening before, with

a strange twist.

The man had left home on Sunday, ostensibly to

apply for a job in Athol, Mass; had returned home early Monday
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evening, shut himself in his second-floor apartment, and turned
on the gas stove.

Later in the evening, his wife, who was at

work, notified that there was an odor of gas around her apart
ment, had gone home to investigate, opened the door, flipped the

light switch, and the arc set off an explosion that wrecked the

apartment, injuring her and a friend who had accompanied her.

There was no fire.

George Hardy had not been killed in the ex

plosion; he died within the hour of gas poisoning.

Boston police,

sent to Westfield, found in the apartment paper like that used in
the ’’Agreement”; a mechanical pencil matching the pen left in the

Boston office, fingerprints matching prints on the President’s

desk or on the ’’Agreement”, and other evidence connecting him
with the crime, including photographs from which identification

was made by some of those who bad seen him.

never found.

The revolver was

After a court hearing a short time later, at which

members of the Boston office staff testified, a judge made the

determination that this man was without doubt the assailant, and

the case was closed.
This is what happened.

Why it happened is still a mystery.

Under the circumstances, there was no in-depth investigation of

the life of George E. Hardy, and had there been, it is very doubt
ful that it would have produced any explanation other than that re

peated failure had made him irrational.
George Hardy, about 49 years old, was a loser.

He was a

machinist by trade, a model-railroad buff, an unsuccessful inventor,
reportedly ’’full of big ideas”, always planning some get-rich-quick
scheme that did not work, one of which got him a short prison term

in 1940 for fraud -- although the writer’s information is that he

got into this trouble more by taking chances than by criminal intent
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be bad moved around from one job to another, working as a tool
inspector during the war.

Subject to periods of depression and

probably paranoid, he was unemployed at the time of which we
write. Contrary to rumor, be had never been at any time an em
ployee of the Great Northern Paper Company.

Somewhere along the line be had conceived the idea that he
could force an official of some company, at gunpoint, to sign the

absurd contract that would make him a success.
thing had gone wrong in his mind.

Clearly, some

Any man in his senses would

have been aware that an agreement obtained by threat would have
been worthless, and that actually shooting anyone would defeat

his purpose, apart from any other consequences.
Although it was never made public, there was found in bis

apartment a list of five or six corporations, including Great
Northern, which as we recall was not at the top.

It was conjec

tured that these were prospects for his scheme, from which he bad

selected the Company because he had a little familiarity with it.
To the best of the writer’s knowledge, there is nothing whatever

to indicate that he knew William A. Whitcomb personally, or that
there had ever been any previous communication between them.

A crank

letter had been received a short time before, but these were not

uncommon, and nothing was found to connect this one with George
Hardy.

He would however have known the President’s name, and this

may have been a factor in bis action, if the situation was as post

ulated .
Whatever William A. Whitcomb may have said or done in that

room on that day will never be known, but it was something that
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turned off this man’s unstable mind and caused him to pull the
trigger not once, but five times, in what would seem like an

uncontrollable reaction, hard to reconcile with his cool and

deliberate behavior immediately thereafter.

He was not so calm,

however, as to remember to pick up the contract from the desk,

and it was the theory that he did away with himself because he
discovered that he had left it behind and knew that it would in
evitably lead to him.
This account is already too long.

We have omitted some

details which we do not consider to be of importance and we have

deliberately left out all the nonsense that was printed.

William

0. McKay gave orders that no newspaper or magazine accounts were

to be kept in the Company’s files, but some people disobeyed, and

we have found, in one place or another, much of what was published
without going to the source.

The writer himself believes that the

background to this tragedy was essentially as he had outlined it

above.

His statement that it remains a mystery is made only be

cause the evidence is circumstantial.

William 0. McKay, who had acting powers, presided at the

meeting of the Board held on June 26th, formally reporting the
death of the President.

The Directors’ memorial to William A.

Whitcomb is quoted in full:
"RESOLVED: that we, the members of the Board of Directors of the
Great Northern Paper Company, profoundly sensible of our loss in

the sudden death on June 10, 1946 of Mr. William Arthur Whitcomb,

hereby desire to have inscribed upon our records this tribute of
our appreciation and respect for his character, his industry and

his unfailing loyalty to his friends and associates within the
Company.
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Mr. Whitcomb came to the Company in 1910 as General Manager,

and was elected a Director in January, 1911.

He was elected Vice-

President in 1912, and succeeded Mr. Garret Schenck, founder of
the Company, as President in 1928.

By education and experience

he was at all times in close touch with the technical aspects of

manufacturing, and contributed several important inventions to the

art of pulp and paper making.
He was respected as a leader by his associates and employees

of the Company.

He was a firm believer in Union labor, and during

his administration labor relations at all plants were harmonious.

In his death, the Great Northern Paper Company has lost an
able and impartial chief executive, the newsprint industry has lost
an outstanding figure and bis fellow-workers have lost a true and

valued friend.”
It was at this time that John P. Burke, President of the Inter

national Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers,

wrote the open letter to the Boston Globe and other newspapers,
a small part of which we have quoted previously.

In this he said:

"It did not take a National Labor Relations Act to win
union recognition and the right to bargain collectively for
the workmen in the Great Northern Paper Company’s mills.

Mr. Whitcomb unhesitatingly granted all those rights to the
workers in the mills of the Great Northern Paper Company 35
years ago.

Time and time again I heard Mr. Whitcomb say that to

run a business successfully the rights of the workers, the

customers and the stockholders all bad to be taken into
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consideration.

Mr. Whitcomb believed the workmen should be

paid just as good wages as the company could pay and keep in

a sound financial condition, that the customers of the company
should be furnished paper at a reasonable price, and that

the stockholders were entitled to a moderate return on their
investments.

If a man with an anti-labor bias had headed the Great
Northern Paper Company, how different might the story be of

labor relations in the mills of this company and in the mills

of many other companies.
William A. Whitcomb was a man of integrity who believed

in the integrity of other men.

His influence and his deeds,

though never publicized, eased life’s burden for thousands
of his fellow-men.”

William A. Whitcomb, like Garret Schenck, was quite a man.
There was a meeting of the Board in July, at which little

business was transacted, and the Company had no President between

June 10th and August 14th, when William 0. McKay was elected to the
office.

On August 9th, Sheldon Wardwell had written to Williamson

Pell a letter which we quote as typical of Sheldon Wardwell the man:
’’Dear Mr. Pell:

You will be glad to know that McKay is feeling much
better.

The other executives are not only cooperative,

as you would expect, but enthusiastic.

better.
vacation.

Teamwork never

He is insisting that all his associates take a
While agreeing that he cannot take one at the

moment, he should be persuaded to have one in the not too

distant future.
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McKay would give me a swift kick if he knew I bad

written this but I hope you do not think me too aggressive.
Sincerely yours”
William 0. McKay had been in a state of shock following the

death of William A. Whitcomb, and did not feel well for quite a

while, although he carried on the duties required of him as acting
President, and because of this and other factors which will become

evident, it is understandable that the Board would take a little

time to make its decision.

Dick Caspar was designated in August

to serve in the case of incapacity of the President, and his salary

was raised to $20,000.
There bad been a revision of the By-Laws, which we have not
mentioned, in January, 1942.

This consisted only of the addition

of a section providing for the reimbursement by the Company of

any officer or director for expenses which might be incurred by
him as the result of any suit brought against him by reason of
bis bolding such office, unless he were found in such action to
be liable for negligence or misconduct.

While the writer

has

found no official information, he is quite sure that this change
was instigated by William A. Whitcomb as the result of the im

position of war-time controls which of necessity involved some
form of concerted action with other members of the industry,
which be feared, not only because of the Company’s long-time

policy, but because one hand of the Government did not seem to know

what the other hand was doing, and any such action might bring on
anti-trust charges.

His outburst at the first Newsprint Advisory

Committee meeting with the O.P.A. in March of that year will be
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remembered.

We mention this here only because at the same time

as William 0. McKay was elected President, Sheldon Wardwell was

appointed Chairman of the Executive Committee, under a section of

the By-Laws which provided that other "officers, agents or servants”
than those specifically provided for could be appointed.

This had

been there for 25 years, perhaps longer, but up to this time the

Executive Committee had had no official Chairmen.

This move,

initiated by William 0. McKay, was to become important to him

later, although he could not have foreseen it at that time.
At this same time, further changes in the way things were
going to be done were forecast by the creation from among the

Directors of two permanent committees; a Salary and Pension Com
mittee, this first one consisting of Sheldon Wardwell, Eustis
Paine and Richard Croft; and a Survey Committee ”to make a survey

of the possibilities of the Company and report from time to time”.

The original members were William 0. McKay, Benjamin Strong and
Samuel C. Park.

This committee really did not function in the

manner which the writer feels was probably intended, but we will

speak of this later.
The vacancies in the Board and the Executive Committee were
not filled at this time, but in November, 1946, Creighton Stanwood
was elected Vice-President and Manager of Manufacture, his salary
being set at $18,000.

Creighton B.

(Stan) Stanwood (1898 - 1973)

was born in Denver, Colorado, but bad come East at an early age;
was educated as a Chemical Engineer, at the Massachusetts Institute

of Technology, and had been employed in Norwich, Connecticut before
coming to the Company in this capacity in 1921.
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Engineer, attached to the Bureau of Economy, in 1926; succeeded

Charles Carrier as Superintendent of the Bureau in 1929, after

a year in Acting capacity, and had come to Boston as Assistant

Manager of Manufacture in 1936.

He was a man of aesthetic tastes

and a rather striking appearance, with heavy features, stiff, iron-

gray hair which he always parted in the middle, 1920’s style,

and thick glasses to correct for congenital strabismus.

He was

a competent administrator, an able and fair-minded negotiator,
and although not a particularly inspiring leader, was respected

by the management people and the rank-and-file alike.

As we

have noted, he had been particularly effective during the period
of war-time controls just past.
We must here go back in time to note that in 1936, when

Creighton Stanwood had been transferred to Boston, he had been
succeeded as Superintendent of the Bureau by Charles A. Turner,

a young man who had joined the Company in 1929 as an Apprentice,

and had become Assistant Superintendent.

He was not a particularly

good administrator, and Bureau services deteriorated.

In 1940

he was set back to the position of Mechanical Engineer in the
Bureau organization, and the direction of its affairs was taken

over by Roy Weldon, who was given the title Superintendent, Bureau

of Tests — the name had been changed by that time -- along with

his other title of Construction Engineer.

Charles Turner joined

the Navy in 1942, and did not return to the Company.

By that

time the Bureau had been decimated by the draft and enlistment,
the apprentice program was at a standstill, and not much was being

done but routine work.

However, in 1945 things began to pick up,

and in August, Warren F. Daniell, Foreman of the Millinocket ground
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wood mill, was transferred to the Bureau as Assistant Super
intendent; was made Superintendent in September of the same
year, and began to put the organization back on its feet.

There

will be more about him later.

In miscellaneous developments of this year 1946 reported to
the Directors, the wharf at Norcross, with land for oil tanks
and a right-of-way for a spur track, together with the right to

use the existing road to the wharf, was purchased from Albert

Fowler.

The Company had been using this wharf for its boats for

a very long time -- perhaps had always used it -- under what terms

is not known.

Jack Marshall died in June, after his long illness.

About 4-1/2 acres of land was donated to the Town of Medway for a

playground for the High School.

The suggestion was made that a

pontoon-equipped or amphibian airplane be bought for the use of
the Spruce Wood Department, and Jock Whitney agreed to help in

selecting the proper type, but William Hilton did not feel that
the expense was warranted, and although purchase was approved, he

did not go ahead with it.

Incidentally, his salary was raised to

$20,000 at the same time as Creighton Stanwood was elected Vice-

President .
It will be recalled that we have mentioned the interest of

the Company in holding grounds on the St. John River, and the fact
that in 1930 a twenty-year option had been obtained from Edouard

Lacroix and his Madawaska Company on a holding ground near Van
Buren, actually at Keegan.

It would seem that this had been given

up before this time, when the matter came up in different shape.
Edouard Lacroix owned the Madawaska Company, which had timberlands
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in northern Aroostook, driving and bolding ground rights on the
St. John River, and a sawmill at Keegan.

Starting in the middle

1920’s, the Company had bought chips from slabs made at this mill,

discontinuing these purchases some time in the early 1930’s.

We

believe that the mill was shut down off and on, but during the

early part of the war, it was operated by the Madawaska Company
on Government orders.

In January, 1943, the mill was sold to a

Portland-based company, the Van Buren-Madawaska Corporation, with
which Edouard Lacroix had no connection.

However, the holding

ground with its piers and booms, shore rights and a right-of-way

to the river were retained by the Madawaska Company, which gave
the Van Buren-Madawaska Corporation an easement providing that the
latter would keep the facilities in shape, and that the former could

continue to use them.

Some time in the 1930’s, Edouard Lacroix

had bought the old Nashwaak sulphite mill in St. John, which we

have mentioned previously in connection with Hardy Ferguson.

In 1945, being in poor health, he had sold this mill, which be had

operated under the name Port Royal, to the K.C. Irving interests,
and in 1946 be had made a deal with these same interests for the
sale of the other properties of the Madawaska Company, which is

how they came to own stock in the Heron Lake Dam Company with
Great Northern.

This purchase included the rights which the Mada

waska Company bad reserved in its deed to the Van Buren - Madawaska

Corporation.

As far as this Keegan operation was concerned, K.C.

Irving’s interest was in the holding ground, it being bis intention
at that time to build a new pulp and paper mill on the St. John

River somewhere between Van Buren and Grand Falls, N.B.

However,

there was some legal question as to whether these rights were ex
clusive, and when the mill came on the market in 1946, at the end
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of the war, there were four possible buyers; K.C. Irving, who

wanted the property to clear up this point, Great Northern, which
wanted the holding ground, and two other parties who wanted the

mill.

The price was between $150,000 and $200,000.

We have given

this background, as nearly as we can figure it out, to explain a

letter from Sheldon Wardwell to William Hilton, dated September
17, 1946, reading in part:
"Re:

Van Buren-Madawaska Corp.

Mr. Allen advises that, as Irving has bought the

Lacroix interests up river, you have decided not to
negotiate for the Van Buren properties..."

Several weeks of study bad determined that the title to the

holding ground was probably now Irving's, exclusive or not, and
that if the Company bought the Van Buren-Madawaska Corporation,

it would at best have a sawmill that it did not want, and a hold

ing ground which it would have to maintain and share with Irving
and possibly others, under the terms of the sale by the Madawaska
Company.

This of course was unacceptable, and decided the matter

as far as the Company was concerned.

The proposed pulp and paper

mill, incidentally, was never built.
On September 23d, Sheldon Wardwell wrote the writer the

following letter:

’’Dear John:
I am wondering if it would not be good policy

to erect a pulp mill at Allagash Falls.
Very truly yours"
We have to admit that we cannot put this letter in any context.

The Company owned the power rights, which had been bought from the
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Maine Central Railroad in 1943, but we have no recollection of
any discussion leading to the writing of this letter. It may
have tied in with the foregoing in some way, or it may have

been connected with the situation about which we will write in
the next chapter of our story.

We just do not know.

We do re

call, however, making a study and reporting the conclusion that

there was not a sufficient amount of reliable power at that loca
tion to support a mill of any size.

Of the small amount of business transacted at the July meeting
of the Board of Directors, there was one item which should be
noted.

This was the announcement by William 0. McKay that the

clerical employees in the offices and store-rooms at the Penob

scot mills and in what was still called the Auditing Department

had decided to organize.

We are not sure whether official notifi

cation of this was received at that time, or whether this announce
ment was the result of a tip-off or a confirmed rumor.

In any

event, it was for real, and kind of shook William 0. McKay up,
not because he had anything against a union, but because it

should be felt that there was any need for one.
This development does not necessarily contradict our previous
comments about the loyalty and dedication of the "backbone" group

of which these people were a part; the state of labor relations in
the latter days of the old Company and the concern of the manage
ment with the welfare of the employees.

At any point in time there

can be dissatisfaction one place or another, under the best condi

tions, and while we do not pretend to know the whole background,

there were reasons for unhappiness in this area which had never got
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up to the head office.

These employees were low on the totem

pole; opportunities for advancement were limited; there were

undoubtedly what were considered to be unfairnesses in promo
tion, and the Auditing Department had its own problem in that

Bryan Seelye, a tireless worker himself, believed that people
were created to work, and was a hard taskmaster.

He was not out

to win any popularity contests, and paid scant attention to the
little things that make a happy ship.

Things were kept smoothed

down somewhat by Les Kewer, who was well liked, but with atti
tudes changing, the little injustices rankled.

What triggered

the move, which started in the Millinocket store-room and spread,
was that when the work force began to be built up after the war,
because paper work had grown by leaps and bounds, and this was

one place where a much larger organization was needed, new people

were hired at rates as high as or higher than those paid to em
ployees who bad been there for a long time.

The writer has asked why they did not get these things out
into the open, instead of jumping into a union without warning,

and has been told that they were afraid of William A. Whitcomb;

felt that the Boston office was unapproachable; and that the only
way they could get anywhere was to back each other up the way the
men in the mills did, which meant a union to speak for them.

This was probably true, given the people involved, William A.
Whitcomb’s forbidding front and the fact that he did not have
much contact with this group, but the writer does not accept this

as the whole reason.

Anyway, they had called in an organizer and

got a majority of the people signed up, without making any visible
effort to correct the situation in any other manner.
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The Company made some motions at discouraging the move,

but not very actively, William 0. McKay saying that the office
employees had as much right to join a union as anyone, and that

in view of the Company’s long history of recognizing union repres

entation it could not in honesty oppose it.

Delegates were sent

to Boston -- one of them has said that they were "scared to death",
but came away almost overcome by the courtesy with which they were
received.

The Company asked for a consent NLRB election, because

there were a number of employees, mostly in the Auditing Depart
ment, who were violently opposed to organization, and in October,
1946, Local 192 of what was then the Office Workers’ Internationa1

Union was chartered, and proceeded to negotiate an

agreement.

William 0. McKay, not wanting any labor trouble at the very out
set of his administration, was quite generous, and the local got

what was really a pretty juicy contract.

Even after this, there

were some hold-outs who bitterly objected to taking out member
ship, and the new union, feeling its oats at this point, was un
willing to work out any arrangement that would exclude them, al
though it did agree not to take in confidential secretaries and the

like.

These objectors were gradually talked into joining, albeit

reluctantly, by Les Kewer, and after the usual period of education

on both sides things settled down, and there were no great diffi
culties except for the special problems inherent in the diverse

make-up of the membership and the nature of their duties.

There

will be a little more later, probably redundant, on this develop

ment .

At the end of the year 1946, the mills were running full;
timberland holdings had grown to 1,928,000 acres; the Company had
$8,000,000 in the bank and no debt; and we have come to the start of

a new ball game.

Of More Things - 179

